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Encouraging entrepreneurship and trade by permitting free access to limited liability is a 
cornerstone emblem of UK enterprise policy. However, it comes at a price. The abuse of limited 
liability by dishonest, unscrupulous, incompetent, negligent, and occasionally deranged 
directors, who drive a company into insolvency –  and the potential that it has to wreak financial 
havoc upon unsuspecting creditors –  is all too well known. Yet, the state’s response to this 
abuse is not to limit access to limited liability. Instead, it has been, over a number of years, to 
create a wide-ranging regulatory regime in an effort to crack down on directorial misconduct. 
The mechanisms employed by the state for this purpose can crudely be split into two camps: 
‘private’ and ‘public’ enforcement mechanisms. Those in the former category are powers of an 
insolvency officeholder under the Insolvency Act 1986, and have the primary effect of 
compensating creditors for misconduct that they have suffered at the hands of delinquent 
directors. This thesis turns its focus on wrongful and fraudulent trading. Public enforcement in 
this context means directors’ disqualification, pursuant to the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986. 
The need for regulation, whether public and private, is shown to arise as a result of moral 
hazards created by this laissez-faire approach to accessing limited liability. The regulatory 
regime and limited liability are therefore inextricably linked. With that in mind, the thesis 
explores how effective these mechanisms are in preventing abuse. Effectiveness here is 
determined with reference to the original rationale and underpinning objectives of each 
respective mechanism. The thesis will however not confine itself to a doctrinal analysis of the 
mechanisms in pursuit of that aim. It will go further and introduce substantial empirical data, 
so as to understand their operation ‘on the ground’ insofar as is possible. It will be shown that 
each mechanism suffers its own significant difficulties which are inhibitive of their overall 
effectiveness. Ultimately the author will express the view that none of the mechanisms 
discussed appear to be working as intended. The thesis examines the recent reforms to this area 
following the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, but asserts that in reality 
they are likely to be of minimal significance. 
The final part of the thesis criticises the approach of the state in adopting an ex post facto system 
of regulation in the first place. It argues it to be misguided and inevitably resigned to at least 
partial failure because it does not deal with the underlying problem. The thesis therefore comes 
full circle in its conclusions by proposing for consideration a new, ex ante, alternative that deals 
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1.1 The limited liability company has been deified by some commentators as a 
‘miracle’1 and ‘one of the most ingenious concepts ever devised’.2 Yet, at the other end 
of the spectrum of opinion, it has been described as a creation akin to Frankenstein’s 
monster,3 or the product of ‘one of Alice’s more extreme adventures on her sojourn in 
Wonderland’.4 There is little doubt, however, that in modern enterprise culture the 
limited company is of crucial importance in facilitating and encouraging 
entrepreneurship.5 The idea that even a ‘one-man’ concern is able to incorporate at 
minimal cost, and with few requirements,6 is seen as pivotal.7 Moreover, it is the 
enterprise policy of the UK that business failure is to be expected and entrepreneurs 
should not be condemned, or face stigmatisation, for this fact alone. Instead, a culture 
of business rescue and recovery continues to be exalted.8 It has always been the case, 
                                                 
1 Colin Meyer, Firm Commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 21. 
2 ibid. 
3 Maurice Wormser, Frankenstein, Incorporated (McGraw-Hill Book Company 1931) 85. 
4 ibid 93. 
5 For the financial year 2016-17 there were 605,951 private companies incorporated in England and 
Wales (and 408,563 dissolutions). See Companies House, ‘Companies Register Activity in the 
United Kingdom 2016-2017’ (2017) <http://bit.ly/2vbSQg2> accessed 1 August 2017, Table A2. 
6 See ch 6. 
7 DTI, Modernising Company Law (White Paper, Cm 5553, 2002). In particular note Part II, ‘The 
Right Approach to Small Companies’. 
8 See generally Gerard McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law – an Anglo-American Perspective 
(Edward Elgar 2008), ch 2. 
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however, that with the economic advantages that limited liability brings, both to the 
entrepreneur and to wider society, there are commensurate disadvantages that arise as 
a result of the way in which it can be abused. This is because limited liability permits, 
in effect, the risk of trading to be passed on to creditors of the company.9 It therefore 
brings about an opportunity for unscrupulous individuals to exploit the corporate 
structure by running up large debts that are unable (if they were ever intended) to be 
paid, at ‘limited’ risk to their personal assets. This opportunity can prove to be a 
temptation too great for the fraudster to resist. Similarly, even for the delinquent or the 
sheer incompetent entrepreneur, it is a structure easily capable of negligent or ignorant 
abuse. And, as history has shown, those who control companies in such a manner can 
often escape liability, by hiding behind the corporate veil, simply to repeat the process 
ad infinitum.10 During periods of boom, directors will therefore carry on the business to 
derive potentially unlimited profits for shareholders. However, when in more choppy 
waters, by the time any of this misconduct or impropriety is discovered it is often too 
late: the company is already well into the ‘twilight zone’11 or insolvent, and unsecured 
creditors will invariably see little, if any, return. 
1.2 Yet, successive governments have been especially wary of inhibiting access to 
limited liability in any shape or form, largely because of the strongly held perception 
that it stimulates economic growth and encourages entrepreneurship.12 In more recent 
                                                 
9 This concept will be dealt with in more depth below: 1.6. 
10 A process known in the insolvency community as ‘phoenixism’: David Milman, Governance of 
Distressed Firms (Edward Elgar 2013) 58-59. 
11 This term is widely utilised in the insolvency literature to refer to companies that are insolvent, or 
of doubtful solvency, even though they are not in a formal insolvency regime. See generally Milman, 
(ibid) ch 3. 
12 See for instance Aubrey L Diamond, ‘Corporate Personality and Limited Liability’ in Tony 




times, however, in part due to moral outrage, the abuse of limited liability has been 
subject to increased scrutiny. The state has began to engage in an exercise of weighing 
the benefits of wealth creation against the cost of failed enterprise. Thus, a regulatory 
regime, aimed at ‘cracking down’13 on delinquent managers, was born to ensure that the 
market, and the public at large, are protected from those who choose to abuse the 
privilege of limited liability. Doing so –  and doing so successfully – is seen as a key 
measure of public trust and confidence in the insolvency regime.14 Directors have 
executive authority over, and responsibility for, the day-to-day activities of a 
corporation. It is therefore unsurprising that they are a prime target for regulation aimed 
at tackling improper conduct. What results is a somewhat fragile balance that has to be 
retained between the state wishing to encourage trade and enterprise on the one hand, 
but on the other ensuring that legal regulatory mechanisms are satisfactory so as to 
prevent the abuse of limited liability. This is to protect stakeholders, including creditors, 
and ultimately to ensure public confidence is maintained in the corporate form.15  
1.3 The state’s answer to preserving this balance exists in a series of ex post facto 
regulatory mechanisms. For convenience, these may be roughly divided into two 
streams of enforcement: ‘private’ and ‘public’. The operation of private mechanisms 
                                                 
13 The terminology used by Sir Vince Cable during his time as Business Secretary. There has indeed 
been a great deal of political rhetoric on the issue over the years. See for example Rowena Mason, 
‘Vince Cable to bring in tougher penalties for dodgy directors’ The Guardian (19 April 2014) 
<http://bit.ly/2q6crfL> accessed 17 May 2016; BBC News, ‘Vince Cable proposes tougher rules for 
directors’ BBC Online (15 July 2013) <http://bbc.in/2rGgX51> accessed 17 May 2016; David 
Oakley and Helen Warrell, ‘UK to crack down on negligent directors’ Financial Times (14 July 
2013) <http://on.ft.com/2vtPmGY> accessed 17 May 2016. 
14 DBIS, ‘Transparency and Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and 
Increasing Trust in UK Business – Discussion Paper’ (July 2013) <http://bit.ly/1F8U9Ks> accessed 
18 October 2015, Executive Summary (T&T Discussion Paper). 
15 See, for example, NAO, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: Insolvency Service 
Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification – A Follow Up Report (HC 1998-1999, 424) 
Executive Summary (NAO Follow-Up Report). 
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generally takes the form of rendering the delinquent manager (or other person as the 
case may be) personally liable for the debts of the company so caused by her 
misconduct. They are proceedings invariably commenced by a liquidator or 
administrator of the insolvent company, utilised as a means of swelling the pool of 
assets available for creditors.16 The private mechanisms discussed in this thesis are 
wrongful trading and fraudulent trading (collectively ‘improper trading’), pursuant to 
sections 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) respectively. The essence 
of public regulation in this sphere, however, is ‘disqualifying’ the person in question 
from being involved in the management of companies, for a fixed period of time, 
pursuant to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (‘CDDA 1986’).17 Public 
enforcement proceedings are of course taken by the state itself, either by pursuing a 
court order, or seeking an undertaking from the individual that she will not act in a 
proscribed manner for the period of disqualification. As will be demonstrated 
throughout the course of this thesis, all of these mechanisms have seen significant, 
recent, reform as a result of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
(‘SBEEA 2015’). 
QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
1.4 With the scene set, the focus will turn to the purpose of this thesis. In essence, 
it sets out to explore the following research questions: 
(a) with a special focus on improper trading and disqualification in English law, 
how effective is the current civil regulatory regime in dealing with rogue directors 
of insolvent companies? 
                                                 
16 See chs 4-5. 




(b) in so far as is possible to determine, what impact might the new measures 
introduced by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (‘SBEEA 
2015’) have upon the effectiveness of the mechanisms subject to discussion? 
(c) what further measures might be taken, or reforms implemented, in order to 
improve the effectiveness of individual mechanisms and the regime overall? 
(d) given that the abuse of limited liability creates the need for regulation, what 
measures might be taken, or reforms implemented, to reduce abuse, thereby tackling 
the problem at source and minimising the need for reliance on enforcement 
mechanisms?  
In order to lay the groundwork for doing so, this chapter will now turn to deal with some 
preliminary matters: to explain some core concepts and ideas in more detail; to set out 
the justification for the inquiry to be conducted; and to explore the way in which the 
author will do so, and the methodology adopted. 
Defining and Questioning ‘Effectiveness’ 
1.5 Given the questions just posed, it is of course central to the forthcoming analysis 
that the reader has an appreciation for how ‘effectiveness’ or ‘success’ are to be 
determined in this context. The author has chosen to define effectiveness, as have other 
commentators in this area18 – either explicitly or implicitly – in the following terms. An 
effective mechanism is one which accords, both in theory and in practice, with its 
original mandate and objectives. A mechanism that adheres to its underlying objectives 
is one which, it will be argued, ought to be considered a success. Conversely, where it 
is identified that these aims do not mirror implementation, it will be argued that this is 
evidence of (at least partial) failure or ineffectiveness. Given the statutory footing of the 
enforcement mechanisms discussed, the objectives are those as elicited by Parliament, 
the Government in consultation, or, where relevant, as developed by the courts. More 
                                                 
18 For instance, Andrew Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (ACCA 
Research Report 59, 1998); Richard Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and 
Practice (Jordans Publishing Limited 2011); T&T Discussion Paper (n 14). 
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broadly, and quite separately, it is argued here that any evidence revealing a lack of 
stakeholder trust and confidence – either in the regime generally or in relation to 
individual mechanisms – must also impinge upon success. Thus, even in the 
hypothetical situation where a mechanism is operating entirely in accordance with its 
objectives, should public trust and confidence in it be low, then, put simply, it cannot 
be said to be successful. This approach is taken for two reasons. First, ‘public trust and 
confidence’ is a metric routinely used by the state itself in order to assess effectiveness 
of the enforcement regime. Second, low confidence in a mechanism may arise if it is 
not operating effectively. However, it may also arise where there are wider concerns 
within the enforcement regime itself – beyond the simple objectives themselves –
deserving of examination.  
THE NEED FOR REGULATION 
The Problem Is Limited Liability 
1.6 More ought to be said as to why regulation, whether private or public, is seen as 
necessary or even desirable in the first place. It has already been stated that, at the most 
basic level, its function is to curtail the effects of the abuse of limited liability. This 
warrants further explanation at this juncture. In order to do so, some of the 
fundamentals, both legal and economical, must be set out to properly frame the 
arguments that follow. It is trite that limited liability forgoes shareholders from having 
to imperil their own personal assets, save for the paid-up value of their shares. In other 
words, shareholders can cap their liability to a known and fixed amount in advance, 
unilaterally, as they see fit. Because of this a moral hazard19 problem arises. 
                                                 
19 This is an economics term, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as the ‘lack of incentive to 




Shareholders are incentivised to cause the company to engage in more risky trading 
activities, in the hope of greater returns. The state’s position is that it is the participation 
in this risk that encourages economic growth.20 If the business were to become insolvent, 
and ultimately fail, the shareholder has lost her investment; but no more and no less. It 
therefore follows that, in insolvency, a shareholder who injects more capital suffers 
greater losses. In turn, this ought to reduce any moral hazard, as more is a stake. Yet, in 
relation to private companies, there are no minimum capital requirements under English 
law.21 As such, it will come of little surprise to the reader that the vast majority of 
companies choose to incorporate with a share capital of less than £100; many with a 
single pound. On that basis, a moral hazard will usually arise from the very moment of 
the company’s inception, becoming intensified where the company enters the twilight 
zone or is insolvent. By way of contrast, in a system of unlimited liability moral hazards 
are less pronounced. Entrepreneurs are more likely to be risk averse and prudent in their 
commercial activities as, in the event of failure, their own personal assets are in jeopardy 
and bankruptcy may ultimately follow.22 In either case, however, the risk is not 
eliminated, as Bainbridge and Henderson note.23 The difference is that where an 
entrepreneur is subject to a regime of unlimited liability the loss remains fixed with her, 
save in cases where the parties decide to contract in to limited liability on a per-
transaction basis. She can be pursued by creditors, who may routinely seek recovery 
                                                 
20 Stephen M Bainbridge and Todd Henderson, Limited Liability: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 47. 
21 Banks are a known exception to this general rule. For detail see: Sarah Garvey and others, 
Encyclopedia of Banking Law (LexisNexis UK 1996) div A, ch 5. Public companies of course must 
have a minimum capital of £50,000 by virtue of Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), s 763. 
22 See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, ‘An Economic Analysis of Limited 
Liability in Corporation Law’ (1980) UTLJ 30 117, 127 who, rather interestingly, notes that 
ultimately of course an individual always has de facto personal limited liability in view of the very 
fact that one can declare oneself a bankrupt.  
23 Bainbridge and Henderson (n 20) 47-48. 
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against personal assets. In a system of limited liability, however, risk is shifted on an 
uncompensated basis. In short, the loss falls to the feet of the company’s creditors and, 
unless security has been obtained, there the loss will invariably remain. In the language 
of economics, limited liability therefore creates negative externalities, with the 
incumbent risk of trading (at least in part) being shifted to creditors of the company.24 
However, contrary to what has just been said, Posner has argued that limited liability in 
fact does not cause an uncompensated transfer of risk.25 The substance of that argument 
is as follows. Because limited liability exists as a default rule, all those who transact 
with the company can be presumed to know the inherent risks of doing so. Creditors 
will therefore compensate for that risk of default either by requiring the contracting-out 
of limited liability, or by increasing rates of interest. This forces the risk of default to 
be internalised by shareholders. However, as Prentice argues, this clearly has no 
application to involuntary creditors who, by definition, cannot choose to whom they 
extend credit, nor its precise terms.26 Moreover, Prentice suggests that even voluntary 
creditors may be subject to the uncompensated transfer of risk in insolvency situations, 
as shareholders ‘cease to have any material interest in the assets of the company’,27 
incentivising further risk taking. He puts it in the following way: 
In a situation of insolvency, the shareholders have a perverse incentive to continue the 
company in business since they have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Any 
additional loss will be at the expense of the creditors, and should the company trade 
back into solvency the gains will be appropriated by the shareholders. In other words, 
there is no downside risk but only upside advantage.28 
                                                 
24 ibid 49. 
25 Richard Posner, ‘The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations’ (1967) 43 U Chi L Rev 499. 
26 Dan D Prentice, ‘Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors’ in Ross 
Grantham and Charles Rickett (eds), Corporate Personality in the Twentieth Century (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 104. 





The role of regulation is therefore clear. It seeks to control the most egregious exercises 
of this risk transfer process, which results from dishonest, negligent, incompetent or 
ignorant behaviour. Private regulation aims to give confidence to the market that those 
who behave irresponsibly are not beyond reproach, and can be dealt with accordingly. 
Public regulation goes further, recognising that in some instances the privilege of 
limited liability ought to be withdrawn entirely in order to protect the market, and the 
wider public, on economic grounds. In either case, the response of the state to abuse is 
not to compromise its position that limited liability must be as freely available as 
possible.29 Instead, it simply tightens its regulatory grip. 
Who Should Be Regulated? 
1.7 If this potential for abuse is accepted as the reason for regulation, a separate but 
interrelated question arises as to precisely which actors can be said to be responsible for 
the abuse, and therefore who ought to be regulated. Prentice identifies three 
‘constituencies’ from whom recovery could be sought in most cases: creditors, 
shareholders and directors.30 The discussion in this thesis deals with only one of these; 
namely directors. However, it should be recognised that a number of avoidance 
mechanisms exist that permit an insolvency officeholder to pursue creditors for 
contributions to the insolvent company’s assets in given circumstances.31 On the other 
hand, there is comparably little appetite for the view that shareholders ought be pursued 
                                                 
29 For instance, by imposing minimum share capital rules or other ‘entry requirements’; the merits 
of which are discussed in the penultimate chapter. The state’s position must be that this is preferable 
economically, in spite of the potential for abuse, to the reverse position; i.e. where limited liability 
must be contracted in to on a per transaction basis. Presumably, due to the existence of transaction 
costs. 
30 The phrase used by Prentice (n 26) 99. 
31 For instance, where there have been transactions at an undervalue: Insolvency Act 1986, s 238 
(IA 1986) or preferences: IA 1986, s 239. 
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to contribute any more than the value of their unpaid shareholdings. The simple reason 
for that, following on from the previous discussion, is that to do so would be to subvert 
limited liability. Kempin has argued, more fundamentally, that to impose additional 
liabilities on shareholders would be ‘unfair’32 as it would make: 
…the shareholders liable for what they cannot directly control. The only control 
shareholders can have over the acts of the directors is after the fact – that is, they can 
refuse to re-elect them if they determine that there has been mismanagement…In 
addition, the shareholders are harmed by the mismanagement of the directors and 
officers at least as much as are the creditors. They may even be injured more than the 
creditors are injured, for they do not, almost by definition, receive the return of any of 
their invested capital until the outside creditors have been satisfied.33 
1.8 Why do directors act improperly? The prevailing theory is that in a system of 
corporate governance that splits management and ownership, directors may tend 
towards negligent or self-serving behaviour by virtue of their agency. Jensen and 
Meckling, in their seminal work on the theory of the firm, describe directors and 
shareholders as being in ‘pure agency relationship’34, which they argue can lead to 
agency problems: 
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can 
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent 
and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limited the aberrant activities of the 
agent…In most agency relationships…there will be some divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the 
principal.35  
It is recognised in corporate governance literature that an underlying purpose of the 
corporation, and therefore one of the primary obligations of directors, is to increase 
                                                 
32 Frederick G Kempin, ‘Limited Liability in Historical Perspective’ (1960) 4(1) ABLA Bulletin 32. 
33 ibid. However, clearly, this has little application in the case of the owner-managed firm. 
34 Defined as ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent’: Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 





shareholder value.36 However, being utility maximisers and the managers of other 
peoples’ money,37 directors are incentivised to engage in risky trading behaviours or 
self-dealing for their own benefit. They do so in the knowledge that, should the venture 
fail, there is minimal risk to themselves and to shareholders, due to the principles of 
separate legal personality and limited liability. In an effort to curtail managerial 
‘negligence and profusion’38 directors are subjected to a multitude of statutory duties.39 
At their roots, the mechanisms explored in this thesis (and more broadly) are designed 
to complement those duties, by creating enforcement powers, should a director fail to 
adhere to them. Moreover, it is generally recognised that shareholders will engage in 
the monitoring of directors.40 Whilst this has an intrinsic cost it may benefit the 
shareholder in the longer term by reducing the scope for abuse that may ultimately cause 
insolvency, and a total loss of the investment.41 External monitoring mechanisms, for 
instance statutory auditing, also have a role to play.42 However, the very existence of 
regulation, it is argued, suggests that monitoring is incomplete as a solution. For 
instance, in the case of the owner-managed corporation, it is suggested that the above 
analysis is of limited application. Owner-managers are especially important in the 
context of this thesis as the lion’s share of enforcement action is, in fact, taken against 
                                                 
36 Meyer (n 1) 67. To fail to do so may be a breach of duty to promote the success of the company, 
pursuant to s 172 CA 2006. However, attitudes have shifted towards other pressing concerns such 
as environmental sustainability. See generally, Benjamin J Richardson and Beate Sjåfjell (eds), 
Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities (CUP 2015). 
37 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (MetaLibri Digital 
Edition 2007), 574. 
38 This was considered by Smith, ibid 574, to be almost an inevitability, given that directors are ‘the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own’. 
39 Namely those set out in the CA 2006, ss 171-177. 
40 Jensen and Meckling (n 34) 305. 
41 ibid 308-310. 
42 Pursuant to CA 2006, pt 16. However, CA 2006, s 477 provides that ‘small’ private companies, 
as defined by CA 2006, s 382, are exempted from audit requirements. As such, for the vast majority 
of corporations, this type of statutory monitoring has no application. 
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that demographic.43 For reasons about to be stated, this is entirely unsurprising. In an 
owner-managed company, the directors and shareholders are materially the same 
person(s), and thus the economic (though not the legal) reality is the entrepreneur is 
managing her own money. In line with the words of Jensen and Meckling above,44 
therefore, the owner-manager will take decisions solely to maximise her own utility. 
But, she does so in circumstances where there is a total absence of monitoring. The 
owner-manager is accountable only to herself, and therefore misconduct as against 
creditors or general delinquency in the conduct of her office is likely to go unchecked.  
She therefore faces little scrutiny but, due to the moral hazard created by limited 
liability, is incentivised to carry on trading in a potentially imprudent manner.45 In other 
cases, even where ownership and management are truly separated, monitoring may 
similarly be absent; inadequate; or directors may simply find that they are insufficiently 
incentivised to stay on the straight and narrow. In any of these instances, the original 
problem is returned to. And therein lies the justification for regulation: in the words of 
Mayer ‘neither incentives nor reputations can be relied on to align the interests of 
companies with those of society more generally…[therefore] we turn to third parties, 
namely governments and regulators to do this for us’.46  
Private or Public Regulation?  
1.9 Given this thesis’ compartmentalisation, into ‘private’ and ‘public’, of the 
enforcement mechanisms to be considered, some words ought to be devoted to the 
                                                 
43 3.47 
44 Jensen and Meckling (n 34) 312. 
45 This is a criticism of considerable antiquity. See for instance the work of Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Some 
Reflections on Company Law Reform’ (1944) 7 MLR 54, where he was heavily critical of the 
application of the Salomon principle in relation to so-called ‘one-man’ companies. 




interaction between the two. The very existence of public regulation in UK company 
law is a curiosity. There has been considerable academic discussion as to the merits or 
desirability of having a system public regulation whatsoever.47 It is not the intention of 
the author to delve into such matters in any great detail. The purpose of this thesis is to 
consider whether the private and public enforcement mechanisms, as they stand, are 
effective. It is not, however, to assess the merits of a regulatory system that is private, 
public, or a combination of the two, in the abstract. Keay, however, has noted that in 
recent times the state has charted a course which demands that ‘there should not be too 
much regulation and that corporate governance should be seen generally as self-
regulatory’.48 One of the primary anti-public regulation arguments, he suggests, is that 
as companies are ‘effectively private…the law, the enforcement of it and relevant 
remedies should also be private’.49 Yet, it is submitted, the position must change where 
companies become insolvent. It has long been recognised that there is a public interest 
element to insolvency proceedings. The fact that companies fail is not necessarily a 
public interest matter. However, the reason why they fail certainly is. As Walton notes, 
insolvency litigation is in effect tripartite; it involves the claimant, the defendant, and 
the wider public at large.50 But, enforcement proceedings taken by the state require 
dedicated and specialised officers to carry out investigations and conduct prosecutions.51 
These have a cost to the general taxpayer. Private enforcement is therefore prima facie 
                                                 
47 See generally for example, Andrew Keay, ‘The Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A 
Normative Inquiry’ (2014) 43 CLWR 89; Robert Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ (2004) 
67 MLR 351; Howell Jackson and Mark Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence’ (2009) 93 JFE 207. 
48 Keay (n 47) 94. 
49 Keay (n 47) 93. 
50 See Peter Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (An 
R3 Report, April 2014) <http://bit.ly/2atR1qh> accessed 1 July 2016, 10. 
51  This function is carried out by the Investigations Unit at the IS. 
Director Liability in Insolvent Companies 
 
 14 
desirable over public enforcement from the perspective of the state, as it reduces or 
eliminates this cost to the public at large, thereby ensuring that those who benefit from 
any regulatory action will pay for it.52 It follows, on economic grounds, that if private 
regulation in isolation was effective (or was perceived as being effective) in preventing 
or combating abuse, then there would be no cause for public regulation. A fundamental 
issue with private regulation, however, is that those with locus standi may not be able 
to take action, for a variety of reasons to be explored in due course, or may simply 
choose not to.53 Thus, it can be stated from the outset that private enforcement must be 
seen (by the state at least) as only a partial solution to remedying abuses of limited 
liability. Therein lies the rationale and justification of this thesis in assessing its 
effectiveness. This ‘lacuna’54 in the private enforcement regime, in theory, is filled by 
public regulation. But due to its own prioritisation of resources, the state cannot 
reasonably fund all actions in countering abuse. Thus, the thesis will consider how 
successfully directors’ disqualification as a regulatory tool fills this gap, before going 
on to deal with private enforcement mechanisms.  
1.10 Keay advocates that these two separate streams of enforcement ought to work 
together in harmony, with the aim of improving the overall effectiveness of the UK 
corporate governance regime.55 However, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
has in recent times become rather blurred. Private mechanisms of enforcement have 
been said to have some public function, in that they may deter others from similar 
                                                 
52 Keay (n 47) 117. 
53 ch 4. 
54 Keay (n 47) 93. 




misconduct.56 Moreover, following changes introduced by the SBEEA 2015, which 
permit a court to order,57 or the SS to seek an undertaking,58 that a disqualified director 
pay compensation to creditors,59 it might readily be argued that disqualification now 
embodies a core function of the existing private enforcement mechanisms, through its 
ability to directly compensate creditors. However, the way in which the mechanisms 
have been compartmentalised in this thesis is justified on the basis that each still can 
readily identified as having the primary objective of securing either a private or public 
remedy, as the case may be. This blurring of the lines will be discussed in more detail 
in due course and, in fact, will be utilised as a means of returning to the original 
question; i.e. the effectiveness of the various mechanisms in fulfilling their stated 
objectives. Particularly when considering the SBEEA 2015, it is argued, the willingness 
of the state to implement reform itself must be the product of a recognition of failure, 
at least in part, of the enforcement regime to embody its objectives to date. In line with 
the author’s approach, therefore, this has a direct bearing on effectiveness. 
METHODOLOGY 
The Approach 
1.11 Legal doctrine is by no means a singularly faceted discipline. At the very least, 
it has been recognised as being in part hermeneutic; part axiomatic; and in other parts 
historical.60 According to Van Hoecke ‘the core business of legal doctrine is 
                                                 
56 ibid 61 (fraudulent trading) and 109 (wrongful trading). 
57 CDDA 1986, s 15A(1). 
58 CDDA 1986, s 15A(2). 
59 2.34 
60 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark 
Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) 6. 
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interpretation’,61 whilst De Geest has argued that its purpose is to reveal an ‘empirical 
truth’;62 defined as being ‘what the judge or legislator really meant’.63 This last statement 
encapsulates at least part of what underpins this thesis. Understanding what the 
legislator ‘really meant’, in terms of the objectives of and rationale for the private and 
public enforcement mechanisms available, is central to the discussion. This alone, 
however, is not sufficient for present purposes. Because, merely understanding 
Parliament’s intentions as to how the enforcement regime ought to operate tells us 
nothing of how it actually operates. It is argued that only through determining how it 
operates in practice, in so far as is possible, can any meaningful discussion as to its 
effectiveness take place. Van Hoecke describes this approach, i.e. the one adopted by 
the author, as ‘evaluative’ in legal methods terminology.64 He states it as being the 
process of ‘testing whether rules work in practice, or whether they are in accordance 
with desirable moral, political, economical aims’.65 It is of note that the thesis does not 
set out to criticise what the underlying objectives of the mechanisms are, i.e. whether 
morally, politically, economically, socially, legally, they are the correct ones to be 
pursuing. Instead, it merely explores the effectiveness of the mechanisms, both public 
and private, with reference to those objectives whatever they may be. Much of the 
existing literature, most certainly due to the breadth of the issues at play, invariably 
focuses on one individual mechanism, or is confined to either ‘private’ or ‘public’ 
                                                 
61 ibid 3 (emphasis added). 
62 Gerrit De Geest, ‘Hoe maken we van de rechtswetenschap een volwaardige wetenschap’ (2004) 
Nederlands Juristenblad 58, 59 as quoted in Van Hoecke (tr) ibid 6.  
63 ibid.  
64 Van Hoecke (n 60) v; AHRQ, ‘Mixed Methods: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
Collection and Analysis While Studying Patient-Centered Medical Home Models’ (PCMH Series, 
March 2013) available at <http://bit.ly/2fYMFcY> accessed 1 January 2017. 




enforcement. This thesis takes more of an all-encompassing approach in examining the 
landscape of director liability, across both public and private enforcement mechanisms. 
Ultimately, this will permit conclusions to be drawn as to the state of the regime in its 
totality, in so far as is reasonably possible within the confines of the project. 
1.12 In pursuit of this task, then, a broad range of methods of inquiry are required. 
The traditional method of text analysis in legal scholarship, of course, has a dominant 
role to play in this thesis. In this context, it will involve an hermeneutic analysis, 
combined with deductive reasoning (e.g. through the use of syllogistic logic) which in 
turn permits the author to make findings, and draw conclusions, in the usual way. In 
doing so, at least some attempt can be made in answering the research questions posited 
earlier in this chapter. Naturally, this will involve the use of sources including primary 
and secondary legislation; case law; government policy and consultation documents; 
existing empirical studies; and scholarly publications including journal articles and 
monographs. The author partly found fortune in that, in the course of conducting the 
research for this thesis, the law in this area changed somewhat significantly. The 
SBEEA 2015 brought about reform in an area that had largely remained untouched for 
two decades; in some cases, three.66 The problem that lies therein however is that little 
is known, at the time of writing, as to how these changes will operate in practice. This 
has in turn led, in respect of the SBEEA 2015, to a purely interpretative methodology 
based largely on policy and consultation documents. Therefore, the best the author can 
reasonably do in this context is assess the potential effectiveness of the new reforms, as 
                                                 
66 The former refers to disqualification, where the last substantive innovation came as part of the 
Insolvency Act 2000 (IA 2000) which introduced disqualification undertakings. The latter refers to 
wrongful and fraudulent trading, which have not seen any major changes to their operation since 
their inception in the IA 1986. 
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when measured against the known failings or inadequacies of the current system. The 
reader will recognise that this has obvious limitations, in that the analysis conducted in 
respect of those reforms may not ultimately be reflective of the reality.  
1.13 Taking a qualitative approach, it is submitted, is the optimal means of 
determining the rationale of each enforcement mechanism, as well as in identifying 
existing criticisms of their operation. This can be done by way of a review of primary 
and secondary sources. As previously stated, however, this is insufficient to the task at 
hand. The overall methodology of this thesis, therefore, might be described as an 
evaluative ‘mixed methods’ approach.67 This is one that integrates both qualitative and 
quantitative elements. In theory, it enables a more thorough observation of findings, 
and permits new observations that would simply not be possible with the utilisation of 
a single method. The thesis will therefore not confine itself to a doctrinal or theoretical 
analysis of the legal sources, it will also employ quantitative methods in answering the 
research questions posed. This method of inquiry will largely be utilised in relation to 
the public enforcement mechanism considered, namely disqualification, simply due to 
the availability of data in that area. Determining effectiveness, it is submitted, is 
something best informed by the actual operation of a system ‘on the ground’. As such, 
the existing empirical works in this area will be heavily drawn upon in assessing 
effectiveness. However, as will be demonstrated in due course, the existing studies are 
either outdated or are more limited in scope than those set out herein. To assist in the 
process of determining effectiveness, the author sets out his own up-to-date statistical 
                                                 





analyses of disqualification, based on secondary data. The particular research design 
posited here utilises the quantitative analysis in three ways: 
(a)  to explore new findings in the vein of the effectiveness of directors’ 
disqualification on the whole; as well as to permit the reiteration and reconfirmation 
of old ones, albeit with more up-to-date source data. 
(b) to validate the qualitative findings as to the effectiveness of disqualification (and 
vice-versa); 
(c) to permit further exploration of the qualitative observations, thereby enabling a 
better understanding of real-world experiences of the disqualification undertakings 
regime. 
The reader will not, at this stage, be troubled with the methodology of the empirical 
work conducted. The reason for that is straightforward in that, it is submitted, it is most 
comprehensible when presented in situ. As such, any empirical analysis to be 
undertaken in this thesis will be prefaced with a comprehensive methodology at the 
relevant point. 
Private Enforcement: Thesis Scope 
1.14 It should be noted that there are other private mechanisms of enforcement in 
English law not discussed in this thesis, with the most noteworthy being the summary 
remedy available to be taken against directors pursuant to section 212 of the IA 1986; 
commonly known as misfeasance. There are two primary reasons that the author has 
chosen to focus this work specifically in the area of improper trading. First, because a 
full and complete exposition of all of the legal mechanisms available to pursue directors 
would be a task that transcends far beyond the scope of a single thesis. It therefore 
follows that the author had to be selective to some degree. Secondly, it can be said with 
some certainty that the mechanisms discussed in this thesis – both public and private – 
are currently at the forefront of government policy in the context of director liability. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that they have seen significant reforms as recent as 2015, 
pursuant to the SBEEA 2015. For two primary reasons, they therefore make for 
interesting critique and analysis. First, at the time of writing, how these reforms will 
take hold is still an emerging landscape, thus providing an opportunity for informed 
speculation in that regard. Secondly, as will be argued, a will to implement reform, by 
definition, suggests weakness (or at least perceived weakness) in the existing system. 
The reforms of the SBEEA 2015 therefore come at an opportune time in the writing of 
this thesis to explore those past difficulties, as well as in looking to the future. On the 
contrary, misfeasance has existed more or less in its current form since the late 
nineteenth century. It is legislatively stagnant and thus, unlike the mechanisms 
discussed in this thesis, cannot be said to form part of the modern (i.e. post-Cork)68 
policy initiatives in this area. 
Ethical Considerations 
1.15 As has been stated, this thesis draws rather heavily on empirical analysis 
conducted by the author. A significant part of this analysis involved the collection of 
biographical data of disqualified directors. Unlike some of the previous studies in this 
area, which made use of primary data,69 the author’s study solely utilises secondary data. 
As will be discussed in considerable depth in Chapter 3, this took the form of data 
obtained from the public registers of disqualified individuals provided by two executive 
agencies of the DBEIS; namely CH and the IS.70 The extent of the data is plainly 
invasive. Indeed, this has been recognised by the state, who have sought to reduce or 
                                                 
68 DTI, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, 1982) (Cork 
Report). 





redact certain parts of the information presented on the public register so as to minimise 
the risk of fraudulent impersonations by opportunistic criminals.71 Potential ethical 
considerations were therefore at the forefront of the author’s mind in collecting and 
analysing the data, as well as in how to manage it following completion of the study. It 
was considered that the collection of this data for analysis, without the permission of 
the subjects involved, did not impinge upon any core principles in the conduct of ethical 
research. Predominantly, this was because the data is, in effect, Government data 
provided in the public interest under statutory authority. In short, the information used 
is a matter of public record. Indeed, the naming and shaming of delinquent directors in 
a public forum – so that their conduct can be scrutinised – is fundamental to at least one 
of the objectives of disqualification; namely deterrence.72 It was therefore considered, 
given this crucial factor, that the present study should not be inhibited by the usual 
ethical considerations that apply to surveys of this type, where informed consent must 
be sought. It is submitted that the survey’s findings, and their publication, ought 
themselves to be matter of public interest. The data was not used for any purpose other 
than for the analysis set out in this thesis.  
1.16 However, although publicly available at the time of collection, upon the lapse 
of individual disqualifications the information held ceases to appear on the official 
databases. In terms of the storage and retention of the data, therefore, as best practice, 
the core data protection principles imposed upon Data Controllers pursuant to the Data 
                                                 
71 For example, a director’s full date of birth was obscured from the register following the 
implementation of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEEA 2015), s 96. 
72 2.11.  
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Protection Act 1998 for the electronic storage of data were adhered to at all times.73 The 
author wrestled with whether to include a methodological appendix to this thesis 
containing the raw data obtained, as is common in studies of this kind. Ultimately, the 
decision was taken not to do so. It was thought that to do otherwise may potentially 
prejudice those directors whose disqualifications had lapsed (or would eventually 
lapse). Naturally, redaction of the data was considered as an alternative. However, it 
was concluded that doing so, in a way that would be adequate to protect individual 
identities, would render the information largely meaningless in any case. 
1.17 It is noteworthy that in the initial planning stages of this thesis a form of primary 
research, in the form of a questionnaire sent to all disqualified directors, similar to 
Hicks’ study, was considered.74 This idea was ultimately abandoned, partly on financial 
grounds, but predominantly due to the potential for ethical issues to rapidly spiral out 
of control. The very last thing that the author would have wanted would be to create 
any impression that he was ‘hounding’ those who had (in some cases at least) already 
suffered enough: the loss of their entrepreneurial freedoms; in many cases bankruptcy; 
and all that stems from those things: deterioration of relationships, the loss of family 
homes and so forth. The potential repercussions, it was thought, outweighed the benefits 
of the approach. As will be suggested in the concluding chapter of this thesis,75 however, 
the lack of primary research evaluating the attitudes of directors to the enforcement 
regime overall provides an opportunity for further empirical engagement going forward. 
 
                                                 
73 Information Commissioners Office, ‘Data Protection Principles’ available at 
<http://bit.ly/1E2lQ8V> accessed 10 July 2017. 
74 Hicks (n 18). 




Structure of the Thesis 
1.18 Following this introductory chapter, designated Part I, Part II will deal with 
public enforcement; namely directors’ disqualification. The first of the two chapters in 
this Part, Chapter 2, will pursue a doctrinal analysis of the effectiveness of 
disqualification. Chapter 3, however, will introduce the reader to the author’s empirical 
study of disqualification undertakings as a means of augmenting and verifying the 
findings of its predecessor chapter. Part III, again comprising two chapters, will deal 
with private enforcement. Chapter 4 will deal with the substantive areas of wrongful 
and fraudulent trading. Chapter 5 will focus on the new power of an insolvency 
officeholder to assign inter alia, wrongful and fraudulent trading claims, pursuant to the 
SBEEA 2015, and explore the impact that this recent development may have in terms 
of the effectiveness of those mechanisms for the future. The improper trading 
mechanisms, although distinct, are linked together in this thesis due to the similarities 
between the two in terms of the analysis undertaken. To separate the mechanisms, it 
was determined, was structurally unworkable as it would have required repetition or 
substantial cross-referencing. Part IV, finally, will deal with reforms and concluding 
remarks. In the penultimate chapter, Chapter 6, the author will return to many of the 
basic concepts set out in this introductory chapter. In particular, as has been set out, the 
need for the regulatory devices discussed within this thesis arises from the nature of 
access to limited liability as being both free and uncontrolled. As will be demonstrated 
throughout the course of this thesis, the simplicity with which limited liability can be 
accessed, when coupled with the ex post facto operation of the legal mechanisms 
available to hold delinquent managers to account is in fact something of a poisonous 
brew. The author therefore, in that chapter, suggests how more wide-reaching, 
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fundamental, reform might be achieved and implemented by tackling that issue at 
source thereby obviating (or at least reducing) the need for reliance on ex post facto 
enforcement. Ultimately, this will lead to some final considerations, in Chapter 7, the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, as to the current state of enforcement regime in its 
totality, its overall success or failure, and thoughts for the future.  
1.19 Given the way in which effectiveness is to be measured each chapter in Parts II 
and III will begin with a brief introduction to the mechanism in question. This will 
provide a platform for further analysis of the underlying rationale, aims and objectives 
against which the mechanism will then be judged. The exception to this rule is Chapter 
5, given that these matters will are dealt with in the previous chapter. Each of these 
chapters will then go on to assess the operation of the particular mechanism with a view 
to determining its effectiveness. As each chapter proceeds, the author will also set out 
suggestions as to potential reforms, specific to that mechanism, that may aid in 
improving its effectiveness. These reforms are distinct from those set out in Chapter 6, 
which are more universal.  
1.20 It is of note, perhaps contrary to the traditional approach of thesis construction, 
that each chapter operates more or less as a standalone entity; albeit each is focussed 
sharply on the underlying research question. This approach was taken due to the 
significant amount of ground that is covered. The thesis covers three distinct 
mechanisms, each of which suffers its own difficulties, though operates largely 
independently of the others. As such, as has been explained, it is Part IV which 
ultimately draws all of this together in order that the reader may appreciate the successes 

























2.1 The next two consecutive chapters will consider the main public enforcement 
mechanism, i.e. directors’ disqualification. As distinct from the private mechanisms 
discussed later in this thesis, those pursued for disqualification are investigated and 
prosecuted by the IS, on behalf of the SS for DBEIS. It should be remembered however 
that the public and private enforcement mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. It may 
indeed be quite proper in the circumstances for a liquidator to take action against a 
director, whilst the same individual is simultaneously being investigated by the IS for 
possible disqualification.76 This chapter and the next will explore the effectiveness of 
disqualification. They will do so first, in this chapter, with a doctrinal analysis of how 
disqualification operates. This will uncover some of the inherent difficulties associated 
with the regime, and assess its effectiveness as against its underlying rationale and 
objectives. The second chapter will assess disqualification through the lens of reality by 
way of an empirical study. Through the analysis of both theoretical and practical 
                                                 
76 Indeed, with the implementation of compensation orders and undertakings, dealt with later in this 
chapter, the interaction between the two is likely to become all the more noticeable, if not strained. 
See: 2.34. 




elements, a more well-rounded understanding of disqualification thus emerges. The 
chapter first turns to a terse exposition of the essential provisions.  
DISQUALIFICATION PROPER: THE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS 
2.2 The phrase ‘disqualification proper’ when used in this thesis refers to either a 
disqualification order or undertaking having the effect set out in section 1 or 1A of the 
CDDA 1986. In the interests of brevity, and given the extent of the analysis to be 
undertaken, a substantive exposition of the law on disqualification is unwarranted. Such 
matters are more than adequately covered elsewhere.77 Though, for convenience, the 
author will set out the bare minimum detail necessary to an understanding of the ensuing 
analysis. Under the CDDA 1986 a court is empowered in various circumstances to make 
a disqualification order against an individual, or she may herself give an undertaking to 
the SS so as to avoid court proceedings. The maximum period of disqualification is 15 
years. Disqualification undertakings, which have precisely the same legal status as a 
court order, were introduced by the IA 2000 in 2001.78 The SS has three years from the 
relevant date of insolvency to accept an undertaking or make an application to the court 
for a disqualification order.79 It is important to note that, formerly, this limitation period 
was two years. It was however recently increased (alongside other changes in this area) 
                                                 
77 For instance, Adrian Walters and Malcolm Davis-White, Directors’ Disqualification & Insolvency 
Restrictions (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010). 
78 For a detailed exposition of the history of the legislation, leading up to undertakings see: Williams, 
Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) ch 1. 




by the SBEEA 2015,80 for reasons to be dealt with in due course.81 Sections 1 and 1A 
mandate that where disqualified, whether by order or undertaking, a person:82  
(a) will not be a director of a company, act as receiver of a company's property or 
in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the 
promotion, formation or management of a company unless (in each case) he has the 
leave of a court,83 and; 
(b) will not act as an insolvency practitioner.84 
2.3 A ‘director’ is defined by the CDDA 1986 as including, of course, de jure 
directors; but also de facto and shadow directors.85 One of the oddities of directors’ 
disqualification is that it can arise in a number of different circumstances, including in 
both criminal and civil proceedings. It should be noted at the outset that although other 
types of disqualification exist86 the dominant focus here will be on directors that are 
disqualified under section 6 of the CDDA 1986, set out below, where they are deemed 
to be ‘unfit’. The primary reason for this is that the proceedings under this section 
account for some 94.5 per cent of disqualifications on average.87 In so far as is relevant 
section 6 reads as follows: 
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83 As to the meaning of ‘without leave of the court’ see CDDA 1986, s 17 which permits a director 
to make an application for leave to act in the management of a company, notwithstanding her 
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85 CDDA, ss 22(4) and 22(5). 
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87 IS, Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes 2016-17 (2017) <http://bit.ly/2u35zoP> accessed 1 
July 2017, Table 1A. 




6  Duty of court to disqualify unfit directors of insolvent companies 
(1) The court shall make a disqualification order against a person in any case 
where, on an application under this section, it is satisfied –  
(a) That he is or has been a director of a company which has at any time 
become insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently), and 
(b) That his conduct as a director of that company (either taken alone or taken 
together with his conduct as a director of one or more other companies or 
overseas companies) makes him unfit to be concerned in the management 
of company… 
(4) Under this section the minimum period of disqualification is 2 years, and the 
maximum period is 15 years. 
2.4 Section 6 only deals with court orders. It is section 7 that empowers the SS to 
accept undertakings, where it is ‘expedient in the public interest’ to do so and the criteria 
under section 6(1) is fulfilled. However, for convenience, the author will refer to 
‘section 6 proceedings’ when dealing with both orders and undertakings throughout this 
thesis. There are a few matters worthy of initial note. Unlike other types of 
disqualification, section 6 only applies to insolvent companies. Moreover, the title of 
the section notes the ‘duty’ of the court to disqualify an individual. This is because, 
again unlike most other types of disqualification, once the requisite ‘unfitness’ criteria 
has been met, the court must disqualify the individual concerned for a period of at least 
two years, subject to the 15-year maximum period. The implications of mandatory 
disqualification88 and, importantly, the meaning of ‘unfitness’ itself89 will be subject to 
substantive exposition below when considering the effectiveness of the regime.  
 
 






OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE 
2.5 Analysis of debate during the passage of the CDDA 1986 through Parliament 
and subsequent judicial comment permit the objectives of disqualification to be distilled 
into three main points:90 
(a) the protection of the public from abuses of limited liability;91 
(b) deterring directorial misconduct;92 and 
(c) the encouragement of probity in corporate management.93 
Given the banning effect of disqualification, the need to strike a proper balance between 
the right of an individual to be enterprising on the one hand, and prevention of abuse of 
limited liability on the other, is more acute than perhaps it is in the case of the private 
mechanisms discussed later in this thesis. Getting the balance right, it is argued, is 
crucial to a successful regime. A regime that is too lax will inevitably lead to a lack of 
protection for the public, and weak deterrence. A regime at the other extreme may 
instead become too inhibitive on individual freedoms, thereby stifling enterprise. Each 
objective will therefore be discussed in turn at this point, so that some general 
arguments can be made relation to how (if at all) successfully they are fulfilled. The 
discussion will then turn to more specific issues that potentially have a bearing on 
effectiveness.  
                                                 
90 Helpfully listed at: NAO, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The Insolvency Service 
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91 See, for example, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle [1998] BCC 282, 284; Walters 
and Davis-White (n 77) 2-04; Cork Report (n 68) para 1808; Re Polly Peck International (No 2) 
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Protection of the Public 
2.6 Punishment vs. Protection The state has generally been unwavering in stating 
that the protection of the public is the primary aim of disqualification.94 Judicial and 
academic comment, however, has historically been far less clear. Dine and Finch, in 
particular, have been highly critical of whether the current approach truly embodies 
protectionist principles. Dine has suggested that disqualification actually concerns the 
application of penal or quasi-penal rules in what is a criminal or quasi-criminal process, 
albeit by the civil courts.95 If disqualification proceedings are inherently ‘criminal’ in 
nature, rather than regulatory, she argues, directors should be investigated, prosecuted 
and adjudicated upon in the normal way in the criminal courts.96 This is more than an 
issue of semantics: to masquerade criminal proceedings as civil regulatory ones has the 
effect of depriving defendants of the full complement of rights available to them in a 
criminal trial, as well as the higher standard of proof. Indeed, as Hicks alludes to, and 
as is reiterated here, should the higher criminal standard ever be imposed in 
disqualification cases the onerous burden of proof on the prosecution would likely be 
very difficult indeed to overcome in most cases.97 There is therefore, it must be 
recognised, some motive (albeit an underhand one) for the State to retain the status quo. 
Finch has suggested that the desirability of either a punitive or protectionist approach 
is dependent on whether access to limited liability is to be viewed as a privilege or an 
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employment right.98 If viewed as an employment right, as appears to be Finch’s position, 
then the only means of removing it ought to be through criminal proceedings.99 Mere 
privileges, however, she argues, can legitimately be removed on the balance of 
probabilities through a regulatory framework as at present.100 In the context of this 
thesis, however, the desirability of either a protectionist or punitive system is of limited 
relevance. That notwithstanding, it ought to be said at this juncture that if the view is 
taken that directors ought to be punished, then the correct approach must be to revisit 
potential criminal sanctions for directors rather than to simply muddle through with the 
current system. Research in this area by Von Hirsch and Wasik, however, seems to 
indicate that as a penal sanction director disqualifications are practically unworkable in 
any event,101 though such matters are strictly beyond the remit of this thesis. The central 
question to be explored here is whether the regime is, in fact, aligned with protectionist 
principles. Because, in this work, adherence to the objectives laid down by Parliament 
are considered the yardstick by which effectiveness can be measured. It may be that a 
punitive regime is desirable, however, that is not the approach Parliament has chosen. 
Therefore, put simply, a regime seeking to punish errant directors for their wrongdoing 
does not accord with the objectives of disqualification, and is therefore not fit for 
purpose. The real concern for discussion here, it is submitted, lies in if the regime 
                                                 
98 Vanessa Finch, ‘Disqualifying Directors: Issues of Rights, Privileges and Employment’ (1993) 
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transpires to be punitive in practice, despite being dressed up by the State in the clothing 
of protectionism. This concern is magnified should it be the underhanded intention of 
the State to take this approach; perhaps in order to circumvent the defendant’s rights in 
a criminal trial, or take advantage of the lower standard of proof required so as to bolster 
the number of disqualifications achieved.102 
2.7 It is argued here that whether the regime is considered punitive is largely a 
matter of perception. First, the two objectives – punishment and protection – are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Even if the courts and the SS have the best of intentions 
in pursuing solely a protectionist agenda as Parliament intended, there may be resulting 
consequences that are, or are perceived as being, punitive. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
that, if surveyed, the majority of disqualified directors would not consider (at the very 
least) some part of the process as being punitive. It is after all a very serious matter: 
particularly for the professional director, where a period of disqualification can have 
life changing consequences. The State itself has recently recognised the ‘serious 
punitive and financial effect’103 of disqualification on the individual. And, whilst there 
have undoubtedly been a number of judicial decisions that have been couched in 
punitive terms,104 equally there have been others that take a protectionist approach.105 It 
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appears to have been the decisions in the former category that has led to commentary 
from those such as Dine. Given that the period of disqualification to be imposed is, in 
effect, a sentencing exercise106 it is hard to dispute that disqualification has a number of 
‘criminal’ elements to it. However, as Williams states: 
The strict question of whether disqualification ‘is’ a protective or a punitive sanction 
is…neither here nor there (and is clearly arguable either way). What is clearly more 
important is…does the sanction, both generally and in individual cases, provide 
effective protection for the public?107 
Thus, in line with that argument, if a disqualification is imposed with the intention of 
protecting the public (despite potentially punitive repercussions), then the underlying 
purpose must be considered as fulfilled. It is only in circumstances where either the 
strict intention is expressed as being to punish the individual in question, or where the 
disqualification is imposed in a way that is so manifestly excessive so as to go beyond 
protection, that the primary objective of disqualification can be said to have been 
frustrated. In relation to the second circumstance, Re Cladrose Ltd108 has been cited by 
Finch as an example of evidence of the punitive nature of the current regime.109 In that 
case, before Harman J, one of the two directors to be disqualified was a chartered 
accountant. The professionally qualified director, said the learned judge, was more 
culpable than his unqualified colleague for the company’s failure to file statutory 
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accounts and returns. As such, he was disqualified for a longer period. However, the 
discussion becomes somewhat circular as, to return to Williams’ point, it can be argued 
either way; given that it is largely a matter of perception. For example, it may equally 
be said that a professional person ought to be disqualified for a longer period of time in 
order to sufficiently protect the public as incompetent, negligent, or dishonest qualified 
persons can potentially exact more damage than their unqualified counterparts. Even if 
the view is taken that such cases demonstrate a penal approach, it is not to say that 
disqualification is fundamentally penal. The better view, it is submitted, is that those 
are merely wrong decisions. In any event, recent judicial authority seems to suggest a 
distancing from punitive terminologies, leaving the author the query whether this 
rhetoric is now a thing of the past.110  
2.8 However, given the recent introduction of compensation orders and 
undertakings to the disqualification arena, there is potential for this argument to once 
again rear its head. The court can now order, or the SS can seek an undertaking from, a 
disqualified director to pay compensation; either as a contribution to the assets of the 
company, or directly to individual creditors.111 It is therefore submitted that this is one 
area to be mindful of for future discussion. Though, the author’s view is that the 
argument remains the same. There is nothing ‘fundamentally penal’112 about awarding 
compensation to creditors for the loss caused by misconduct (though of course financial 
punishment may be a by-product of it). To the contrary, this provision has considerable 
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potential to reinvigorate the direct protection benefit for creditors (i.e. the ‘public’) by 
compensating them for any losses incurred. However, it is submitted that the approach 
of the courts and the SS must continue to be focused towards protectionism if the 
underlying purpose of disqualification is to be achieved. A director who has to 
compensate creditors over and above the losses actually incurred, or who is ordered to 
pay a form of aggravated or punitive damages would have, in this author’s mind, a 
legitimate argument that the decision was made without regard for the underlying 
objective of the regime. This does not, however, seem to be how the regime is intended 
to operate.113 Thus, it is submitted, a director who is simply ordered to pay back what he 
‘owes’ ought to be afforded little scope for such complaint.  
2.9 Protection from what? Disqualification is generally held out as being to protect 
the public specifically from those who ‘abuse limited liability’.114 Limited liability and 
disqualification are therefore inextricably linked.115 This being the primary aim, it ought 
to follow logically, then, that a disqualified person should still be able to set up in 
business so long as she trades in an unlimited form. Surprisingly, this is not the case. 
Within the terms of the CDDA 1986, a disqualified person is barred from being 
involved in the promotion, formation or management of a ‘company’. The term 
‘company’ is defined within section 22(2) as meaning:  
(a) a company registered under the Companies Act 2006 in Great Britain, or 
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114 See for instance, to name but a few authorities: Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1990] BCC 
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(b) a company that may be wound up under Part 5 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
(unregistered companies) 
This definition is therefore broad enough to extend the banning effect of disqualification 
beyond the limited company. It would also include unlimited liability companies and 
companies limited by guarantee; both of which are incorporated under the CA 2006.116 
If disqualification is held out as being to protect the public specifically against abuses 
of limited liability, then the wording of the CDDA 1986 is evidently at odds with that 
rationale. To avoid this contradiction, it must be assumed that disqualification serves a 
broader purpose. It might be described more generally as being to ‘protect the public’ 
from misconduct arising out of the conduct of corporate affairs. However, why the line 
is drawn in this particular way is unclear. It seems strange that a disqualified person can 
carry on business the very next day as a sole trader, perhaps even building it to a large 
empire,117 yet cannot do so using an incorporated vehicle even on terms of unlimited 
liability. Indeed, in Re Dawes and Henderson (Agencies) Ltd118  Sir Richard Scott VC, 
granted an application for section 17 CDDA 1986 leave to direct an unlimited company, 
on that basis.119 This decision, it is argued, embodies the notion that disqualification is 
primarily to protect from the abuse of limited liability; not merely just poor trading 
practices generally. Therefore, although a disqualified director can rely on the section 
17 CDDA 1986 process to obtain leave, it is argued that the better solution, to accord 
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with its objectives, would instead be to limit the effect of disqualification solely to 
limited companies. 
2.10 Protection for whom? The phrase ‘protection of the public’ is in itself rather 
illusory. In the natural sense of the word, ‘public’ is one which encompasses the whole 
of a population or society. Protection is therefore a measure justified as being utilitarian 
in nature, i.e. for the greater good of the populous as a whole. It is incontrovertible that 
where limited liability is abused, leading to insolvency, it can cause great losses to the 
community at large. It is important to note, therefore, that it is not just creditors that 
need to be protected. For example, the NAO have expressed the role of disqualification 
as being to protect the ‘commercial world’120 more generally. Moreover, Walters and 
Davis-White posit analysis of the implications of disqualification for shareholders, 
investors, consumers and employees.121 It is argued here that although the protection of 
those stakeholders is no doubt important in the context of promoting public confidence 
in the regulatory aspect of corporate culture in the UK they are often incidental to 
disqualification cases. The main focus as seen throughout the case law is the protection 
of both the public and private creditor.122 The need to protect creditors from unfit 
directors is vital, though, to take a step back, it must be recognised that most creditors 
do in fact get paid.123  However, as disqualification occurs after the fact it is of course 
merely a mechanism of future damage limitation. Disqualification proper is therefore 
unlikely to provide great comfort to affected creditors. After all, creditors do not 
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necessarily care about why they have not been paid, simply that they have not been paid. 
This is of course an inescapable weakness of ex post facto regulation. 
Deterrence  
2.11 It is fair to say that although it is often held out as being a core aspect of the 
regime by the State, the deterrence effect of the disqualification regime is, in reality, 
rather weak.124 Deterrence, it being pervasive, will be revisited throughout this chapter 
when dealing with the substantive issues. However, at this juncture, it is worth setting 
out some of the key areas of concern. The potential impact of a successful deterrence 
agenda should not be overstated. This is because deterrence can be a powerful motivator 
to alter behaviour. To operate successfully, however, it is argued four primary factors 
must be present: firstly, directors must be aware of disqualification itself to be deterred; 
secondly, they must be aware of the sanctions that they may face; thirdly, they must 
understand the acts or omissions that may lead to being sanctioned; and finally, the 
sanctions themselves must have sufficient ‘teeth’ in order to be heeded, so as to 
stimulate a change in behaviour. If these factors are not present, there will be no 
deterrence or, at best, very weak deterrence.  
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2.12 Awareness Awareness of disqualification is undoubtedly very low.125 This is 
perhaps the greatest stumbling block at present to creating an effective deterrent. 
Moreover, little has changed in this regard since the genesis of disqualification. As 
stated previously, it is impossible to deter, and therefore foster a change in the behaviour 
of, directors who are simply unaware of the consequences they may face. In the two 
reports published by the NAO, 58 per cent126 and 66 per cent127 of directors that were 
surveyed, respectively, stated they were unaware of disqualification as a sanction. Even 
57 per cent of the directors of those who knew about the CDDA 1986 said they were 
‘not well informed’ about disqualification procedures.128 In Hicks’ survey, 76 per cent 
of those surveyed thought disqualification should be better publicised.129 As Williams 
notes, a 2009 IS Stakeholder Satisfaction Survey suggests the position has not changed 
since that time. He records that 42 per cent of those surveyed thought that sanctions 
(including disqualification) were ‘quite effective’ or ‘very effective’ at deterring 
wrongdoing.130 This author notes that a more recent 2012 IS Stakeholder Confidence 
Survey showed that only 43 per cent of directors surveyed were aware of 
disqualification as a sanction,131 broadly at similar levels as in 2011.132 It is especially 
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worthwhile to set out that the latest Stakeholder Confidence Survey available at the time 
of writing, which boasts an overall 91 per cent awareness rating133 did not survey 
directors unlike its predecessor surveys (or at least the results were not published). 
Evidently, merely being selective as to the statistics deployed does little more than brush 
the issue under the carpet; further deepening the issue. It goes without saying: this is 
particularly troubling. 
2.13 Thus the IS, and the state more broadly, should they wish to increase the 
effectiveness of this objective, need to undertake a more widespread campaign to 
dramatically improve awareness. Current efforts in this regard are either lacklustre, 
improperly targeted or both. Respondents of the 2012 Stakeholder Confidence Survey 
suggested several methods for increasing the profile of disqualification, including the 
compulsory education of directors, or ‘naming and shaming’ those disqualified in local 
and national press, as a matter of course.134 The former suggestion will be discussed in 
some depth in the penultimate chapter of this thesis.135 As to the latter, the implication 
is that the practice at that time was only to report the most ‘exciting’ or topical cases. 
However, in recent times the IS have attempted to improve the situation somewhat by 
the use of social media platforms, such as Twitter.  But, as might be expected, the author 
notes that many of the IS’s ‘followers’ are insolvency professionals, large organisations 
and academics. It rather goes without saying that the reach of the IS, without more 
proactive measures to target directors specifically, is thus likely to be limited to persons 
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who are already intimately familiar with disqualification. Nonetheless, efforts to 
improve awareness in this fashion must of course be welcomed. However, the 2012 
Stakeholder Confidence Survey previously mentioned paints a rather bleak picture in 
this regard: only 4 per cent of directors surveyed were aware of enforcement related 
communications.136 
2.14 Enforcement generally and dishonest directors Some people may simply be 
incapable of being deterred, i.e. those who deliberately set out to abuse limited 
liability.137 Thus, in the case of this individual, the objective is not fulfilled and, as Hicks 
notes, although it restricts their business activities, disqualification proper provides 
limited recourse.138 It is suggested that a person who purposefully rips off creditors is 
less likely to be deterred from doing so if the ill-gotten gains potentially outweigh the 
benefits. Non-compliance, from the perspective of the errant director, may be both 
rational and financially desirable.139 Just under half of the directors in Hicks’ survey said 
they were unaware of the sanctions available if they were caught being in breach of a 
disqualification order.140 Moreover, some 39 per cent thought that the likelihood of 
being caught acting in contravention of one was low.141  A general point stemming from 
this discussion is that even for the vast majority of directors who do not set out to 
deliberately abuse limited liability, the deterrence objective is unlikely to be fulfilled 
should the threat of sanctions (i.e. disqualification) be perceived as weak. In Hicks’ 
                                                 
136 IS, Stakeholder Confidence Survey 2012 (n 131) 8. 
137 Many of these arguments are revisited, and further expanded upon in the penultimate chapter 
when dealing with the potential target audience of education and training for directors. 
138 Andrew Hicks, ‘Director disqualification: can it deliver?’ [2001] JBL 433, 440. 
139 See, for more detail, Richard Williams, ‘Disqualifying Directors: A Remedy Worse than the 
Disease?’ (2007) 7(2) JCLS 213, 235-236. 
140 Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (n 18) 10. 
141 ibid. 




research, 60 per cent of those surveyed suggested that their knowledge of 
disqualification had no impact on how they ran their ailing company.142 This broadly 
accords with the NAO’s research, which set out that 63 per cent of those surveyed 
considered disqualification had little or no relevance to their business; and 90 per cent 
thought it had no impact on them personally.143 More recently, the 2012 Stakeholder 
Confidence Survey found that only 37 per cent thought that disqualification was an 
effective deterrent to misconduct generally.144 
2.15 Owner-managers and disqualification Owner-managers of small concerns, it is 
submitted, are far less likely to be deterred than professional directors. This is for two 
reasons. First, as Hicks recognises, these individuals will invariably be heavily invested 
(both emotionally and financially) in their business.145 As such, ‘disqualification may 
not be a sufficient sanction to induce them to behave better when faced with the possible 
failure of their business’.146 Put simply, these individuals are far more likely to try and 
trade out of insolvency in order to save the business and thus may not be deterred with 
the threat of sanctions. Secondly, these individuals do not have very far to fall.147 Unlike 
the professional director, they can simply set up in business the next day – albeit as a 
sole trader. Though, as is argued in the penultimate chapter, the soletradership (or other 
form of unlimited liability vehicle) may indeed be the more appropriate vehicle for 
business for such individuals.148 Thus, the author is sceptical as to whether owner-
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managers can really ever be deterred. These factors may well go some way towards 
explaining why owner-managers make up the vast majority of disqualifications.149 Or, 
vice-versa, why the deterrence effect is so poorly felt. It is submitted this must, 
notwithstanding the other issues identified, be evidence of a failure of the deterrence 
objective in and of itself. 
2.16 Deterrence post-disqualification This is a matter that will be revisited in more 
depth in the penultimate chapter, when discussing general reforms to the enforcement 
regime.150 The central point is this. Even after a director is disqualified, what about when 
that disqualification lapses? There is a continuing need to ensure deterrence, after the 
fact, so that a director is not tempted to reoffend should she return to the market. On the 
contrary, the current regime seems to treat disqualified directors as lost causes; there 
are no follow-up measures designed to instigate a change in behaviour. It almost appears 
to be a hope of the state that the process of disqualification in itself is enough to do so. 
Behavioural change is however crucially important for those few directors that do return 
to the market. As Loughrey has argued, through having to justify their behaviour in an 
adversarial context, directors will seek to minimise the degree of their misconduct rather 
than accepting that it was wrong.151 Thus, they will avoid altering their behaviour in any 
future endeavours. Directors need to appreciate the legitimacy and fairness of the 
process and be supported in any rehabilitation should they so desire it. It is submitted, 
that only in this way can a change in behaviour be effected. On the contrary, Hicks’ 
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research suggested that a majority of directors surveyed felt victimised as a result of the 
proceedings taken against them.152  
Raising Standards of Corporate Management 
2.17 As to the final objective, it is closely linked to those addressed previously, 
namely the specific deterrent of disqualification and its primary aim of protecting the 
public. The NAO noted in its Follow-Up Report that: 
[B]y deterrence and by the promulgation of orders made by the courts, to contribute to 
fostering the integrity of markets generally and improving the standards of company 
stewardship in particular, but without inhibiting genuine enterprise and entrepreneurial 
management.153 
The statement might now be read as to include the promulgation of disqualification 
undertakings, and even compensation orders and undertakings.154 This objective was 
also advanced by Lord Woolf in Re Blackspur Group (No. 2),155 who stated that the 
‘encouragement of higher standards of honesty and diligence in corporate 
management’156 is a general deterrent by-product of disqualification. The idea is that as 
disqualifications are made, this in turn causes a widespread positive effect on corporate 
governance practices. This in theory has the benefit of protecting the public by reducing 
misconduct where it might otherwise have occurred but for the deterrent. The real-world 
impact of this objective is difficult, if not impossible, to measure as Hicks has noted.157 
By reason of the interconnectivity with deterrence, achieving measurable success is 
thereby, it is argued, limited in this objective in much the same way. For instance, if the 
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impact of the specific deterrent effect of disqualification is negligible, it is difficult to 
credibly argue that a general deterrent would be any more effective. In relation to this 
objective, therefore, the author repeats many of the same arguments set out previously. 
However, there are additional standalone issues that merit specific consideration.  
2.18 Unfit conduct By definition, raising standards of management requires an 
awareness (and therefore dissemination) of the types of conduct deemed to be 
unacceptable, so that behaviour can be changed. As previously explored, awareness of 
disqualification is low. Thus, it follows that a director is equally likely to be unaware 
of the type of conduct that might lead to her being disqualified, whether through 
‘unfitness’ or otherwise. It is therefore all but impossible for them to behaviourally alter 
course without professional intervention. Granted, whilst a layperson may inherently 
understand, to give an extreme example, that frauds are wrong, the ‘nebulous concept’158 
that is unfitness will be shown later in this chapter to be far more technical.159  
2.19 Education It seems to this author that if this is an object of disqualification, then 
the current means of achieving it are misdirected. Yet, with proper implementation, 
simply raising standards across the board is likely to be a very powerful means of 
reducing abuse. This goes back to the demography of disqualification as largely being 
owner-managers. Granted, some owner-managers will simply have no regard for their 
responsibilities. Others will carry them out diligently. The vast majority, however, are 
entrepreneurs concerned more with running their business; not legal formalities. Whilst 
they may not want to break the law, they may do so inadvertently due to their ignorance 
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or incompetence. Educating directors as to what the law is, therefore, ought not only to 
be a very powerful tool to combat this ignorance, and therefore reduce disqualifications, 
it is something so basic that the lack of its implementation at present is unforgiveable. 
The problem with current policy, is that government simply waits and hopes that there 
will be sufficient dissemination and reporting of directorial misbehaviour; causing 
others to change their ways. A more direct approach is needed. Government ought to 
take the initiative to educate directors as to such matters ex ante. The proper way to 
improve standards, it is submitted, must be through direct intervention. This will be a 
central reform considered in considerably more detail in the penultimate chapter of this 
thesis.160 It will be argued there that a proper implementation of a regime of education 
and training of company directors, before they take up office, is likely the only credible 
means of truly improving standards. At present, it cannot be said with any confidence 
that this objective is anything more than a theoretical one. This was a point identified 
by Hicks in 1998,161 and very little appears to have changed. Moreover, there is no 
reason to think, at present, that anything will change in the following two decades unless 
the state commits itself to more radical action.  
2.20 The leaflet As part of his research the author contacted CH to determine what 
routine steps are taken to inform directors as to their legal responsibilities and the 
consequences of misconduct, in order to gauge whether the State takes any proactive 
measures in helping to fulfil this objective. The author was particularly interested as to 
whether communications would be made to directors in relation to the (at the time 
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forthcoming) changes under the SBEEA 2015. CH confirmed that it does not take any 
such steps, save for one exception. An initial leaflet published by DBIS entitled 
‘Directors’ Duties’ is sent to the service address of each new director on appointment.162 
It details, in plain English, the core director duties set out in sections 171-177 of the CA 
2006. It is successful in this respect, and clearly a lot of thought has been put in to 
making it accessible, understandable, and digestible. However, it is a mere two sides of 
A5, and makes no reference to consequences of breach of duty. There is no mention of 
the civil liability provision under section 177 CA 2006, let alone any discussion of 
wrongful or fraudulent trading, or disqualification. The leaflet is accompanied by a 
letter which details some of the more administrative responsibilities such as filing 
annual accounts and a return, as well the need to inform CH of any changes in 
directorships or the registered office address. The letter also directs the reader to a 
website containing details of the seminars CH runs on director responsibilities.163 Hicks 
notes that a similar practice was in place as at the time of his report in 1998.164 CH, of 
course, is largely concerned with the filing of documents and other administrative 
matters. However, as the registrar holding all records of active directors, they are clearly 
best placed to provide pertinent information directly across a range of topics including 
disqualification. Government’s failure to mandate that it does so is therefore an obvious 
and alarming omission, demonstrative of little inclination towards raising standards of 
management. The letter and leaflet appears to represent the totality of communications 
that directors receive in relation to their duties, save for those that seek out additional 
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information on the CH or IS websites, or through private training.165 To return to 
deterrence, it is therefore unsurprising that awareness is as low as it is thought to be 
given that no real proactive steps are taken. There may be an element of not wanting to 
‘burst the bubble’ of entrepreneurial spirit in lecturing new appointees with swathes of 
material on what might be considered by the population at large to be rather tedious 
matters, much of which is likely to go unread in any case. However, that is rather an 
unsatisfactory position. Whilst many new appointees may have some loose idea that 
they are subject to various duties, it cannot be said that the current approach is anywhere 
near adequate, so as to have the effect of raising standards. 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES  
Early Criticisms 
2.21 Much of the focus on its effectiveness in the literature has, in fact, revolved 
around administrative concerns. With that said, this section of the chapter turns to 
explore some of these difficulties before continuing on to deal with some more 
substantive issues.  The effectiveness of the disqualification regime first came under 
real scrutiny in a series of reports published by the PAC and the NAO. The report 
published by the PAC, in the 1993-1994 session,166 examined the administrative efficacy 
of the disqualification regime and found gross systematic failures. The IS was severely 
criticised for its methods in managing disqualification cases, with a primary allegation 
being that it simply took them too long to obtain a disqualification order against an 
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individual.167 It identified that reports of unfit conduct from IPs, dealt with below, were 
of a poor quality and, in any case, only 1 out of every 22 reports where unfit conduct 
was found were actually referred to the IS for investigation.168 The NAO published two 
separate reports dealing with the effectiveness of disqualification. The first,169 in the 
1992-1993 session, also uncovered similar matters relating to the poor quality of some 
reports170 and, when looking at cases rejected for prosecution by the IS in 1991-1992, 
uncovered that 29 per cent of these were rejected on the basis that there was not enough 
time remaining within the (then) two-year statutory limitation period to ‘resolve 
outstanding points’171, i.e. they were not being dealt with quickly enough. In fact, the 
NAO observed in most cases it would take nearly two years to gather enough data to be 
in a position to apply for a disqualification, and a further four before legal proceedings 
would have finished.172 Following these two reports, steps were taken to address the 
concerns identified. The NAO’s second report,173 published during the 1998-1999 
session, expressed that the changes implemented had significantly increased the 
effectiveness of the system,174 which had led to an overall sharp increase in the number 
of disqualifications year over year. The NAO identified the obvious relationship 
between the administrative efficiency of the IS in dealing with investigations and the 
effectiveness of the regime itself.175 Despite the positive changes in reporting the NAO 
commented that the amount of time taken, on average, to actually issue disqualification 
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proceedings against an individual had remained the same, and this was still therefore an 
area that ought to be improved upon.176 This section will now continue to explore these 
early criticisms  in order to assess whether problems of old have truly been resolved.  
Reporting Unfit Conduct 
2.22 Primarily, the SS is made aware of misconduct following reports submitted by 
officeholders. As such, it is clearly crucial to the effectiveness of the regime that they 
are received promptly by the IS so that investigations can commence, but also that they 
are of sufficient quality. Prior to the implementation of the SBEEA 2015, when 
investigating an insolvent company, IPs were required to submit a report in 
circumstances where it appeared to them that the conduct of a director177 made them 
unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.178 Initially they would submit 
an interim ‘D2 return’ within 6 months of the date of insolvency, followed by a more 
detailed (and final) report on unfit conduct known as the ‘D1 return’.179 The IP was 
expected to submit the D1 return within approximately nine months of the D2.180 This 
system however was subject to numerous criticisms. These may be summarised as 
follows: 
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(a) the statutory, paper-based, D1 and D2 forms were outdated, being last amended 
in 2001, and were not fit for purpose given the technological and digital shift in 
recent years;181 
(b) as a supplementary point, the forms were out of alignment with the Government 
Digital Strategy, which would require online submission of reports;182 
(c)  the timeliness of IPs in supplying the information was variable, and only 68 per 
cent were submitted within six months. This was largely due to the fact that IPs 
would often ‘delay their reports whilst they…[satisfied]…themselves that 
they…[had]…sufficient evidence of misconduct’;183 
(d) the quality of the information supplied by IPs was variable. Although most were 
good, some lacked sufficient detail or relevant records so that cases could be 
investigated properly.184 
2.23 Given the then two-year limitation period for the SS to pursue individuals for 
disqualification, the above factors had a considerable impact upon the outcome of any 
individual case.185 The danger of course was that proceedings could not be commenced 
against persons worthy of disqualification because of administrative inefficiencies. If 
the system of reporting is inefficient this has a trickle-down effect on the effectiveness 
of the entire regime. This was recognised by the state and, following the IS’s Red Tape 
Challenge consultation,186 set to change. Section 107 of the SBEEA 2015 now provides 
for an entirely new system of reporting on the conduct of directors by insolvency 
officeholders. 
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2.24 Section 107 SBEEA 2015 implemented a new section 7A CDDA 1986.187 It 
requires a report to be made to the SS as to the conduct of all directors of an insolvent 
company. The report must ‘describe any conduct of the person which may assist the SS 
in deciding whether to exercise the power [to seek an undertaking or apply for a 
disqualification order]’188 and be supplied within three months of the insolvency date.189 
There is a further obligation to supply any new information to the SS, when it becomes 
available, as ‘soon as is reasonably practicable’.190 The old D1 and D2 forms have thus 
been replaced with a single electronic form, submitted by IPs utilising the IS’s Director 
Conduct Reporting Service (‘DCRS’) as of 6 April 2016.191 It is understood that the new 
electronic return is shorter, with much of the information being pre-populated based on 
information already submitted, and with an ability to select from specified list of outline 
behaviours which may indicate misconduct, though with an additional ‘free text’ box 
to specify other matters.192 Mark Danks, part of the insolvency targeting team at the IS, 
has commented that the DCRS was at the time of launch ‘very much a basic 
application’193 that simply met the terms of the legislation. As time moves forward, new 
features and a more refined reporting experience are expected to be introduced. In 
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particular, the author notes that the three-month time period is a considerable change, 
thereby allowing the IS to proceed to the investigation stages far more rapidly than was 
formerly possible. Moreover, given the ‘new information’ provisions, IPs should be less 
inclined to ‘wait and see’ before submitting their reports. It would seem that the 
extension of the limitation period for obtaining disqualification to three years, fits hand 
in glove alongside the new reporting requirements. Although it will not avert the 
substantive difficulties this surely an important step forward. 
Resourcing Concerns at the IS 
2.25 Since the introduction of undertakings, the Investigations Unit at the IS have 
seen an increase in workload. Yet, in 2010-2011 the Service experienced an 11 per cent 
budget cut, and 18 per cent of their workforce left under a voluntary exit scheme.194 The 
cuts in the workforce were ascribed to an overall reduction in case load since December 
2009,195 though concerns were expressed at the time that it might ‘put undue pressure 
on [the IS’s] ability to deliver’.196 Indeed, a report by the DBIS Select Committee in 
2013 suggests that resource constraints, both in terms of staff and funding, have had a 
negative impact on the enforcement regime.197 The report noted evidence from the trade 
union Prospect, which indicated that resourcing issues had led to the IS being ‘unable 
to meet its internal target for the progression of disqualification investigations’,198 and 
that some cases had simply been abandoned.199 Moreover, in the 2012 IS Stakeholder 
Confidence Survey one-third of IPs cited lack of resourcing as being a weakness of the 
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IS.200 It was also submitted in evidence to the BIS Select Committee by R3 that, whilst 
the number of D1 returns submitted by IPs had risen, the number of disqualifications 
had dropped in the same period.201 A small 21 per cent of D1 reports were being taken 
forward to disqualification at that time.202 Despite this, however, the IS stated that it 
‘[was] confident that it [had] emerged [from the cuts] in good shape after a challenging 
period’.203 The central point here is that an improperly resourced IS fundamentally 
weakens and destabilises the entire enforcement regime. This is of particular concern 
given the introduction of compensation orders and undertakings, which will only 
increase this burden.204   
Timeliness 
2.26 The most important consideration, resulting from a combination of the above 
two matters, is the impending statutory limitation period. Resourcing and reporting 
concerns ultimately leave the IS with a reduced amount of time to deal with the 
investigation and prosecution of cases. In some instances, this may result in a failure to 
secure a disqualification, or a complete abandonment of otherwise fruitful cases. This 
inevitably has an impact upon eventual enforcement outcomes, and thus the 
effectiveness of the regime. By the time D1 returns had been assessed the IS had, under 
the old two-year limitation period, approximately 12 months to investigate cases for 
disqualification.205 An Impact Assessment produced by DBIS suggests that in a 
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‘minority’ of cases this was insufficient.206 In those instances the IS had two options: 
either to issue protectively, or to allow the limitation period to lapse and seek permission 
to issue out of time. Both circumstances have obvious costs implications for the IS207 
and create uncertainty for the director involved. Thus, the longer limitation period 
should provide more flexibility for the IS in managing its caseload and permit, without 
prejudicing the interests of directors by any measurable degree, more complex cases to 
be seen to successful resolution. The author retains some scepticism as to the motive 
behind increasing the limitation period, however. Although heralded as a means of 
allowing the IS to deal with more complex (and thus potentially more serious) cases, it 
is suggested here the reality may be that it simply gives the IS the breathing room it 
needs in order to stabilise itself – to ‘catch up’ – following a harrowing period of cuts 
and redundancies.  
Summary 
2.27 Undoubtedly, disqualification has suffered with administrative difficulties since 
its inception. As explored above, this has a clear bearing on the effectiveness of the 
regime. Such matters are clearly important cogs in the overall machinery – though, it is 
submitted, they are by no stretch of sole importance. Indeed, as shown, considerable 
efforts have gone in to remedying administrative inefficiencies. Though, it is argued, 
one primary issue of concern as to the future of disqualification is that, due to the 
obsession with administration, sight has been lost in ensuring that the more substantive 
issues are dealt with. As the next chapter will explore, this is compounded by the fact 
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that the IS’s primary means of assessing effectiveness is not in the adherence to the 
underlying objectives of disqualification (as this author suggests ought to be the proper 
measure), but in meeting bureaucratic and arbitrary targets.208 Put simply, the DBEIS 
adopts the view that the more disqualifications, the better – but it looks not much further 
than that. Thus, the IS is incentivised to oil the wheels of disqualification to increase its 
efficiency (and will no doubt continue to do so), but no similar urge is felt in terms of 
remedying other, underlying, concerns so long as targets are met. The position of the 
state in this author’s mind is therefore to do little more than ‘keep up appearances’ by 
patch working an already broken system. Some of these underlying concerns are dealt 
with in the next sections. 
THE MEANING OF ‘UNFITNESS’  
2.28 There have been numerous stumbling blocks in the interpretation of section 6 
CDDA 1986 generally which, by way of a reminder, provides a power to disqualify a 
person whose conduct ‘makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
company’. It will be remembered that section 6 is particularly important in this context, 
as the vast majority of disqualifications are made under this section. It is submitted, 
therefore, that difficulties associated with section 6 are likely to have a profound effect 
on the effectiveness of the regime as a whole. Perhaps the greatest challenge has been 
the meaning of the word ‘unfitness’ itself. 
2.29 If it cannot be said with any certainty what conduct might actually lead to 
disqualification for unfitness, not only does this have significant implications for 





objective of raising standards, as discussed previously, but also the deterrence objective. 
In other words, directors cannot be deterred from conduct that they do not know is, in 
fact, misconduct.209 In turn, this has wider ramifications for the primary objective of 
protecting the public from that misconduct. It is therefore submitted that clarity in 
respect of the meaning of unfitness, both in the orders and undertakings landscapes, is 
an essential ingredient to a successful regime. No definition of ‘unfitness’ is to be found 
within the CDDA 1986, and so some general rules of construction of the term have 
emerged in the case law. In Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd210 Dillon LJ set out that 
no judicial gloss ought to be placed on the meaning of the word, and that it was to be 
given its ordinary meaning.211 Hicks argues that the problem with this approach is that 
‘judges [must] intuitively know what constitutes unfit conduct’.212 Simply put, judges 
and the SS are expected to know unfitness when they see it. Moreover, in Re NCG 
Trading Ltd213 it was made clear that conduct rendering a director unfit in one case is 
not necessarily conclusive of making such a finding in another. In essence, determining 
what type of conduct might render a director unfit in any given circumstance is little 
more than a ‘value judgement’ in the application of common sense principles. Judicial 
inquiry as to all of the circumstances, as opposed to a simplistic ‘tick box’ approach to 
a finding of misconduct, is no doubt desirable. However, as Hicks argues, this causes a 
further difficulty of ‘creating and applying a consistent standard of unfitness both in the 
initial screening processes and in the courts’.214 Hicks also doubts whether it is realistic 
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to expect a court, in all cases, to be able to intuitively and accurately make such a 
finding. He suggests that judges may be faced with having to consider the issues perhaps 
without very much experience of the realities of commercial decision-making during 
their own careers.215 This is potentially just as problematic, if not more so due to the 
presence of bias, in the case of undertakings, as directors will be clueless as to the 
internal processes and policies used by the SS in determining unfitness. Hicks goes on 
to criticise the position as being a ‘legalistic approach to a highly practical matter’.216 It 
is accepted that unfitness is very much a subjective term that, to use the terminology of 
one IS employee, ‘means different things to different people’.217 This inevitably creates 
room for error. However, the fault here does not lay solely at the feet of the judiciary.  
2.30 Although the term is not defined in the CDDA 1986, a non-exhaustive list of 
factors to be taken into account by the court or SS in determining unfitness exists in the 
form of Schedule 1. Schedule 1 therefore presents itself as being the only form of 
Parliamentary indication as to the intended approach of the courts and SS in assessing 
unfitness. Effectively, it is a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be taken into 
account when either the court or SS is considering disqualifying a person. As part of 
the raft of changes introduced by the SBEEA 2015, Schedule 1 was repealed and 
replaced for reasons to be explored. Before this, the Schedule had not seen any 
significant modifications for over 30 years. The current implementation of Schedule 1 
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came in to force as of 1 October 2015.218 At the time of writing, therefore, the practical 
implications of it have not yet been felt. The chapter will therefore go on to consider 
the position pre-SBEEA 2015 (‘old’ Schedule 1) as against the current implementation 
(‘new’ Schedule 1) in order to assess its potential utility.  
2.31 The first thing of note in relation to ‘old’ Schedule 1 is that it is extremely statute 
heavy. Whilst it includes matters such as misfeasance and breach of duty, considerable 
focus is placed on administrative matters and, as Williams notes, financial harm to 
creditors.219 This led to considerable criticism of the fitness for purpose of the Schedule. 
Hicks argued, discussing ‘old’ Schedule 1, that it was ‘narrow and technical’220 and 
‘[did] not lay down positive standards of best practice towards creditors’.221 The 
technical and legalistic approach to the question of unfitness taken by Parliament in 
Schedule 1 of the Act appears at least in part to have been driven the judiciary down the 
same path, as alluded to previously. A cursory reading uncovers a serious, yet 
elementary, point as to whether the average entrepreneur would have been able to 
understand and adopt the spirit of the Schedule in any meaningful way. It is suggested 
that they would have not. This may have been an unanticipated by-product of design, 
given it was likely drafted with its target audience, that being the courts and SS, in mind. 
This had significant ramifications for directors who, in turn, faced an ever-increasing 
regulatory burden. The real problem with ‘old’ Schedule 1 and the approach of the 
courts when considering the aims of disqualification, it is argued, is that it prevented 
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directors from, as conclusively and comprehensively as possible, being able to 
determine whether any particular action might lead to their disqualification later down 
the line. There is no magic formula for unfitness. Whilst this creates flexibility for the 
judiciary and SS, it has the consequence of significant uncertainty for directors. 
Therefore, to the return to the original problem, due to the approach of the courts and 
SS, there is no straightforward means of ascertaining whether any particular conduct 
may render a person unfit.  
2.32 Two things therefore follow from that conclusion. Firstly, that it is unsurprising 
that so many directors are disqualified for what appear at face value to be rather trivial 
matters,222 given that they have limited means of knowing what is right, and what is 
wrong. Granted, the number of individuals that would in any case seek out that 
information proactively is likely to be small. However, even those that do so would be 
required to trace through and decipher numerous case law authorities and the CDDA 
1986 itself; possibly none the wiser at the end of the process. The mere fact that there 
is a lack of comprehensible material outlining the circumstances in which a director 
may be disqualified is considered by this author to be a significant failure. Turning to 
the second point, this failure is made more acute by the fact that directors cannot be 
deterred, in accordance with the aims of the regime, from misconduct that they simply 
do not know, or have no means of knowing, impinges upon their fitness to act. It is 
therefore ultimately concluded that this approach to determining unfitness at best fails 
to maximise the potential effectiveness of disqualification. It creates an uneven playing 
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field in a situation where the commercial decision-making of directors is placed under 
microscopic scrutiny. Fortunately, this was a point recognised in the Transparency and 
Trust consultation,223 which led to the implementation of ‘new’ Schedule 1. It was 
accepted that often directors will have considerable difficulties in knowing where they 
stand and that this was crucial to the effectiveness of the regime.224  Indeed, the author 
has no hesitation in suggesting that this particular deficiency of ‘old’ Schedule 1 has 
hindered the success of the regime at least in part for some three decades. This is not, 
however the only criticism to be levelled at the Schedule. With it setting out a non-
exhaustive list of factors, this has inevitably led to significant judicial energy being 
expended on determining whether specific types of misconduct, upon which the 
Schedule is silent, might evidence unfitness in any given case. Again, this was 
recognised in the Consultation.225 It is doubtful, however, that the Schedule should ever 
have been, or be, so specific so as to list individual matters that demand a finding of 
unfitness. The reason for this is aptly summed up in the Government Response: 
[A]ddressing this issue simply by adding to the list…[is]…not appropriate – this might 
feed any unhelpful belief that if a matter is not explicitly listed, it will not be taken into 
account by the court or the SS. It seems that it is the list itself that is the problem.226 
Moreover, if the Schedule is to be non-exhaustive (which it is argued it ought to be) it 
would be of limited value to list individual forms of misconduct in any case. The court 
or SS could simply go behind it in appropriate circumstances, albeit at the potential cost 
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of further litigation. The difficulty for the draftsperson is therefore to ensure that the 
Schedule is accessible to the wider public at large so that they know where they stand, 
whilst avoiding the creation of an ever-growing list of specific instances of misconduct 
akin to an ‘instruction manual’, that can in any event be abandoned. Ultimately, the 
Government concluded that the ‘old’ Schedule 1 was outdated and lacked 
transparency.227 It was therefore pledged that the old Schedule 1 would be replaced with 
a generic set of (non-exhaustive) factors, rather than focusing on specific forms of 
misconduct.  
2.33 ‘New’ Schedule 1 is therefore far less verbose than its predecessor. Existing 
references to statutory provisions have been vanquished and instead catch-all 
phraseology is utilised, such as ‘any material contravention…of any applicable 
legislative…requirement’, in its place. References to misfeasance or breach of duty are 
maintained. However, a new provision is introduced requiring the court or SS to 
consider ‘[t]he nature and extent of loss or harm caused, or any potential loss or harm’ 
as a result. Importantly, the frequency of the misconduct is now a requirement for 
consideration. Given the relatively recent introduction of the Schedule, it is difficult at 
this point in time to accurately reflect on how its implementation may affect the 
disqualification landscape. At the very least, it can be said that there has been some 
recognition on the part of the state that defining unfitness is problematic, and that they 
have sought to address it. From the point of view of accessibility, it is certainly true that 
it is drafted in a way that is more understandable to the layperson. This should ease 
some of the criticisms levelled by those such as Hicks. The ‘new’ Schedule, in fact, is 
                                                 




a relatively untechnical document. To use the terminology of Williams, who discussed 
‘old’ Schedule 1, the State has moved away from a largely ‘rules-based’ approach to a 
more ‘standards-based’ one.228 The adoption of a more generic set of guiding principles 
is to be applauded, and it ought to have some wider impact upon the cost and ease of 
administering the disqualification regime.229 However, the author is still sceptical as to 
whether ‘new’ Schedule 1 will assist with achieving the desired deterrent effect given 
that directors must still, of course, go out of their way to discover the information. 
Individuals cannot be expected to absorb legislative changes by osmosis; no matter how 
comprehensible they might be. As has been shown, CH do not take steps to notify 
directors of legislative changes, including Schedule 1, in an all-encompassing way. 
Awareness is therefore still likely to be low. It will be interesting to see how the courts 
approach ‘new’ Schedule 1 in practice, though it is unlikely to herald much change for 
directors. Undoubtedly, though, the tempering of existing confusion that had been 
known to arise out of the application of the predecessor Schedule is to be welcomed.   
COMPENSATION ORDERS AND UNDERTAKINGS 
2.34 This section looks in detail at the newly enacted regime of compensation orders 
and undertakings. This is surely the most radical reform to disqualification since its 
original inception. In effect, it permits recovery for creditors by rendering a delinquent 
director personally liable for losses incurred as a result of her misconduct, in a similar 
way to the private enforcement mechanisms discussed subsequently. However, it blends 
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this function with public regulation.230 It empowers the SS to apply to the court to seek 
a compensation order against a disqualified director for the benefit of a defined creditor 
or creditors of an insolvent company, or as a general contribution to the company’s 
assets, within two years of the disqualification start date.231 A director may also offer a 
compensation undertaking to the SS should they wish to avoid court proceedings.232 As 
indicated in the first chapter of this thesis, it is presently impossible to judge the 
effectiveness of these new provisions on the basis that there is simply no data to 
consider.233 This section will therefore go on to examine some of the issues that may 
help or hinder their potential effectiveness, which will then be supplemented by 
empirical findings in the next chapter. On the face of it, the changes are innovative in 
an area that has gone virtually untouched by way of reform for some two decades. 
Moreover, they may transpire to be welcome, as they provide yet a further avenue of 
recovery for creditors thus enhancing the direct protection objective of disqualification.   
The Legislation 
2.35 The power The provisions themselves are contained within Part 9 of the SBEEA 
2015, specifically section 110. That section amended the CDDA 1986 to add sections 
15A-15C. The provisions were brought in to force on 1 October 2015 by Regulations.234 
Section 15A(1) provides that the court may make a compensation order against a person 
on the application of the SS. Under section 15A(2) the SS may instead accept a 
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compensation undertaking from an individual. Both subsections are subject to the 
proviso that the two conditions under section 15A(3) are met. That subsection reads: 
15A(3) The conditions are that – 
(a) the person is subject to a disqualification order or disqualification undertaking 
under this Act, and; 
(b) conduct for which the person is subject to the order or undertaking has caused 
loss to one or more creditors of an insolvent company of which the person has at 
any time been a director. 
One additional matter worthy of attention is set out in section 15A(5), which defines a 
limitation period of two years from the date the disqualification order was made, or the 
undertaking was accepted.  
2.36 The requirements to seek compensation are thus summarised by the author as 
being: 
(a) the misconduct must have been committed by a director on or after 1 October 
2015; 
(b) the company must be insolvent; 
(c) the director in question must have been disqualified for misconduct in relation 
to that company; 
(d)  the loss suffered by the creditor(s) must be identifiable and able to be attributed 
to the director’s misconduct leading to the disqualification; 
(e) no more than two years from the start date of the disqualification must have 
elapsed. 
The requirement that some loss is caused, given the compensatory agenda of the 
legislation, is no great surprise. A director cannot therefore be pursued on principle for 
what might be described as nominal damages. Moreover, Section 15A(3)(b) guarantees 
that all compensation cases will involve insolvent companies. Given that 
disqualifications pursuant to section 6 CDDA 1986 for ‘unfitness’ also require 
insolvency, it seems likely that it is anticipated that the bulk of compensation claims 




will arise out of section 6 disqualifications. The business of insolvency naturally 
involves an expectation that some loss will have been incurred somewhere along the 
line. For that reason, the inability of the SS to establish the ‘loss’ criterion is likely to 
be reserved for the rarest of cases. However, there is also a causation requirement 
between the conduct of the director in question and the loss. The wording of the 
provision suggests that any conduct not forming part of the original basis for the 
disqualification will fall outside of the scope of the compensation provisions. In any 
event, the burden of proof clearly rests on the SS to prove the causal link between the 
misconduct and the loss. The causation requirement therefore provides something of a 
safety net for disqualified directors, ensuring that their exposure is not ‘unlimited’. It 
ensures that compensation will only be obtainable in those cases where the loss can be 
shown to be a direct result of their misconduct, and this, it is suggested, is demonstrative 
of an underlying intention to protect creditors in accordance with the objectives of 
disqualification; rather than to punish errant directors. The final stipulation of section 
15A(3)(b) – that a person can be held liable to compensate if he has been a director at 
any time – is also worth identifying. This mirrors the existing provisions for 
disqualification orders and undertakings, to ensure that retired directors, or even those 
forcibly removed from office, cannot escape liability. Of course, it should be 
remembered that only the SS has locus standi to bring an application for compensation 
order, or seek an undertaking. As such, creditors are unable to avail themselves of the 
power directly. Thus, to a significant degree, their prospects of recompense and 
therefore the success of the regime is based upon the policy of the SS in deciding which 




2.37 Allocation of compensation Section 15B(1) sets out the three ways in which 
compensation can be allocated under a court order.  Section 15B(2) places undertakings 
on the same footing as orders in this regard. An order can be made to require a 
disqualified director to compensate: one or more creditors; a class or classes of creditor; 
or by way of a contribution to the general assets of a company. There is no stipulation 
that the three types of allocation are mutually exclusive and so it is possible that a 
director may be required to make multiple compensatory payments depending on the 
circumstances, perhaps one amount to an individual creditor and another to the 
insolvent company’s assets. 
2.38 Determining the amount In determining the quantum of the compensation 
section 15A(3) provides a non-exhaustive list of three factors that either the court (in 
the case of an order) or the SS (in the case of an undertaking) should have particular 
regard to. They are as follows: 
(a) the amount of the loss caused; 
(b) the nature of the conduct mentioned in section 15A(3)(b); 
(c) whether the person has made any other financial contribution in recompense for 
the conduct (whether under a statutory provision or otherwise) 
It is logical to assume that the starting point for determining the amount of 
compensation to be awarded should be the debtor company’s liability to the relevant 
creditor at the time of the order or undertaking. Specific focus should be placed upon 
the portion of the liability proven to have been caused by the director’s misconduct. It 
was stated in an Impact Assessment published by the IS that the amount of 




compensation awarded should never exceed the loss caused,235 which again reinforces 
the notion that the regime is not designed to be punitive, merely restorative. Whilst 
acknowledging the difficulty of calculating the prospective amount of compensation 
directors might be expected to pay, the IS calculated an average of approximately 
£132,000, based on a sample of 26 cases considered by debt recovery agents.236 This 
point will be revisited in some depth in the next chapter when considering the solvency 
of disqualified directors.237 In short, the author is sceptical, when considering the largely 
owner-manager demographic, as to the number that would be sufficiently personally 
solvent to be able to satisfy such claims in any case, thereby bringing the potential utility 
of the section in to question.238 
Objectives and Rationale 
2.39 As part of the coalition government’s agenda of identifying measures to increase 
the level of trust and stakeholder confidence in UK company law, DBIS conducted the 
Transparency and Trust consultation.239 The consultation also included significant 
proposals in relation to disqualification. Evidently a perception exists within society 
that delinquent directors rarely suffer financially and, in the main, ‘get off lightly’ given 
the circumstances of their misconduct.240 Although disqualification currently helps to 
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minimise phoenix syndrome by preventing a director from acting in future, a frequent 
criticism of it in the past has been that it does little for the creditors actually affected.241 
This may now be set to change. Creditors, it is suggested, are likely to be advocates of 
robust recovery mechanisms, rather than regulatory procedures. Thus, it is unsurprising 
that the government’s response to this criticism comes in the form of the compensation 
provisions. Throughout the legislative process, the driving factors behind the reforms 
were stated as being:242 
(a) to improve stakeholder confidence in the enforcement regime, and; 
(b) effect a change of behaviour in directors; 
(c) whilst providing better recourse to suffering creditors. 
As a natural extension of it, it is unsurprising that these objectives can readily be 
associated with the underlying objectives of the general disqualification regime. The 
idea is that through increased accountability for directors, the trust and confidence of 
stakeholders will increase in turn. Indeed, from a corporate governance perspective, it 
has the merits of promoting good stewardship, as well as being yet a further deterrent 
to director misconduct. As has been set out previously, a by-product of the specific 
deterrence is that it may generally raises standards of management which, from a 
corporate governance perspective, is no doubt welcome. Appealing to the needs of 
creditors and having a general appearance of being ‘tough’ on directors is surely key to 
increasing this confidence. It is also thought that by increasing the accountability of 
                                                 
owner Dominic Chappell prosecuted by Pensions Regulator’, The Telegraph (22 August 2017) 
available at <http://bit.ly/2glLqRQ> accessed 30 August 2017; ‘Sir Philip Green's reputation 'still 
stained' despite BHS pension deal’, BBC News (1 March 2017) available at <http://bbc.in/2lborhw> 
accessed 30 August 2017. 
241 Hicks, ‘Director disqualification: can it deliver?’ (n 138); Williams, ‘Disqualifying Directors: A 
Remedy Worse than the Disease?’ (n 139). 
242 DBIS, ‘Impact Assessment – Giving the court and Secretary of State (SoS) a power to make a 
compensatory award against a director’ (n 235) 1.  




directors in this way standards will be raised. If it is to be effective, however, there must 
be a ‘seen’ effect in the actual compensation of creditors. Primarily, it should therefore 
allow better recourse for those affected by misconduct, in a way that the law has not 
previously provided for. As Williams notes, whether the net level of recovery for 
creditors will increase in practice is unclear.243 In furtherance of that point, this section 
will therefore now continue by identifying some of the potential barriers to the success 
of the compensation mechanism.244 
Pressures on the IS 
2.40 The two-year clock for the SS to obtain compensation begins to run when the 
original disqualification order is made, or the undertaking is accepted. With what is 
arguably backwards thinking, one of the reasons for the recent increase from two years 
to three of the limitation period for disqualification proper, it seems, stems from the 
fact that the IS has in the past been under-resourced to the point of being unable to 
conclude cases within the limitation period. Thus, instead of leading to a proper 
resourcing of the Investigations Unit, it merely drove an extension of the limitation 
period. In order to secure a compensation order or undertaking it is clear that additional 
investigations, beyond those currently conducted, will be required. Naturally this has 
further implications for the IS with respect to the time and cost involved. It has been 
estimated that investigation costs for each case considered for compensation may rise 
by 20-50 per cent.245 Despite failings in the past, there is some hope that they will not 
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translate in to the compensation regime. One reason for this is because much of the 
evidence gathered in order to a secure a disqualification in the first place will no doubt 
also be instrumental in obtaining a compensation order or undertaking. Much of the 
additional work required, it is suggested, will probably involve satisfying the causal link 
between the loss and the misconduct. Taken in conjunction with the extension of the 
limitation period, and simplified reporting requirements, it is hoped by the author that 
this will reduce the need for some of those criticisms previously expressed. In most 
cases, it has been suggested that compensation orders or undertakings would in fact be 
sought contemporaneously with the disqualification itself.246 In any event, the IS has 
pledged to ensure that directors are fully informed, and have sufficient notice, should 
the intention be to pursue them for compensation.247 At worst, however, a director may 
be embroiled in proceedings for up to five years.248 Only time will tell as to whether the 
IS will be able to deal with the additional pressures placed upon it under the new regime. 
Further, questions should be raised as to whether additional resources will be secured 
to ease the burden currently suffered by the Investigations Unit, though recent accounts 
do not show any significant additional funding from DBEIS at present.249 If resourcing 
is still a core difficulty within the IS, then it must follow that increasing the current 
workload to include compensation claims has the potential to diminish the effectiveness 
of the disqualification regime as a whole, if cases cannot be investigated and 
proceedings instigated in a timely manner. 
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2.41 Walton has raised concerns with regards to how the existing private recovery 
mechanisms, will interact with the new compensation legislation.250 He suggests that 
there is a ‘real risk that any compensation orders or undertakings being sought by the 
Secretary of State…may interfere with or prevent actions currently being taken by 
office holders’.251 There are in effect two ‘interference’ arguments in the author’s mind. 
Firstly, both parties (the office holder on the one hand, and the state on the other) may 
launch proceedings against the same individual, for the same or similar misconduct. If 
communication fails between the two parties, and thus the litigation is not properly 
orchestrated the consequences may be significant in terms of costs (to creditors, as well 
as the tax payer), as well as in hindering the efficiency of the regime. There are also 
clear difficulties in terms of double recovery, and the means of how this will be avoided 
is unclear. Vicky Bagnall, director of investigation and enforcement services at the IS, 
has stated that the process will require ‘collaborative working’252 and a ‘continuous 
dialogue’253 in order to avoid these issues. This may be all the more difficult to ensure 
given that, inter alia, wrongful and fraudulent trading claims can now be assigned to 
third parties as dealt with later in this thesis.254 The IS will have to ensure sufficient 
communications with assignees so that proceedings are not launched needlessly; at cost 
to the taxpayer. It will therefore be interesting to see how these issues resolve 
themselves in practice, though the author retains some scepticism as to what rather 
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sounds like a haphazard approach at present. The second issue relating to interference 
is that officeholders may refrain from taking action against directors and instead ‘sit 
and wait’ for the SS to pursue a claim under the compensation provisions. The reasons 
for this are fairly plain, as Williams argues: 
[The risk of private enforcement litigation] would tempt many insolvency practitioners 
to pass issues of civil recovery to the SS, which after all, could well be the lowest-risk 
way of securing the highest compensation for creditors. Passing the costs of recovery 
to the state lowers the expenses of the liquidation through lower insolvency practitioner 
fees and creates no risk of litigation costs falling on creditors, enabling the office holder 
to achieve a better return for creditors in a shorter time scale.255 
The result of which, he suggests, ‘could have the effect of encouraging insolvency 
practitioners to shift the financial burden of civil recovery from the estate of insolvent 
corporations to the state’.256 As to this point, however, Bagnall has rather conclusively 
stated that: 
[The IS] certainly don’t want to bring proceedings where the IP is already 
contemplating recoveries for the same misconduct…[so] we expect that in many cases, 
the office-holder will continue, as now, to take recovery action.257 
As an initial point, to state that ‘in many cases’ the officeholder will take action (i.e. the 
state will not) is surely to concede that the section will have limited application in a very 
small number of cases. More substantively, again, this seems something of a haphazard 
approach to the issue. Without a clear implemented policy, as to how the differing 
interests between the various stakeholders is to be managed, it is suggested that 
Walton’s fears are highly likely to become a reality. The whole issue can be reduced to 
that of costs: the state will commence proceedings in the public interest, at its own cost, 
but it will only do so where private financing is unavailable as its resources are limited. 
The officeholder, on the other hand, who is tasked with ensuring the best return for 
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unsecured creditors, is incentivised to decline to take action so that it may be funded by 
the state. The author therefore has in mind a rather childish stalemate type situation, 
where each party anxiously awaits to see whether the other will make the first move. 
Of course, the danger is that in the end neither makes a move in a timely fashion 
(considering the two-year limitation period), thereby hindering returns for creditors and 
the effectiveness of the regime, as compared with the previous system. It goes without 
saying, that this is no way to go about the very serious business that is disqualification. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Bagnall is intently willing on the need for a strengthened 
collaboration with IPs, given that this particularly fragile link in the chain may lead to 
the undoing of the compensation regime, before the benefits of it have even begun to 
take effect.  
 ‘Cherry Picking’ 
2.42 The Impact Assessment suggested that the SS may pursue directors for 
compensation particularly where vulnerable members of the public (perhaps 
consumers) are concerned, or where there are large numbers of unsecured creditors.258 
That aside, it also made clear that compensatory awards would only be sought against 
directors in the most serious of cases.259 The level of seriousness of a case is thought to 
be gauged with reference to the period for which a director is disqualified, in line with 
the Sevenoaks brackets. It is assumed by the author therefore that the IS would only 
consider pursuing those cases where a disqualification is for a period in either the 
middle or upper Sevenoaks brackets (i.e. greater than five years), given that conduct in 
                                                 
258 DBIS, ‘Impact Assessment – Giving the court and Secretary of State (SoS) a power to make a 
compensatory award against a director’ (n 235) para 42. 




the lower bracket is generally expressed as being ‘minor’. The reason for this limitation 
is perhaps unclear. The legislation itself does not impose any criteria with regards to the 
severity of the misconduct. As previously discussed, it merely requires that a director 
has been disqualified under the CDDA 1986 and that there is some level of loss 
attributable to the misconduct. Whilst it provides that the severity of the conduct is a 
relevant factor in determining the quantum of the compensation to award, it does not 
impact upon a director’s general exposure to liability. A question therefore has to be 
asked as to why the IS would choose to artificially limit the scope of the provisions by 
‘cherry picking’ the cases to bring forward. There are several practical reasons why an 
action may not be pursued against any individual director, for instance, a lack of 
evidence, a director’s inability to pay, or the balancing of investigative priorities (i.e. IS 
resource constraints).260 However, these matters would not explain a steadfast policy of 
rejecting less serious cases. It is possible that the IS wishes to make an example of 
directors who commit serious misconduct, though it is submitted this would be counter 
to the objective of the legislation to protect; rather than to punish. Again, in a similar 
fashion to arguments put forward previously in this chapter, it is suggested that if the 
introduction of compensation is to shift the focus of the regime more forcefully into the 
territory of punishment, then the underlying disqualification framework ought to be 
revisited. One might also think that serious cases are more likely to involve the largest 
amounts of loss, and therefore be the most appropriate to consider for compensation. 
However, although the quantum of loss suffered is a consideration in compensation 
matters, it does not appear to be a factor considered when determining the length of the 
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period of disqualification itself.261 In short, it is not necessarily true that longer periods 
of disqualification are associated with any greater amount of loss. Thus, prosecuting 
these cases in particular may be no more or less advantageous, and there seems little 
rationale for discriminating between directors who have committed greater and lesser 
misconduct. Furthermore, it introduces uncertainty for creditors as to whether they will, 
in practice, be able to depend on the compensation provisions. Strangely, creditors have 
to rely on directors to be sufficiently improper so as to warrant proceedings being taken. 
This is in spite of the fact that increasing stakeholder confidence (presumably across 
the board) is a core aim of the regime. The author adopts the concerns of Sarah Paterson, 
who fears that the compensation regime may end up becoming a ‘politically engaged 
remedy’.262 Here, directors would be pursued for compensation only where potential 
losses to creditors or the seriousness of the misconduct is considered ‘intolerable to 
public opinion’.263 Such an approach if it materialises, of course, is difficult to square 
with the underlying objectives of either disqualification proper or the compensation 
mechanism.  
Challenging Deterrence (Again) 
2.43 The threat of compensation should, in theory, aid in the deterrence agenda of 
disqualification generally by ensuring that directors are more financially proximate to 
their own risk taking; thereby reducing the moral hazard problem, and deterring self-
dealing or other misconduct. However, as Williams recognises, it will only do so where 
there is an ‘increased likelihood of civil liability in disqualification as compared to the 
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likelihood of sanction under existing rules’.264 If effective, incidences of this behaviour 
should decrease, or at the very least not increase, and standards of company directors 
should therefore be improved overall. It should be reiterated that many of these same 
arguments have been made in favour of disqualification proper over the years; the fruits 
of which remain to be seen. However, instead of mere regulatory action by the State the 
new power permits personal assets to be touched. Therefore, it may be the key to 
reinvigorating the deterrence objective of disqualification.  Despite this optimism, if the 
new provisions are to rectify issues of the past, there are several concerns that must be 
first addressed. Two distinct issues that may give rise to further or accentuated 
difficulties will therefore be examined below. 
2.44 Awareness As set out previously, awareness amongst directors of 
disqualification proper is low. If the new compensation provisions are to be effective, 
the IS needs to revisit this issue. At the time of writing, the author is not aware of any 
such steps relating to compensation specifically. It will also be remembered that no 
action was taken by the State to notify directors of the new changes; save for 
information published on the IS and CH websites.  
2.45 ‘Cherry picking’ revisited The issue of the State ‘cherry picking’ cases to pursue 
for compensation, dealt with previously, also has some relevance in the specific context 
of deterrence. It is argued here that the artificial filtering of cases in such a way can only 
hinder the prospect of a successful deterrence agenda. It is of course to be expected that 
minor misconduct would not be placed on an equal footing with more serious 
misconduct. However, it is submitted that in outwardly maintaining a policy not to 
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pursue instances of minor misconduct, this will not only fail to deter directors from it, 
but it may even go some way as to rationalise the behaviour; leading to directors feeling 
that they can ‘get away with it’. As such, it is tentatively suggested it may go as far as 
to encourage certain types of misconduct. By the same token, due to the discriminatory 
element of the policy, those who are disqualified for serious misconduct and ordered to 
pay compensation, when those who commit misconduct at the lesser end of the scale 
are not considered, may be in fact justified in feeling that the proceedings are punitive 
and vindictive. Most importantly, in line with Loughrey’s arguments, set out previously, 
this is again unlikely to effect a change in director behaviour.265  
2.46 Summary In summary, although deterrence is merely one element, it is an 
important one. It is argued here that the introduction of compensation orders and 
undertakings presented an opportune time to rectify previous failings under the existing 
legislation. Based on the hypothesis that directors who face both financial and 
regulatory sanctions are more likely to conform to higher standards of management than 
those who merely face regulatory sanctions, it has the potential to occupy a far larger 
role in disqualification than it does at present. These arguments will be further expanded 
upon in the next chapter and, in particular, the penultimate chapter when dealing with 
general reforms. 
THE COST OF CHALLENGING UNDERTAKINGS 
2.47 The very purpose of introducing disqualification undertakings was to reduce the 
time and cost involved in obtaining court orders,266 thereby reducing the burden on the 
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taxpayer on the one hand, as well as anxiety for directors who would otherwise have to 
go through a protracted judicial process. To this end, it is clear that undertakings have 
done just that. One of the substantial criticisms267 over the introduction of an 
undertakings regime however was that it would deny directors the right to ‘have their 
day in court’. Of course, a director has always been free to refuse an undertaking (and 
thus have their day in court), but this may well be a false choice. As a trade-off for these 
efficiency savings, there is a not insignificant risk that some directors are coerced into 
giving an undertaking so as to limit any additional financial exposure – potentially even 
in cases where the evidence against them is weak. This is because the usual litigation 
rule as to the award of costs (i.e. that the claimant pays the defendant’s costs on 
discontinuance)268 is reversed in disqualification cases.269 Directors therefore have to be 
especially mindful that if an undertaking is initially refused, they may face considerable 
financial consequences if they should later have a change of heart. This imbalance in 
relation to costs, when combined with the fact that the IS, in relative terms, has 
unlimited investigation resources at their disposal as against the individual director, who 
may be unable to even afford to instruct a solicitor, thus uncovers considerable potential 
for oppression to fester in the undertakings regime.270 The survey conducted by Hicks 
in 1998 explored these issues somewhat.271 It must be remembered that his survey pre-
dates the introduction of undertakings, and therefore only concerns disqualification 
orders. However, this is useful as it details the type of costs that directors who seek to 
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challenge undertakings may ultimately be faced with. Hicks noted the average cost of 
defending was £18,000, though in some cases it ran in to the hundreds of thousands.272 
Moreover, adverse costs orders averaged at £7,800 though, again, some were much 
higher.273 Hicks therefore estimates the total cost of defending proceedings to be in the 
region of £25,000-30,000.274 In the survey, only 50 per cent defended disqualification 
cases and, amongst those that did not, the primary reason was that they could not afford 
to do so.275 This led Hicks to identify that the most often cited reason (in 27 per cent of 
cases)276 for directors finding the disqualification process to be unfair was the expense 
and complexity of the process.277 Many thought that, in effect, they were denied access 
to justice; one particularly disgruntled director referred to the entire process as a ‘gravy 
train’ for lawyers and accountants.278 Directors therefore simply ‘rolled over’ because, 
as Hicks summarises:  
They could not afford the time, energy and money to oppose the state machine with its 
apparently unlimited expertise and resources.279   
2.48 Owner-managers Again, when one remembers that, by and large, most 
disqualifications are suffered by owner-managers of small concerns, the problem is 
magnified somewhat. Moreover, empirical research conducted by this author, set out in 
the next chapter, suggests that a small but noticeable proportion of disqualified directors 
suffer bankruptcy following the corporate insolvency.280 Owner-managers, who are 
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likely to be the only source of capital in their business, are known to plough personal 
funds into their ailing company in order to try and save it. A proportion of these directors 
will have given personal guarantees to banks or other lenders.281 The reality is that many 
of the individuals in this demographic will have insufficient assets to be able to 
challenge even the threat of an undertaking in the first place. Thus, the idea of directors 
having a legitimate choice of being able to have their case heard before a court is, in 
many instances, almost certainly an illusory one.  
2.49 Compensation undertakings It is further argued, for reasons that will now be 
obvious, that this potential for oppression is likely to become all the more noticeable 
once the compensation regime takes hold. Here, we are dealing with very large sums 
indeed. In terms of the cost of defending proceedings, as stated above, the IS has 
estimated an increase of 20-50 per cent in its own investigation costs.282 If this is 
translated into the costs payable by those who seek to compensations undertakings, 
alongside the disqualification undertaking itself, in line with Hicks’ figures, this may 
see legal costs easily exceed £50,000. Moreover, it will be remembered the average 
figure the IS suggested as being obtained for creditors was some £132,000.283 Although 
this calculation is by no means an absolute science, it may be said that in a typical case 
a director will face having to pay sums bordering £200,000. If it is assumed that most 
directors will not be able to afford such sums, as this author does, then invariably they 
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will face two choices: bankruptcy, or challenging the undertaking(s). Relative to the 
principal amount of compensation, the issue of legal costs will invariably fall into 
insignificance. Therefore, there may be an argument to suggest that more directors will 
seek to challenge undertakings, given that in either circumstance they will ultimately 
be faced with bankruptcy proceedings anyway. Unlike what has been seen in the past, 
the scenario envisaged here could result in a significant proportion of directors wishing 
to take their chances with a court hearing as, simply put, they would have nothing to 
lose if bankruptcy is already a foregone conclusion. Given the fact that most 
disqualification and compensation undertakings will be sought contemporaneously,284 
this may leave these directors with little choice but to challenge both undertakings at 
increased cost. If this were to become a reality, the effectiveness of undertakings as 
being a time and cost saving initiative both for the courts and the general taxpayer, in 
this admittedly small subset of cases, would then be brought into question. It has been 
stated by the IS that they will only pursue those directors for compensation who, to put 
it bluntly, can afford to pay.285 But, considering the demographic and solvency issues 
explored in the next chapter,286 the author remains fundamentally sceptical, to put it 
rather simply, whether the IS will be able to find anyone that meets the criteria. 
2.50 Considering effectiveness The issue of balancing the rights of individuals, and 
the need to protect the public from the abuse of limited liability (and deter others from 
doing so) permeates the entire fabric of public regulation in this area. The scope for 
oppression as regards costs brings the need for a fair balance more sharply in to focus. 
                                                 






Should the proper balance not be maintained, then the interests of justice are 
compromised. Thus, the concerns expressed above in relation to oppression must be 
constantly guarded against by the IS if trust and confidence in the regime is to be 
maintained, and increased beyond current levels. The essential point is that bureaucratic 
concerns of the IS287 should never trump the fair treatment of defendants in what is 
probably at the very least a quasi-criminal process.288 The impact of the compensation 
regime, on the issue of oppression, may inevitably create some ripples given the huge 
financial stakes. As stated, this may lead to an increase in the number of challenges 
made thereby frustrating, at least in part, the underlying purpose of undertakings 
(including disqualification proper undertakings) and hinder the overall effectiveness of 
the regime in the process. 
CONCLUSION 
2.51 Being ex post facto, disqualification proper and the newly introduced 
compensation mechanisms are inevitably condemned to at least partial failure in 
protecting the public from abuses of limited liability. This chapter has gone some way 
in exploring a number of the prominent difficulties faced by the regime, and it has 
speculated on emerging difficulties – and opportunities – created by the SBEEA. In 
short, it cannot be said convincingly that disqualification is operating in line with its 
underlying objectives. In reality, the number of disqualifications each year is relatively 
low. In part, this has been caused by significant administrative failings, and IS resource 
constraints. However, even where directors are disqualified, the overall direct protective 
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benefit of disqualification proper to creditors is limited. This may be set to change 
following the introduction of the compensation mechanisms, which provide a means of 
direct redress for creditors. However, as has been alluded to, and as will be more fully 
expanded upon in the next chapter,289 the author is sceptical as to its utility given the 
tiny proportion of directors that are likely to be suitable to pursue. Thus, any real 
increase felt by creditors is likely to be minimal at best. Returning to disqualification 
proper, concerns of construction within section 6 have also played their part in 
diminishing the efficacy of the regime. Put simply, there is little wonder that directors 
often struggle to understand the extent of their (ever increasing) duties, and the type of 
conduct that might lead to a finding of ‘unfitness’. Whilst it is reassuring that this has 
been recognised by the state in its enactment of the SBEEA 2015 as being a concern, 
only time will tell whether the measures put in place go far enough. One of the author’s 
primary concerns, which has been laboured throughout this chapter, is that the 
deterrence objective continues to go unfulfilled. Much of this stems from a sheer lack 
of awareness of the sanctions that directors can face should they misbehave whilst 
carrying out their office. Whilst true rogues will never be dissuaded from misconduct, 
and can likely never be deterred by sanctions, far more could be done to increase the 
profile of disqualification in an effort to target the vast majority who can be deterred if 
both the knowledge of, and the threat of, sanctions is pervasive enough. As a corollary 
to that point, the third objective of disqualification – raising standards of management 
– exists, in this author’s mind, in name only. It has been shown that the state takes no 
proactive steps to improve standards and appears simply reliant on the deterrent aspect 





of disqualification to carry this objective into effect. But, the failure of disqualification 
as a deterrent has thus inevitably led to failure in equal measure of this objective. The 
potential scope for oppression in the regime is another area that needs to be monitored 
carefully, particularly given the introduction of compensation orders and undertakings. 
It seems to this author that the disqualification regime is rather on the cusp of ‘penal’ 
or ‘criminal’ territory. Care must therefore be taken to prevent the compensation 







AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
 
3.1 Given the large amount of literature on the subject of disqualification 
undertakings it is surprising that very few studies of an empirical nature have been 
conducted. In part, this may be a result of statistics published on an annual basis by CH 
and the IS.290 As the body responsible for maintaining the statutory register of 
disqualified directors,291 the data published by CH provides details as to the total number 
of directors disqualified each year, whether by order or undertaking. The data is broken 
down by disqualifications made under each section of the CDDA 1986. The statistics 
provided by the IS, on the other hand, report details of only those directors that they 
themselves have investigated and prosecuted. The IS data, however, is far more 
extensive. It contains details of the total number of directors disqualified each year; a 
breakdown of disqualifications by period based upon the Sevenoaks classification; and, 
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in the case of section 6 CDDA 1986 undertakings, a breakdown of the type or category 
of allegations of misconduct which led to the disqualification. 
3.2 These ‘headline’ figures, particularly those of the IS, provide some insight into 
the operation of the regime. In some ways, however, they simply beg more questions 
than they answer. In pursuit of developing a more nuanced understanding of the 
undertakings regime, this chapter explores the findings of a survey of disqualified 
directors conducted by the present author. In gathering individual records of directors 
and conducting a detailed analysis of the results, the current state of the disqualification 
undertakings regime will be examined in order to evaluate its adherence to the global 
aims of disqualification, as set out in the previous chapter.292   
EXISTING SURVEYS 
3.3 Before setting out the approach of this author, some attention should be paid to 
the existing surveys in this area. There are three of note. The first was carried out by the 
NAO in 1993,293 which set out inter alia to understand the effectiveness of the 
disqualification regime.294 Some of those findings were discussed in the previous 
chapter.295 The second was conducted by Hicks in 1998.296 This empirical analysis 
considered disqualification orders and their wider impact, and in doing so sought to 
assess the effectiveness of disqualification as an enforcement mechanism. The third, far 
more recent, survey was conducted by Williams in 2008 and published in 2011.297 It 
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analysed 397 records of directors disqualified by undertakings. The existence of other 
statistical material allows for some direct comparison between findings across the 
various sources, assuming a similar methodological approach. To that end, the author 
will take a similar approach to that of Williams in his analysis. However, this chapter 
intends to bring those statistical findings up to date and take Williams’ research one-
step further in order to provide yet additional insight as to the effectiveness of the 
current regime. It will do so largely through the involvement of a second data source, 
namely the register of disqualified directors provided by CH.  
PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY 
3.4 The primary purpose of the survey is to uncover, as accurately as is possible, 
whether the current undertakings regime operates as it ought to. It is suggested here that 
an effective, and thus successful, undertakings regime should ensure that directors are 
appropriately being disqualified within the meaning of section 6 CDDA 1986; for a 
period of time that is both adequate to protect the public, and proportionate to the 
misconduct committed; that the disqualification regime acts as a deterrent to others from 
committing misconduct; and that the consequences of breaching an undertaking are of 
gravity such as to dissuade disqualified directors from doing so, thereby raising 
standards. Ultimately, with this in mind, such a regime should facilitate the protection 
of the public against delinquent company directors. The author sets out to: 
(a) demonstrate that the survey data is sufficiently valid and reliable for present 
purposes; 
(b) explore the issues and defects that arise in the data sources used; 
(c) assess the accuracy and utility of the online register of disqualified persons 
provided by CH; 
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(d) demonstrate the most common forms of misconduct that lead to disqualification 
for ‘unfitness’, as well as the average period of disqualification for each such 
category, and therefore the forms of misconduct which attract both the highest and 
lowest periods of disqualification. Moreover, to speculate upon the process that the 
IS undertakes in determining the period of disqualification, and any relevant factors 
that may be considered as part of that process; 
(e) consider the average deficit of an insolvent company which led to a director 
being disqualified; 
(f) explore the deterrence implications of disqualification by identifying those 
directors that act in breach of pre-existing disqualifications or bankruptcy 
restrictions; 
(g) consider the potential implications of compensation orders and undertakings on 
the regime going forward; including the ‘target market’ for them based upon an 
analysis of the solvency of disqualified directors; 
(h) analyse the share capital of those insolvent companies that led to a director being 
disqualified, so as to comment on the issue of capitalisation; and 




3.5 The source of the data, which forms the basis for much of the statistical analysis 
presented hereafter, was the Disqualification Outcomes Facility provided by the IS (the 
‘IES’).298 The IES is, in effect, a publicly available register of disqualified directors.299 
Part of the reason for its existence is to demonstrate the success of IS enforcement 
agents -  adding to the deterrence effect – and, as such, a new record is listed on it when 
an undertaking is obtained. Records remain live for a period of three months from the 
date that they are first added.300 Each record contains a large amount of biographical 
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information about each director including their name, last known address, date of birth 
and nationality. It also contains details of the insolvent company, the length of the 
disqualification and its start and end dates. Importantly, within each record is also a 
detailed report of the director’s misconduct which led to the disqualification. This report 
is adapted from the undisputed findings in the ‘Schedule of Unfit Conduct’ that is 
appended to every disqualification undertaking. As will be discussed, this misconduct 
report generally is made up of certain ‘stock’ phrases. In many cases it also includes 
details of the insolvent company’s assets and liabilities, as well as any creditor 
deficiencies at the time of disqualification.  
3.6 The period of the survey The author collected data from the IES for analysis on 
the 30th November 2013. On that day, there were 288 records listed. Given the stated 
three-month viewing period from the date of submission, this should have dictated that 
undertakings added between 30th August 2013 and 30th November 2013 were visible. 
However, the data in the survey actually spanned across an approximately four-month 
period from 29th July 2013 to 19th November 2013. In contrast, Williams in his survey 
was afforded six months of data from the same source.301 Whilst something of a minor 
point, the author conducted some investigations to explore the reduction (by 
approximately half) of the data made available. It is proven through the use of Internet 
archiving tools that six months of data was available on the IES until approximately 
July 2011.302 At the same time the IS website was overhauled as part of a government 
initiative, as commented upon in the Annual Report for that year: 
                                                 
301 Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.3. 
302 This was achieved using the Internet Archive ‘Wayback Machine’ at <http://bit.ly/1i7Bzdj> 
accessed 1 July 2017. 
Disqualification Undertakings: An Empirical Study 
 
 93 
At the end of July 2011, The [Insolvency] Service’s website was transferred to the BIS 
website platform. The transfer was part of the government’s Service Transformation 
Agreement which set out to improve delivery by radically reducing the number of 
government websites by 2011.303 
It is unclear why the decision was taken by the IS to reduce the time period for which 
records are displayed. However, it is suggested that in doing so the IS has, despite its 
mandate to improve the delivery of services, surely hindered the public interest aspect 
of ensuring the information it publishes is freely available to interested parties. Not only 
did the transfer to the DBIS platform see a reduction in the number of records visible at 
any one time, it also significantly altered the format and type of the data presented. 
Before the redesign, the IES contained a greater number of variables within each record, 
including a figure of the deficiency of the company; type of insolvency; sector or 
business the company was involved in; whether the disqualification was the result of an 
order or an undertaking; and the date the order was made or the undertaking was given. 
In the present database, most of this supplementary information was available within 
the misconduct details section of each record, though each report had to be individually 
read and analysed to extract the requisite information. As such the IES has clearly seen 
a decrease in both functionality and usability between the time of Williams’ survey and 
the one conducted by the present author. In the case of the additional details within each 
record, this can likely be put down to resource constraints.304 However, there appears to 
be no conceivable explanation for reducing the number of records placed on the system. 
Nonetheless, save for the reduced scope, this did not affect the substance of the survey 
carried out. 
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3.7 Collecting the Data The IES is simply a list on a single webpage of every 
director available to view at the particular time of access.305 Summary details were 
provided for each director on this page including the full name, company name, 
disqualification length, the date of submission to the database, and a hyperlink allowing 
the user to click through to see ‘more details’ about a particular record. This ‘more 
details’ webpage included the record of misconduct detailed previously. A computer 
programme was written by the author for the purpose of automatically retrieving all of 
this data, including that set out on the ‘more details’ page.  This approach was adopted 
given the author’s background in computer science and in order to reduce the time taken 
to complete the study. Otherwise, collection would have been a very protracted and 
laborious process. Upon retrieving the data, the programme collated it into a single, 
keyed, table within a relational database both for ease of viewing, and so that statistical 
analysis could be conducted at a later point in time using the application SPSS Statistics 
(‘SPSS’).306 Table 1 below indicates the table structure of the data obtained by the 
author’s programme: 
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Table 1: The structure of the table containing data from the IES Database 
Name Description 
id A unique integer identifier (primary key) 
name The name of the director disqualified 
co_number The number at CH of the company involved 
co_name The name of the company involved 
length The period in the format ‘X Years Y Months’ 
submitted The date the record was added to the IES 
dob The date of birth of the director involved 
date_starts The start date of the disqualification 
conduct The misconduct report 
3.8 Data Processing Once the data had been collected, processing was required to 
make it compliant for import into SPSS. In three cases a record suffered from a broken 
‘more details’ link. Because of this, two of the three records in question could not be 
included in the survey data due to the fact that the vital information relating to the 
misconduct could not be sourced. However, the third of these records could be included 
as the individual in question was one of two directors disqualified due to their 
misconduct in the management of the same company. Moreover, each suffered the same 
period of disqualification. On that basis, it was assumed for the purposes of the survey 
the conduct leading to disqualification for one director (which was available for 
viewing) was the same for the other (which was not). In addition, one of the records in 
the database was a duplicate and so was removed.  For technical reasons, namely to 
enable numerical processing, it was also necessary to convert the data in each ‘length’ 
field (containing the period of disqualification) from a string type (e.g. ’12 Years 6 
Months’) to a decimal floating-point type variable (e.g. 12.5). Overall, counting the 
exclusions and corrections, this left a total of 285 records to be used for analysis in the 
survey.  
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Limitations, reliability and validity 
3.9 Introducing the DDR At this stage it is necessary to introduce a second database 
used by the author in conducting the survey: the Disqualified Directors Register 
(‘DDR’) provided by CH.307 As the name would suggest, this contains a list of every308 
disqualified director. It is this register that CH is required to maintain by statute in the 
public interest. Much of the same biographical data provided by the IES is also available 
on the DDR. Moreover, it contains basic details about the company or companies 
involved; the length of the disqualification; the start and end dates of the 
disqualification; the section of the CDDA 1986 (or CDDO for Northern Ireland) under 
which the individual was disqualified; and the number of disqualification orders against 
the individual309. Information on the DDR is viewable publically until the 
disqualification lapses at which point it is, presumably automatically, removed. What 
the DDR does not provide, unlike the IES, is the misconduct report itself. Instead, it 
merely documents the authority under which the disqualification was made, for 
example, ‘CDDA 1986 S7’. It is therefore impossible from this dataset alone to 
ascertain the underlying factual background to the misconduct.310 The initial data from 
the DDR was retrieved on the same day as that of the IES, at which point there were 
7,874 disqualified directors on the register. The DDR was put to a variety of uses, and 
it will be revisited throughout this chapter and the thesis. However, it must be 
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introduced at this stage as in large part it was used as a way of investigating the 
reliability and validity of the survey data. It is remembered that when the SS accepts an 
undertaking prosecuted by the IS, the information is added to the IES as record of the 
disqualification. This information is then forwarded to CH for publication on the DDR. 
Similarly, when a disqualification order is made by a court there is an obligation to 
forward details of the order directly to CH for reflection on the DDR.311 Each record on 
the IES should therefore appear on the DDR, and contain the same data.312 This fact 
allowed the author to cross-reference the two data sources so as to make findings on the 
survey data’s integrity overall. 
3.10 Errors and omissions It is suggested that most would have no reason to be in 
doubt of the accuracy of government data. Indeed, prior academic works, also 
predicated upon the validity of the official data simply assume accuracy without 
question.313 Following the collection of the survey data, and having had the benefit of 
the DDR however, the present author is less convinced. On that basis, the limitations of 
the survey must now be dealt with. Due to the fact that the survey is in effect made up 
of secondary data the findings made – and the conclusions drawn – assume that the data 
is both reliable and valid. This assumption underpins all that is to follow. Whilst 
collating the data the author carried out several tests to ensure data consistency and 
validity. Checks were made so as to ensure that there were no obvious errors or 
                                                 
311 The Companies (Disqualification Orders) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/2471 reg 6. However, it has 
been suggested in the past that this does not happen in a timely fashion, leading to inaccuracies on 
the register. This point, amongst others, will be discussed later in this chapter, see 3.50. 
312 At least, of course, in so far as the data is held on each respective system. As is implied, they 
often do not match: see 3.50. 
313 By way of example, Williams when conducting his survey dealt with the matter in a sentence; 
indicating that there was no reason to doubt the data provided. See Williams, Disqualification 
Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.70. 
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omissions in any of the records before conducting the statistical analysis. It transpired 
that there were six omissions and six errors,314 as detailed in Figure 1 below:  
Figure 1: Errors and omissions in the survey data  
ERRORS 
Field Raw Value Rectified 
Value 
Description 
dob 19/07/2013 19/07/1956 Human error. The 
current year was 
entered instead of the 
year of birth. Correct 
data obtained from 
DDR. 
28/03/2013 28/03/1956 Human error. The 
current year was 
entered instead of the 
year of birth. Correct 
data obtained from 
DDR. 
02/11/1969 01/11/1968 Human error. The date 
of birth was 
incorrect. Correct 
data obtained from 
DDR. 
date_starts 2103 2013 Human error. A 
typographical was made 
inputting the current 
year.  
submitted 213 2013 
22/08/2008 22/08/2013 Human error. The 





                                                 
314 Included within that total are the three previously mentioned records; two excluded and 1 
rectified. 







submitted N/A The submission date was blank. This 
record could not be rectified, 
though this particular column is 
not consequential to the findings 
of the survey. 
N/A The submission date was blank. This 
record could not be rectified, 
though this particular column is 
not consequential to the findings 
of the survey. 
dob 06/11/1960 The date of birth was blank. Cross-
referencing the name and company 
number with the DDR rectified this. 
conduct N/A The ‘more details’ link to this 
record was broken and therefore the 
conduct data could not be 
established. This record had to be 
removed from the survey entirely. 
N/A The ‘more details’ link to this 
record was broken and therefore the 
conduct data could not be 
established. This record had to be 
removed from the survey entirely. 
N/A The ‘more details’ link to this 
record was broken. Conduct data was 
obtained from another director of 
the same company and the record was 
rectified. 
 
3.11 At this juncture, the impact of these errors and omissions upon the integrity of 
the survey demands further comment. Many were identified with a cursory reading of 
the data gathered, and others were confirmed by cross-checking the information with 
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the DDR. The reader must be reminded that the IES is not the official public register 
and, as such, one might expect there to be less thorough quality control standards 
applied in ensuring the integrity of the data in respect of that database. After all, these 
are tasks of administration and are susceptible to human error. In the context of the 
survey these errors and omissions accounted for just less than 5 per cent of the records. 
However, it should be recognised that a seemingly small and controlled amount of 
human error can give rise to catastrophic consequences in a statistical survey.315 In order 
to address and minimise data entry issues the author used the two databases at hand, 
having the benefit that they covered largely the same information; but were from two 
separate executive agencies. As a result, many of the records in issue could be rectified 
quickly before importation into SPSS. In the case of the errors, the evidence strongly 
would suggest that simple human error is at fault. It is more difficult to speculate upon 
the reasoning for the omissions in the survey data. However, it is likely that the 
information was not on hand at the time of the data input, or there was an oversight on 
the part of the one responsible for the entry. 
3.12 Summary Given the above findings it is clear that although there were some 
issues with the data, the rate of error would appear to fall within ‘acceptable’ margins.316 
It should also be noted, however, that the error rate stated is only calculated upon 
findings following basic validation tests. It is therefore anticipated that the rate of error 
                                                 
315 As stated by Barchard and Pace, ‘[j]ust one or two serious data entry errors can completely alter 
(and invalidate) a statistical analysis’. See Kimberly Barchard and Larry Pace, ‘Preventing human 
error: The impact of data entry methods on data accuracy and statistical results’ (2011) 27 
Computers in Human Behavior 1834. 
316 See Ian Atkinson, ‘Accuracy of data transfer: double data entry and estimating levels of error’ 
(2012) 21 Journal of Clinical Nursing 2730, 2731 where data entry error in that survey was posited 
at between 2.3 and 26.9 per cent; though standard rates of expected error depend largely on the type 
of data entry method used: ibid 1836. 
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may in fact be higher, and the potential for error must be identified as a limitation of 
the analysis set out hereafter. Aside from those records mentioned, cross-referencing 
between the IES and DDR showed no signs of inaccurate reporting of the basic 
biographical data,317 nor the period of disqualification, for those records that appeared 
in the DDR. As will be explored later in this chapter, however, not all records were 
available on the DDR for verification of the IES data and as such these were impossible 
to verify against a second source.318 Verification of the misconduct reports was 
impossible for present purposes,319 and as such it is an assumption of the survey that 
they were both correct in content and in their association with each individual record. 
Naturally, all of the above is predicated on the global assumption that at least one of the 
databases used in the survey was accurate; the likelihood of which is not in question for 
the present purposes, though it must be identified as a potential limitation. The author 
has minimised his own data entry error culpability by ensuring that the data was 
retrieved, and imported into SPSS, by automated means and not manually. Save for 
correcting the data as set out in Figure 1 above, no further modifications were made. 
Analysis 
3.13 With the data collated, corrected, and imported into SPSS the next phase was to 
carry out the survey. This section will identify some of the substantive methodological 
decisions; laying the ground so that the reader can readily comprehend the subsequent 
findings. As has been stated, the IS provides its own measure of statistics in each annual 
                                                 
317 Though it should be noted that in Hicks, in his 1998 survey discovered many director addresses 
on the register were either missing, incomplete, or outdated. See Hicks, Disqualification of 
Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (n 18) 117-118. This was relevant to Hicks’ research as 
he contacted directors by post. 
318 3.50. 
319 Obtaining copies of original undertakings and their accompanying Schedules was, for present 
purposes, simply not feasible. 
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report that is broken down into various categories of misconduct. Table 2 below 
reproduces IS data from the 2012-2013 annual report and illustrates the number of 
allegations made across each category of misconduct over five financial years. The data 
reflects orders and undertakings made solely under section 6 of the CDDA 1986. As is 
shown, the number of allegations made can be seen to decline over the period, though 
it averages at around 1500 per year:320 












Crown Debts 563 816 636 635 626 
Accounting Matters 381 448 342 200 152 
Transactions to the 
detriment of creditors 
246 391 392 161 103 
Criminal matters 174 258 259 102 54 
Misappropriation of 
assets 
49 68 59 56 28 
Technical matters – 
statutory obligations 
46 33 70 52 50 
Trading at a time when 
company knowingly or 
unknowingly insolvent 
44 40 35 7 1 
Phoenix companies or 
multiple failures 
14 12 7 2 0 
Other 0 98 0 0 0 
Total 1517 2164 1800 1215 1014 
 
                                                 
320 Though since the time of the survey, the figures do appear to be increasing once more. For the 
year 2016-2017, 1272 allegations were made: IS, Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes 2016-
17 (n 87). 
321 IS, Supporting Data for Comparison of Performance in 2012-2013 to Previous Years (n 290) 3. 
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3.14 The author adopted these categories in his own survey. More needs to be said as 
to how these categories of allegations are determined. The misconduct report 
accompanying each survey record consisted of ‘stock’ phrases, i.e. specific phrases that 
were systematically used across the reports to identify particular types of misconduct. 
It should be noted that these ‘stock’ phrases formed the bulk of the report. Precisely 
zero of the records in the survey made reference to companies or insolvency legislation. 
The lack of primary legislation being cited is somewhat surprising, though this may be 
for several reasons; the most obvious perhaps being a desire to express the undisputed 
conduct in plain English so that it is understandable by the wider public when placed 
on the register.322 The use of ‘stock’ phrases however permitted the author the means to 
easily sort and categorise the type of misconduct within each record. Not by 
coincidence, the ‘stock’ phrases also fell into the broad categories listed in the IS annual 
report (e.g. Crown debt). It is obvious then that the misconduct report, given that it 
permits a ‘drilling down’ into more precise reasons for the disqualification, allows for 
a considerably greater scope of analysis than that found in the official statistics. An 
example of a ‘Crown debt’ misconduct report, with ‘stock’ phrase emphasised, is set 
out below: 
‘[The director] failed to ensure XYZ Limited complied with its statutory obligations to 
submit Value Added Tax returns and make full payment to HMRC. By failing to make 
the requisite payments for VAT when they were due, XYZ traded to the detriment of 
HMRC.’ 
3.15 It must be stressed to avoid confusion in the ensuing analysis that the number of 
allegations made, as is shown in the IS annual report, is not the same as the number of 
directors disqualified. This is because it is possible that an individual director has 
                                                 
322 As well as, of course, the director himself before he signs it. 
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accepted an undertaking concerning multiple allegations of misconduct. In short, a 
director may be disqualified for more than one reason. As such, the number of 
allegations generally exceeds the number of actual disqualifications made. For example 
it is fairly common, as will be seen from the survey data, for a director to accept an 
undertaking on a ‘Crown debt’ basis, and simultaneously on a ‘accounting matters’ 
basis.323 In the IS data, this would then lead to one instance of misconduct being counted 
for each of these categories. It is important to identify this as in conducting the author’s 
own survey the same approach was taken. For the sake of comparison between the IS 
data and the present survey, it was also desirable to collate the data relating to the 
misconduct description into similar broad categories as the ones provided by the IS in 
its annual report.324 It should be noted that the precise methodology of how the IS data 
is collated and categorised was not published as at the time of conducting the survey.325 
As such it was not definitively known which ‘stock’ statements fell within the broader 
categories and therefore a direct comparison of the two is difficult.326 However, the 
author in collating the survey data into his own categories took a common-sense 
approach.327  
                                                 
323 The reader will appreciate that the reason for this is that they are linked. Generally speaking 
accounting failures will often mean that a person is not properly paying HMRC. In terms of the 
‘stock’ statements which led to these categorisations, it was very common for a report to cite that a 
director ‘failed to maintain and/or preserve and/or deliver accounting records’ (‘accounting 
matters’) which then led to a ‘breach of obligations to HMRC’ (‘Crown debts’). 
324 A measure that was also adopted by Williams throughout his survey: Williams, Disqualification 
Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.8, Figure 1. 
325 This has since changed. See: IS, ‘Guide to Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes’ (2015) 
<http://bit.ly/2tXg6Rx> accessed 1 June 2017. 
326 For instance, the category ‘Other’ is one that is especially difficult to anticipate with any accuracy 
what particular types of misconduct might be included.  
327 To give a simple example, any ‘stock’ statements which mentioned a form of detriment to HMRC, 
howsoever caused, were categorised as Crown debts. Though, as with any rule there is an exception: 
MTIC fraud was not included in the Crown debt category as explored below. See 3.36. 
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3.16 As there were multiple ‘stock’ statements that fell within many of the broader 
categories it was very common for multiple allegations within the same category to be 
made. For instance, in relation to Crown debts three different ‘stock’ statements were 
identified: 
(a) trading to the detriment of HMRC; 
(b) breach of obligations to HMRC; 
(c) transaction(s) to the detriment of HMRC. 
It often (though not always) transpired that a director disqualified on the basis of Crown 
debts would have ‘breached her obligations to HMRC’ and ultimately ‘traded to 
HMRC’s detriment’. This would lead to two allegations being registered against the 
director, though within the same broad category of Crown debts. As such, in order to 
output meaningful data where there were multiple ‘stock’ statements within a broader 
category, the number of unique records within that category was also calculated so it 
could be compared to the total number of records in the survey. 
FINDINGS 
3.17 With that said, the findings of the survey will now be explored. Figure 2 below 
shows the breakdown of the survey data; categorised in the fashion explained 
previously: 
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Figure 2: Survey Data: Disqualification Orders and Undertakings (Section 6 of 
the CDDA 1986): Allegation Types 




Crown Debt 175  61.4 
 Trading to the detriment of HMRC 163 62.5 57.2 
Breach of obligations to HMRC 96 36.8 33.7 
Transaction(s) to the detriment of HMRC 2 0.8 0.7 
Accounting 53  18.6 
 Failure to maintain and/or preserve and/or 
deliver accounting records 
39 71.0 13.7 
Failure to produce and/or maintain 
accounting records 
4 7.3 1.4 
Failure to prepare accounting records 1 1.8 0.4 
Failure to deliver accounting records 3 5.5 1.1 
Failure to file accounts and/or returns 5 9.1 1.8 
Overvaluation of asset to artificially 
inflate company value 
3 5.5 1.1 
Detriment to creditors other than the Crown 68  23.9 
 Insolvent trading 32 33.3 11.2 
Misappropriation/diversion of assets 55 57.3 19.3 
Transaction(s) at an undervalue 9 9.4 3.2 
Pre-existing disqualification 11  3.9 
 Acting as a director whilst disqualified 4 36.4 1.4 
Allowing a director to act whilst knowing 
that they were disqualified 
2 18.2 0.7 
Acting as a director whilst an undischarged 
bankrupt 
5 45.5 1.8 
In dealing with suppliers and/or customers 4  1.4 
Missing Trade Intra Community (MTIC) VAT Fraud 9  3.2 
Breach of fiduciary duties 42  14.7 
Failing to cooperate with a liquidator 4  1.4 
Breach of technical statutory provisions 23  8.1 
Other 14  4.9 
3.18 The emboldened and underlined figures represent the number of unique records 
within each category that contained multiple ‘stock’ allegation statements, as previously 
Disqualification Undertakings: An Empirical Study 
 
 107 
explained. In addition to the breakdown of allegations above, the periods of 
disqualification based on Sevenoaks brackets are displayed in Table 3 below. The mean 
average period of disqualification in the survey was towards the lower extreme of the 
middle Sevenoaks bracket; 5.50 years. As is shown below, the vast majority fell within 
the lowest bracket. In Williams’ survey the average period of disqualification was 5.73 
years.328 A comparison between the two therefore indicates a decrease in the number of 
middle bracket disqualifications since 2008, with the majority being redistributed to the 
lowest bracket.329 
Table 3: The periods of disqualification in undertaking cases across the three data 
sets 
Survey Length (percentage of total) Total 
Cases 1-5 years 6-10 years  11-15 years 
Archer (2013) 183 (64.2) 75 (26.3) 27 (9.5) 285 
IS (2012-13) 633 (61.4) 287 (27.8) 111 (10.8) 1031 
Williams (2008) 224 (56.4) 127 (32.0) 46 (11.6) 397 
Preliminary Observations 
3.19 Whilst the table of misconduct will be dealt with in much more detail throughout 
the course of this chapter, some preliminary observations will be made at this stage. The 
three categories that attract the most allegations are: 
(a) Crown debt misconduct 
(b) Accounting misconduct 
(c) Transaction(s) to the detriment of creditors (other than the Crown) 
                                                 
328 Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.10. 
329 The IS data for 2012-13 shows an average of 5.7 years (5.4 for undertakings; 7.0 for orders). See 
IS, Supporting Data for Comparison of Performance in 2012-2013 to Previous Years (n 290). The 
latest IS data as at 2016-2017 indicates a marginal increase at 5.8 years (5.5 for undertakings; 7.5 
for orders). See IS, Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes 2016-17 (n 87). 
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By way of comparison, for the year 2012-2013 the IS reported 61.7 per cent of 
allegations made involved Crown debt (61.4 per cent in the present survey). In relation 
to accounting matters, the IS statistics state 15.0 per cent of total cases, as opposed to 
18.6 per cent in the present survey. Finally, the IS statistics in relation to transactions to 
the detriment of other creditors was 10.2 per cent, compared a more considerable 23.9 
per cent in the author’s survey.330 On the whole, survey data fits the trend evidenced 
within the IS statistics, and those within Williams’ survey331. It can therefore be said 
with some confidence that, in terms of the broad categories of misconduct, the types 
and frequency of misconduct reported have remained fairly constant between 2008 and 
2013. The remainder of this chapter, then, will go on to consider each category332 in 
significantly more detail to unearth how the undertakings system operates in practice. 
Ultimately, with a focus on gauging the overall effectiveness of it. 
Crown Debts 
3.20 What are Crown debts? Much confusion in the jurisprudence has emerged in 
relation to so-called ‘Crown debts’ over time. So much so that it led Dillon LJ in 
Sevenoaks to describe them as a ‘term of art’333. It is a term that, in this context, has been 
used to describe debts owed by a company to the HMRC in respect of NIC, PAYE and 
VAT; though not generally debts in respect of other matters. Following the introduction 
                                                 
330 IS, Supporting Data for Comparison of Performance in 2012-2013 to Previous Years, (n 290). 
The reason for the small discrepancies may be methodological. 
331 Williams’ also exhibits similar findings: Crown debts (60.9 per cent); accounting misconduct 
(29.7 per cent); and transactions to the detriment of creditors (17.2 per cent). See Williams, 
Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.8, Figure 1. 
332 The author will, however, not deal with the categories marked other; breach of technical statutory 
provisions; failing to cooperate with a liquidator; or misconduct in dealing with suppliers or 
customers in any great depth. This is simply on the basis that these categories added little additional 
value to the survey findings on the whole. 
333 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164 (CA), 175. 
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of the CDDA 1986, the courts were long plagued by a number of questions in relation 
to the significance of debts owed to HMRC. Predominantly, these questions revolved 
around the circumstances in which non-payment of Crown debts can render a director 
liable to a finding of ‘unfitness’, and whether Crown debts are to be treated differently 
(i.e. more seriously) to debts owed to other trade creditors in the context of determining 
the period of disqualification. A complete exposition is not desirable here334, though it 
should be noted that those questions have since been resolved by the courts.335 Of course, 
the assumption must be made, in respect of undertakings, that the SS follows the same 
approach as the judiciary. Turning to the law, the authorities have made clear, since Re 
Verby Print for Advertising Ltd,336 that Crown debts are not to be treated differently, in 
terms of their seriousness or status, from debts owed to other trade creditors in relation 
to a finding of unfitness. There is no practical distinction. Moreover, in order for a 
finding of unfitness to be made, simple non-payment is generally insufficient;337 as is a 
merely preferring other creditors to the Crown.338 There must, instead, be a policy of 
unfair discrimination exacted against the Crown in its capacity as creditor of the 
company.339 
3.21 Survey findings Out of the total of 285 records 175 (61.4 per cent) involved 
Crown debt, thus it was the most commonly cited allegation by some margin. The 
misconduct data as embodied in the ‘stock’ statements (Figure 2 above), largely 
                                                 
334 For a detailed descriptive account of the case law in the area see: Walters and Davis-White (n 77) 
paras 5-1 – 5-30. 
335 For commentary on the key authority of Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164 (CA) 
on this issue see: Sally Wheeler, ‘Re Sevenoaks – continuing the search for principle’ (1990) IL&P 
174. 
336 [1998] BCC 652. 
337 Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch. 164 (CA), 182-183. 
338 Re Verby Print for Advertising Ltd [1998] BCC 652, 665. 
339 ibid 665. 
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consisted of individuals who traded to the detriment of HMRC (62.5 per cent of Crown 
debt records). Other misconduct included a breach of statutory obligations towards 
HMRC (36.8 per cent of Crown debt records). 
3.22 Remembering the rationale Interestingly, 108 of the total survey records (37.9 
per cent) involved misconduct solely relating to Crown debt. The rather elementary 
analysis set out thus far therefore already raises questions as to whether the original 
aims of disqualification are reflected in practice. The reader is reminded of the primary 
aim being to protect the public against abuses of limited liability.340 The survey data 
paints a different picture, where a significant majority of directors are disqualified for 
misconduct connected with being a debtor to the state. It might be argued that the Crown 
is, by extension, the ‘public’ in that it is the tax collector for society at large, and as such 
the objective is being achieved. However, the reality of disqualification as being a 
champion for the unsecured trade creditor, then, as will be dealt with in due course, is 
open to considerable challenge. Even more striking is that in nearly two-fifths of all 
disqualifications in the survey, Crown debt misconduct was cited exclusively as the 
reason for the finding of unfitness. In other words, the figures demonstrate clearly that 
a significant majority of overall disqualifications contain some element of Crown debt, 
and a substantial proportion arise solely as a result of Crown debt misconduct. Given 
HMRC’s status as the largest UK creditor341 this might be explained away by simple 
statistical probability. By definition, the Crown is a creditor to every trading 
corporation. As such, in an insolvency setting, it would not be surprising that HMRC is 
                                                 
340 2.5 
341 Peter Bailey, ‘Insolvency Service Consults on Insolvency Practitioner Fees and IP Regulation’ 
(2014) 349 SMCLN 1, 2. 
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left unpaid in greater frequency than, say, when compared with other trade creditors.342 
That notwithstanding, it is clear to the author that Crown debts are the lifeblood of 
disqualification and, when considering its objectives, this is somewhat concerning. 
3.23 A different type of ‘cherry picking’ In considering the effectiveness of 
disqualification, it is crucial to consider who is targeted by the regime. This is because 
it is fundamental to ensuring that the public are protected that the right people are 
disqualified, and for a length of time proportionate to the misconduct. The IS however, 
being a government agency, is target driven. It is obvious to any reader of the IS annual 
reports that the effectiveness of the Disqualifications Unit is judged based upon the 
number of disqualifications achieved in any particular year, and the time taken for those 
proceedings to be concluded.343 In other words, the IS are under considerable pressure 
to meet (and exceed) these targets. It must also be remembered that the IS do not have 
an infinite number of resources to pursue suspected director misconduct.344 On the IS 
criteria, as disqualifications rise the statistics become more and more attractive 
politically. However, this is surely a crude method of determining success. Simply 
increasing the number of disqualifications per year is of little value in terms of the 
effectiveness of the overall regime, as measured against its objectives to protect the 
                                                 
342 This is compounded by the fact that the Crown faces substantial difficulties in pressing for 
payment as compared with other trade creditors. See Dillon LJ: Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) 
Ltd [1991] Ch. 164 (CA), 182-183; and generally: Walters and Davis-White  (n 77) para 5-29. 
343 For the first time in 2012-2013 the Insolvency Service created a new target relating to the 
percentage of ‘appropriate disqualification cases in which proceedings are instigated in under 23 
months’. See IS, Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013 (2013) <http://bit.ly/1qxxDFF> accessed 
30 April 2014, 13-15. According to Hicks, it was ultimately the NAO’s 1993 report that created 
pressure on the IS to increase numbers: Hicks, ‘Director disqualification – the National Audit Office 
follows up’ (1999) 15(4) IL&P 113, 114. 
344 2.25 
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public and deter misconduct, if they are improperly targeted.345 In short, to be effective 
disqualifications must first and foremost be of quality, not quantity.346 This was a point 
picked up by Hicks as early as 1999.347 Hicks also made the point that many 
disqualifications are of sleeping partners, inactive spouses, or other ‘sundry 
nominees’.348 Whilst these further bolster the statistics, he argues, they do not 
necessarily address the underlying issue of the abuse of limited liability, nor protect 
unsecured creditors.349 Whilst the author has not carried out any statistical analysis to 
prove or disprove this argument, it does not seem farfetched.  
3.24 Moreover, in this vein, it has been suggested by some cynical commentators, 
including representatives of R3, that this target-driven environment has led the IS to 
cherry pick the ‘low hanging fruit’ that are Crown debt cases for investigation and 
prosecution.350 This has the political benefit for the IS of bolstering its statistics by 
increasing the number of actual disqualifications made, and by reducing the average 
time taken to prosecute such cases. This effect is achieved because, relatively speaking, 
Crown debt cases are easy to prove351. Given the resourcing constraints and other 
administrative constraints addressed previously, one does not have to think for very 
long to come to the view that this position is entirely desirable for the IS.352 When an IP 
                                                 
345 The number of disqualifications may increase over time given the new three-year period 
(increased from two) that the SS has to make an application for an order: CDDA 1986, s 7(2). 
346 The author borrows Hicks’ phrase here: Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place 
for the Unfit? (n 18) 99. 
347 Hicks, ‘Director disqualification – the National Audit Office follows up’ (n 343) 114. 
348 ibid. 
349 ibid 113-114. 
350 For example, see R3, ‘Directors Disqualification: Room for Improvement’ (2011) 
<http://bit.ly/2tXkQ9Y> accessed 1 January 2017. 
351 Due to a readily available paper trail: Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164 (CA), 
182; Re Verby Print for Advertising Ltd [1998] BCC 652, 665. 
352 2.25. 
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files a conduct report353 with the IS a grid is used to score each individual case that may 
warrant investigation.354 Only cases that exceed a particular threshold score will be 
investigated. Whilst the specifics behind how the grid operates are unclear, it is not a 
great leap to suggest that it would lend itself to outputting those cases which, based 
upon the type of suspected misconduct, are capable of being successfully pursued 
within the statutory time limit. However, should the cherry-picking approach be the 
reality it is submitted that this will ultimately transpire to be highly damaging. It is 
problematic because it creates the mere illusion of a successful disqualification regime. 
There is no suggestion from the commentators, as far as this author can tell, that 
directors are improperly being disqualified, i.e. without sufficient evidence.355 The more 
likely problem is that where evidence of Crown debt misconduct is uncovered the IS 
concludes the investigation and looks no further. This, as Williams notes, prevents a 
‘detailed investigation of a director’s conduct revealing a broader unfitness’.356 Again, 
it is understandable, though not condonable, why this approach might be desirable for 
the IS.357 The danger is that once the minimum threshold for a successful disqualification 
(on a Crown debt basis) is passed, investigations which may reveal more serious forms 
of misconduct cease due to the difficulties and costs associated with investigating more 
complex types of misconduct. Such an approach undermines the objectives of the 
disqualification regime on two fronts. Firstly, it does not protect the public adequately, 
as the director is disqualified for a shorter period of time than she otherwise would have 
                                                 
353 2.42. 
354 DBIS Committee (n 103) Q129. 
355 Though, as discussed earlier, given the financial pressure placed on directors when considering 
whether to accept an undertaking, it is of course a danger that this could be exploited: 2.47. 
356 Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.14. 
357 2.21. 
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been had the further misconduct been uncovered. Secondly, she is not deterred by the 
threat of disqualification because, in effect, she ‘gets away’ with the substantive 
misconduct and faces no consequences for it. It goes without saying that it is not 
acceptable, because of bureaucratic concerns, that those deserving of disqualification 
should go unnoticed, or worse, are not pursued (or fully pursued) in order to bolster the 
statistics. It must be stated very clearly that officials within the IS and DBIS have 
repeatedly denied this allegation.358 Moreover, there is no evidence, other than musings 
by practitioners, that it is the reality. However, when considering the figures presented 
in this survey, such assurances hardly provide comfort to unsecured trade creditors as 
to the effectiveness of disqualification. Notwithstanding anything said previously, it is 
argued that the existence of the cherry-picking argument in the academic and 
practitioner commentary in itself speaks volumes as to the low level of trust and 
confidence of important stakeholders in the disqualification regime.359 
3.25 The period of disqualification What has not been discussed until now is the 
period of disqualification solely in respect of Crown debt cases. Table 4 below shows 
the breakdown as per the Sevenoaks brackets: 
Table 4: The period of disqualification for Crown Debt cases from the survey 
Length (years) Total Cases Cases solely involving 
Crown debts 
2-5 147 101 
6-10 26 7 
11-15 2 0 
Total 175 108 
                                                 
358 DBIS Committee (n 103) Q128; DBIS, ‘Impact Assessment: Matters to be taken into account by 
the Court when determining that a person is unfit to act as a company director’ (2014) at 
<http://bit.ly/2uVywQ8> accessed 1 July 2017, 6, fn 2. 
359 A point recognised by DBIS and the IS themselves: DBIS, ibid 6, fn 2. 
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3.26 Out of the total, 84 per cent of cases fell within the lowest bracket, and the mean 
average disqualification period within this category was 4.34 years – significantly 
below the overall mean average of 5.50 years. Where a case solely involved Crown 
debt, a staggering 93.5 per cent fell into the lowest bracket suggesting that such 
misconduct, except in the rarest of cases, is only considered ‘minor’.360 There were only 
two cases that attracted the highest bracket. In the first instance this involved a director 
who, in addition to his Crown debt misconduct, was found already to have been 
disqualified. In the other, that director was acting whilst an undischarged bankrupt. 
Those individuals were given 11 and 12 years respectively.361  
3.27 The compensation dimension When considering the compensation regime, 
another facet worthy of critique raises its head in respect of Crown debts. Consider the 
nearly two-fifths of directors in the survey that were disqualified solely on the basis of 
Crown debts misconduct. Each director within that demographic would, if the 
legislation were in force at that time, have been exposed to compensation liability.362 If 
pursued, any deficit could be awarded solely for the benefit of the Crown, or as a 
contribution to company assets.363 First, it should be said that the routine procedure of 
disqualifying directors who seek to defraud or discriminate against the HMRC is 
undoubtedly justified. However, it is suggested that it would not be desirable should the 
                                                 
360 This is surprising given the average deficit of companies where misconduct was attributed solely 
to Crown debt cases was £237,896.45 (median £134,341.50). Evidently, attitudes have changed 
substantially over time as to the seriousness of Crown debt misconduct. For instance, in the early 
days it was described as a particularly serious form of ‘commercial immorality’, see Re Wedgecraft 
Ltd (unreported) 7 March 1986 as quoted in Re Stanford Services Ltd (1987) 3 BCC 326, 333.  
361 As will be demonstrated in due course, it seems to be the policy of the SS to make an ‘example’ 
of directors who are undeterred by the restrictions made against them. See 3.17. 
362 Only misconduct taking place after 1 October 2015 is able to be targeted for compensation. 
363 CDDA 1986, s 15B. Though where the only creditor is the Crown, as one suspects it probably 
was in cases where the sole reason for disqualification was Crown debts, the effect is the same. 
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new legislation engender a practice of pursuing these individuals, for the benefit of the 
Revenue. Given the large amount of Crown debt cases, there is a real danger the 
compensation regime will develop to be little more than a state-manufactured tool for 
the recovery of debts owed to the state. This concern may be lessened somewhat as the 
IS has stated that it only intends to pursue directors for compensation in the most serious 
of cases.364 If seriousness is to be determined by the period of disqualification fixed as 
set out in the previous chapter, it seems likely that only a small number of Crown debt 
cases would fall within that category in any case. Until the compensation regime really 
takes hold, it is impossible to comment upon the approach in reality. However, it is 
argued here that the purpose of the compensation regime must be the protection of the 
private creditor. It must not become a backdoor or subversive means of recovering 
Crown debts. One facet that is particularly worrying, as discussed previously, is that 
there is evidence to suggest that directors may feel pressured by the SS into giving 
disqualification undertakings.365 To reiterate the point: it is not a great leap to assume 
that directors, when faced with mounting costs, may be similarly pressured into giving 
an accompanying compensation undertaking simultaneously. 
Transactions to the Detriment of Creditors 
3.28 The second most common category of allegation was transactions to the 
detriment of other creditors. This was generally due to insolvent trading, transactions 
aimed at defeating particular (or indeed all) creditors, or showing preference to others 
either whilst insolvent, or whilst trading within the ‘twilight zone’. When considering 
                                                 
364 DBIS, ‘Impact Assessment: Giving the court and Secretary of State (SoS) a power to make a 
compensatory award against a director’ (n 235) 90. 
365 Given that it is the SS’s practice to pursue costs against directors that challenge undertakings: 
2.47. 
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it is this category of misconduct that goes to the very heart of the rationale of 
disqualification,366 and the compensation regime, it is disappointing to see that less than 
a quarter of disqualifications in the survey arise from it. This may be for many reasons, 
including evidential difficulties. For instance, proving unfitness will involve protracted 
investigations that may be stifled by inter alia a lack of evidence, difficulties in 
accessing records, or sheer uncooperative creditors. Moreover, other threshold 
difficulties may arise. For instance, in the case of insolvent trading, authority makes it 
clear that attempts to merely trade out of insolvency will be insufficient to find 
unfitness, unless the prospects of doing so were unreasonable.367  This balance must be 
approached carefully, as it would clearly be in error to disqualify a director whose 
company failed for legitimate commercial reasons. Of course, all of this evidence 
gathering takes time and costs money. Both are commodities in limited supply at the 
IS.368 The statistics reveal that the bulk of cases in this area involved the 
misappropriation or diversion of company assets to the detriment of creditors (57.3 per 
cent of allegation in the category). This invariably involved a director syphoning off 
assets for her own personal gain. In other cases, it involved using company funds to pay 
off particular creditors, at a preference to others. Unsurprisingly, the most common 
creditor paid at a preference was the errant director herself in repaying a loan account.  
3.29 The period of disqualification Table 5 below indicates the breakdown of 
disqualification periods for this category: 
  
                                                 
366 2.10. 
367 In other words, the company must in effect trade ‘wrongfully’: Re Cubelock Ltd. [2001] BCC 
523, para 71; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Creegan [2002] 1 BCLC  99, para 7. 
368 2.25 
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Table 5: The period of disqualification for creditor misconduct cases 
Length (years) Total Cases Cases solely involving 
creditor misconduct 
2-5 47 10 
6-10 17 5 
11-15  4 1 
Total 68 16 
3.30 The mean average period of disqualification was 5.40 years, i.e. more or less in 
line with the overall mean average across all records. It is interesting to note that this 
was significantly higher than the mean average period in Crown debt disqualifications 
(4.34 years). Given what was said earlier in relation to their being no practical 
distinction between trade and Crown debts, it might have therefore be assumed by 
extension that the nature of the creditor should have no bearing on the period of 
disqualification. As such, although the two factors are not necessarily causative, one 
might have expected the gap between the two average periods to be closer. As was 
expected, very few cases solely involved creditor related misconduct as there were 
almost always moneys owed to HMRC in addition. Disturbingly, 69.1 per cent of the 
disqualifications were made in the lowest bracket of 2-5 years. The reasoning behind 
this cannot be conclusively be explained, however, it is especially concerning when 
considering the underlying policy aims of disqualification. Across the whole survey 
there was one record solely involving creditor misconduct where the director was 
disqualified for the maximum 15 years. This was a particularly clear-cut case where the 
director diverted substantial funds, held on behalf of members of the public, from the 
company (at least £4.1 million) for the purposes of meeting his own personal liabilities. 
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3.31 In summary, therefore, the figures demonstrate that disqualification is rather 
ineffective at protecting the private creditor. This is troubling, as it is surely this 
category of creditor, first and foremost, that disqualification must protect to be capable 
of being labelled successful. After all, it is unsecured creditors that feel the brunt of any 
abuses of limited liability. Overall figures are extremely low within this category and 
when disqualifications are made, they are for relatively short periods. In the vast 
majority of cases this type of misconduct is treated as ‘minor’ in line with the Sevenoaks 
classifications. It is even more shocking this is so when considering the median average 
of deficit to creditors in cases solely involving this type of misconduct is £488,636. This 
state of affairs must surely have significant (negative) implications for the trust and 
confidence that the public place in the regime. Moreover, when considering the 
secondary aims, it cannot be said that delinquent directors are likely to be deterred from 
their misconduct for precisely the same reasons; they are unlikely to be caught, and if 
they are they will be disqualified for a short period of time.  
3.32 The compensation dimension As with the private enforcement mechanisms 
considered, at the heart of the public compensation regime is the protection of 
(unsecured) creditors. However, the present author is sceptical as to how successful the 
new regime will be in fulfilling this aim. Simply put, there are very few disqualifications 
in this category and as such there are likely to be even fewer compensation orders or 
undertakings that are able (or worthwhile)369 to be pursued.370 Again, if the IS only 
choose to pursue those cases involving the most serious misconduct the potential 
                                                 
369 3.57. 
370 If the average deficit in this type of case is nearly £500,000, the author is highly sceptical as to 
how many directors actually pursued would be able to afford to compensate creditors: 3.57. 
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number of candidates shrinks into insignificance. On that basis, it is argued here that 
the utility of the compensation regime in respect of protecting private creditors has been 
grossly overstated. 
Accounting Matters 
3.33 Accounting matters were the third most commonly cited reason for misconduct 
in the survey, making up 18.6 per cent of the total cases. Most involved either a 
company director failing to provide the appointed IP with detailed accounting records 
of the insolvent company, or persistently failing to file accounts with the registrar.371 
Good accounting practices are key to the successful management of a company and 
therefore a failure to keep accounting records is, quite rightly, evidence of unfitness for 
the purposes of section 6 CDDA 1986.372 It is also contrary to sections 386 and 388 of 
the CA 2006.373 However, the misconduct reports on the whole indicate that it is the 
impediment caused to the IP in exercising the function of her office that is the main 
driving force behind the finding; not the breach of the statutory obligation per se.374 The 
‘failure to maintain and/or preserve and/or deliver accounting records’ makes up the 
bulk of this category (71.0 per cent). Though, what also arises from the analysis is that 
many directors simply refuse to hand over, or conveniently ‘cannot’ provide, 
accounting records. In those cases, it seems from the misconduct reports surveyed that 
the SS makes an inference that the records do not exist (likely for ease). After all, a 
failure to keep records renders a director equally (if not more) culpable. It is suggested 
                                                 
371 Note, that this can also lead to disqualification under CDDA 1986, s 3. 
372 CDDA 1986, sch 1. 
373 Though neither of these sections (nor, in fact, any) were mentioned in any of the misconduct 
reports.  
374 This is likely because the IP can provide direct evidence of the obstruction, thereby making the 
misconduct somewhat easier to prove. 
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that whilst poor record keeping is not, taken alone, one of the more serious forms of 
misconduct dealt with here, it may be a type of ‘gateway’ misconduct. This is based on 
the fact that despite accounting for 18.6 per cent of cases, only 24 cases out of the total 
(8.4 per cent) exclusively concerned accounting misconduct. Therefore, the vast 
proportion of directors who fail to keep accounting records are also guilty of other 
(possibly more serious) misconduct. It follows, then, that poor accounting practices 
should be an indicator to IPs that greater scrutiny into their activities is required at the 
investigation stage. 
Table 6: The period of disqualification for accounting misconduct cases 
Length (years) Total Cases Cases solely involving 
accounting misconduct 
2-5 14 5 
6-10 33 18 
11-15 6 1 
Total 53 24 
3.34 The period of disqualification Table 6 above shows the breakdown of 
disqualification periods for individuals whose misconduct involved accounting 
misconduct. We see a higher than average disqualification period at a mean of 7.0 years 
per individual. This category of misconduct also sees the largest range in the company 
deficit at the point of insolvency when compared to any other. Deficits ranged from a 
mere £1,757 of liability to £9,106,532 with the median figure being £161,136. This 
suggests that, as perhaps would be expected, accounting malpractice can be seen across 
a very broad range of companies. Most accounting misconduct fell squarely within the 
middle Sevenoaks bracket. Dishonest practice, for example falsifying accounts, led to a 
longer period. Given the attitude of the courts and the SS towards fraud, this is to be 
expected. Indeed, in the one instance solely involving accounting misconduct where the 
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director was placed in the highest bracket (11 years), it was undisputed that he had 
previously submitted falsified records to CH which showed that the company was 
profitable, when it was not. The 14 cases that fell within the lowest bracket all concerned 
a failure to maintain accounting records in micro-businesses.  
3.35 The reason for this higher than average period of disqualification is unclear. It 
is possible, due to the existence (or lack) of a paper trail in accounting matters, that 
more serious misconduct is easier to unearth. In any case, the author again takes issue 
with the utility of disqualification given the above analysis. Can it really be said that 
the public, and importantly the private creditor, is significantly better protected as a 
result of cracking down on poor accounting practices? As might be inferred from the 
tone, it is argued here that it is not. Though, admittedly, the evidence suggests that it 
may provide a ‘window’ into identifying other forms of misconduct; perhaps leading to 
a higher period of disqualification. One issue with accounting malpractice, as with 
Crown debts, is that it invariably arises from ignorance and incompetence; not 
necessarily a wilful abuse of limited liability. As such, it is argued that this is one area 
in which education and training is surely the solution. This is a point to be revisited later 
in this thesis, when considering reform.375  
Carousel (MTIC) Fraud 
3.36 Missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud is, in some ways, a specialised 
type of Crown debt as it relates to the theft of VAT.  However, when conducting the 
survey, it became obvious that MTIC fraud was deserving of its own category. This was 
for two substantive reasons. Firstly, disqualification involving MTIC allegations 
                                                 
375 6.20. 
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generally involved much higher than average periods of disqualification which would 
otherwise skew the results for the broader Crown debts category. Secondly, MTIC fraud 
is also a criminal matter376 and so the author was hesitant as how exactly to categorise 
it.377 As such it was simply separated. Doing so had little impact on the remainder of the 
survey results as none of the nine directors who were disqualified for MTIC fraud were 
disqualified for any other reason, i.e. they were disqualified solely on the basis of the 
fraud.378 This was a fact unique to this particular category. Another fact unique to MTIC 
fraud is that all of the undertakings given fell within the highest Sevenoaks bracket. Six 
directors were disqualified for 12 years, with the remaining three for 13 years. This 
reveals two things. Firstly, the SS is particularly determined to send a strong message 
that those involved with fraud on the taxpayer (as opposed to just trading to the Crown’s 
detriment) will be dealt with severely. This must be the correct approach. It seems to 
this author that there can be no greater demonstration of ‘unfitness’ to direct a limited 
company than the commission of fraud. Secondly, MTIC fraud cases account for one-
third of all undertakings in the top bracket. When widened to encompass all types of 
Crown related misconduct, this rises to two-fifths. A significant proportion of what is 
deemed to be the most severe misconduct, therefore, is tied to matters affecting the 
state. When discussing MTIC fraud, Williams concludes that the state occupies a 
‘prominent role’379 at the higher end of the spectrum of the disqualification period.  
                                                 
376 Generally the charge is conspiracy to cheat the public revenue, see: R v Paul Ward [2005] EWCA 
Crim 1926. As such, a court can impose a disqualification order on conviction under CDDA 1986, 
s 2. However, it can also arise as a s 6 undertakings issue where the company in question becomes 
insolvent. 
377 Since the survey was conducted the author has learned that the IS do include MTIC within Crown 
debt. 
378 All nine instances of MTIC fraud involved the sale of mobile telecommunications devices. 
379 Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.46. 
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3.37 Therefore, whilst it is obvious that these individuals are deserving of lengthy 
bans, when considering the purpose of disqualification, it is in another sense still 
somewhat troubling. This is because it is indicative of a regime operating largely for 
the protection of the state rather than, say, the private creditor. Such heavy periods of 
disqualification are no doubt put in place, in part, so as to deter others from committing 
this type of misconduct. However, the author is of the view that a fraudster is a fraudster. 
It seems unlikely that any (civil) penalties will be of any deterrent to this type of 
individual. This may change following the introduction of the compensation regime. 
MTIC cases invariably involve large sums therefore, if the IS decides to pursue these 
individuals (assuming they are worth pursuing), the deterrent factor may increase. 
However, the same issues arise as discussed previously in respect of Crown debts more 
generally; the temptation for compensation undertakings to be used as a means of state 
debt recovery, by the backdoor, must be avoided. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties  
3.38 The fact that a director had ‘breached his fiduciary duties to the company’ was 
reported in 42 cases out of the total (14.7 per cent). It is not an especially noteworthy 
category, as the misconduct reports obtained did not give any substantive detail as to 
what led to the breaching of the duty; merely that the duty was breached, and that this 
was in itself evidence of unfitness.380 Despite specifically mentioning fiduciary duties 
(a legal term) there was not one reference to the duties breached as enshrined within 
sections 171-177 CA 2006, common law duties, or otherwise. What is surprising, is that 
the reporting of a breach of fiduciary duties was not much higher. Clearly many of the 
                                                 
380 CDDA 1986, sch 1. 
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instances of Crown debt or accounting cases, on a strict interpretation, would also 
involve a breach of fiduciary duties. This is perhaps an issue with the methodology used 
in the IS’s reporting of misconduct, and is indicative of an inconsistency in the approach 
adopted.  
Pre-Existing Disqualification 
3.39 In 11 records (3.9 per cent) there was an allegation that the director in question 
had, either acted whilst disqualified;381 had acted, or was willing to act, on instructions 
given by another, knowing that they were disqualified;382 or had acted whilst an 
undischarged bankrupt.383 Out of the 11 cases, one disqualification fell within the lowest 
Sevenoaks bracket, five within the middle bracket, and the remaining five within the 
top bracket. The only instance where an undertaking was given for a period in the lowest 
bracket (3.5 years) was where a director (who was not disqualified) allowed another 
director (who was) to act whilst the former knowing that the latter was disqualified. The 
highest period of disqualification under this category was 12 years. Interestingly, three 
out of the 11 records (27.3 per cent) were disqualified solely on the basis of a pre-
existing disqualification or bankruptcy. It is possible, though entirely speculative, that 
these individuals were caught by the IS following a ‘tip off’ from a member of the 
public.384  
3.40 As one might expect, individuals who were ‘repeat offenders’ or acted in breach 
of restrictions were treated severely. This is important from the perspective of 
                                                 
381 CDDA 1986, ss 1 and 1A. 
382 CDDA 1986, s 15(1)(b). 
383 CDDA 1986, s 11. 
384 Originally this would be by way of the IS ‘hotline’; now replaced by an online ‘Investigations 
and Enforcement Services Breach Questionnaire’ <http://bit.ly/2tsEg5Z> accessed 1 July 2017. 
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deterrence and upholding trust and confidence in the disqualification regime. However, 
it is of course questionable as to whether an additional disqualification order or 
undertaking is a credible threat to those who are willing to act in breach of their initial 
disqualification. It is clear that the real deterrent for such individuals must be the threat 
of imprisonment following a conviction under section 13 CDDA 1986. Though, 
evidently, for some 4 per cent of persons, that is still not a credible threat. This could 
be due to the fact that prosecutions under section 13 CDDA 1986 are not widely 
publicised; or that those who are disqualified are simply unaware that imprisonment is 
a possibility.385 Hicks noted that for the years 1991-92 to 1996-97 the number of 
successful prosecutions were: 83, 66, 67, 54, 78 and 70 respectively.386 However, these 
figures include prosecutions made under section 11 CDDA 1986 (undischarged 
bankrupts) and so are not a reliable indicator as to section 13 proceedings when taken 
alone. A Freedom of Information request by this author has determined that in recent 
years, the number of successful prosecutions has diminished quite significantly, in spite 
of the number of disqualifications increasing since that time. It should be noted by way 
of limitation, in similar fashion to Hicks’ data, the following figures show those 
individuals convicted of at least one offence under section 13 CDDA 1986. However, 
they may have been charged and convicted of other offences simultaneously. Naturally 
this may have therefore had a bearing on whether a custodial sentence was imposed or 
not. 
  
                                                 
385 See Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (n 18) 127, where only 
12 out of 28 (42.9 per cent) disqualified directors seemed to be aware of imprisonment as a sanction 
for breach of an order. 
386 These statistics used to appear in annual CH reports; though this is no longer the case: ibid 51. 
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Table 7: Number of successful prosecutions under section 13 CDDA 1986, the 
number of custodial sentences and if suspended  
Year Convictions Custodial  
sentence 
Suspended? 
2012-2013 25 10 0 
2013-2014 31 21 0 
2014-2015 24 19 0 
2015-2016 21 9 0 
2016-2017 12 5 1 
 
Whilst it is not known how many prosecutions were commenced, so that a success rate 
can be determined, it is readily apparent that the numbers here are small. On average, 
in just over 50 per cent of cases over the past five financial years a successful 
prosecution resulted in a custodial sentence. This figure is likely to be inflated, due to 
the fact that some individuals may have been convicted of other offences (perhaps more 
deserving of custody). Although more data is needed in this regard to say with certainty, 
the present author is sceptical as to the potential deterrent effect of section 13 CDDA 
1986 given its low utilisation and the roughly one-in-two chance of going to prison even 
where convicted. It is especially troubling that the number of successful prosecutions 
has declined since the time of Hicks’ study, as this author has not encountered any 
evidence that might suggest the type of behaviour covered by section 13 CDDA 1986 
is itself on the decline.387 This may be a result of resourcing issues which has led to these 
matters falling somewhat by the wayside. 
  
                                                 
387 Though of course it is recognised that an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.   
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THE PERIOD OF DISQUALIFICATION 
3.41 As a part of the original hypothesis, the author considered it important to 
understand the potential factors that may influence the period of disqualification. This 
is a matter of the gravest importance. The length must be balanced between the 
protection of the public and the imposition on an individual’s freedom to manage a 
company, if it is to be effective. A period of disqualification that is disproportionate to 
the aims that are sought undermines the success of the regime. A period too harsh is 
indicative of an intention to punish, rather than to protect.388 Similarly, a period of 
disqualification that is too short is unlikely to have sufficient impact upon the individual 
concerned; but cause significant wastage of public expenditure in the investigation 
process. However, the exact mechanics used by the IS for determining the length are 
unknown. The mean average period of disqualification in the survey was 5.50 years – 
just outside of the lowest Sevenoaks bracket. This is partially skewed by the number of 
MTIC cases that always result in longer periods of disqualification. The median, it is 
submitted, is the more appropriate measure at 5.0 years. This figure is rather low, 
considering the minimum period is two years under section 6. In line with the Sevenoaks 
brackets, this would suggest that most misconduct is only considered to be ‘minor’. In 
fact, there is anecdotal evidence that public perception is that disqualification for a 
period within this bracket is equivalent to no more than a ‘slap on the wrist’.389 It goes 
without saying that low periods of disqualification are therefore damaging in terms of 
the trust and confidence in the enforcement regime, and as a deterrent to future 
                                                 
388 2.6. 
389 See for example John Willcock, ‘4,000 Rogue Directors on Loose in UK Companies’ The 
Independent (28 October 1996) at <http://ind.pn/2uCfcrO> accessed 3 January 2015. 
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misconduct. Moreover, the statistics cause reason to doubt the effectiveness of 
disqualification should it, on the whole, fail to protect the public for an appropriate 
period of time. With the assistance of the survey data, the following section will 
consider the impact of the insolvent company’s deficit on the period of disqualification.  
Company Deficit 
3.42 It was hypothesised that the magnitude of the deficit of the company at the time 
of insolvency would be a significant factor in determining the period of disqualification. 
However, analysis of the survey data reveals – somewhat surprisingly so – that this is 
not the case. The deficit was obtained for each company by reading the misconduct 
report and recording the appropriate figure. By the very nature of the reports, 
particularly in cases where there was a lack of accounting records, often this figure was 
an approximation or a ‘minimum potential deficit’ and so should be looked upon 
conservatively. For present purposes, however, the information recorded permits the 
drawing of some general conclusions. Across the survey, the mean average deficit 
recorded was £475,149.80 and the median average £164,456.00. The large disparity 
between the two figures was largely due to the various MTIC fraud cases on one end of 
the spectrum, and trivial accounting matters on the other. The highest recorded deficit 
was £9,106,532.00 and the lowest recorded (as in 10 cases in total) was nil.  
3.43 A correlation co-efficient calculation was carried out in SPSS, across all of the 
records within the survey, so as to determine the association (if any) between company 
deficit and the period of disqualification. The calculation identified a very weak, but not 
entirely non-existent, positive correlation between the two variables (U = 0.288). This 
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suggests that deficit is of limited relevance in determining the period.390 However, it is 
possible that one ‘advantage’ of a large deficit is that it that it is likely to trigger alarm 
bells for IPs; causing them to conduct more detailed inquiries. This may in itself lead to 
disqualification, whereas otherwise the director might have slipped through the 
proverbial net. As was discussed with accounting misconduct, it may be that a 
particularly large company deficit is a ‘gateway’ into exploring the entire extent of a 
director’s involvement and culpability, though the statistics are not conclusive in this 
regard. 
3.44 The fact that there is no obvious correlation between deficit and disqualification 
period, it is argued, is rather staggering; though it is recognised that the two factors are 
not necessarily causative. However, the perception conveyed is that directors may run 
up any number of debts, to any number of creditors (even if well into the millions), 
without particular consequence in terms of the period of their eventual disqualification. 
Instead, it is how they do it that is at issue. The fixing of an appropriate period is one of 
the key factors that the author suggests is necessary to a successful disqualification 
regime. It is therefore odd that company deficit does not appear to be a factor. By 
contrast, in respect of compensation orders and undertakings, it is a requirement that 
the amount of loss caused is considered as a factor in determining the level of 
compensation.391 This, of course, makes perfect sense. However, there is some 
possibility that, in the future, this element will also make it into determining the period 
of undertakings more generally. As stated previously, the ‘new’ Schedule 1 now 
                                                 
390 By way of comparison, in his survey Williams discovered a practically non-existent correlation 
(U = 0.0351); Williams, Disqualification Undertakings: Law, Policy and Practice (n 18) para 5.11. 
391 CDDA 1986, s 15B(3)(a). 
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requires in all cases that consideration be given to the ‘nature and extent of any loss or 
harm caused’. Loss can of course include financial loss. This may therefore pave the 
way for a new process of evaluating periods of disqualification, with harm to creditors 
playing a more central role. It is argued that tying culpability directly to the extent of 
the damage caused must represent a better approach. 
CAPITALISATION 
3.45 It is often stated that the undercapitalisation of limited companies leads to 
excessive risk taking; increases moral hazards for company directors; and generally 
lends itself towards the abuse of limited liability.392 These assertions will be examined 
in more detail in the penultimate chapter, when discussing the prospect of minimum 
share capital rules as a measure of reform. However, as part of the survey, the author 
sought to understand exactly how undercapitalised (if at all) the average company is 
where it has been driven into insolvency by a director who later is disqualified. The 
process of doing so was straightforward. The 285 survey records of disqualified 
directors resulted from a total of 224 insolvent companies.393 A search on the CH register 
was carried out for each of these companies in order to determine its share capital based 
on the last annual return filed, or on the information provided upon incorporation 
(whichever was the latest available). For 29 of the companies the information was not 
held, was unavailable or was not applicable394 to the entity type. As such, 195 companies 
were able to be surveyed for their share capital. One company had a share capital of 1 
                                                 
392 1.6. 
393 This is obviously due to the fact that multiple directors from the same company were disqualified 
at the same time. 
394 Three companies were limited by guarantee; two were LLPs; and for the others the information 
simply was not held. 
Director Liability in Insolvent Companies 
 
 132 
USD, which was treated as 1 GBP for present purposes. A simple frequency table, Table 
8, is shown below to illustrate the data: 
Table 8: Share capital of companies with disqualified directors 
Share capital Frequency Percentage (%) Cumulative (%) 
£0-100 156 80.0 80.0 
£101-1000 23 11.8 91.8 
£1,001-10,000 6 3.1 94.9 
£10,001-100,000 6 3.1 97.9 
£100,001+ 4 2.1 100.0 
3.46 It is unsurprising to see that the vast majority of companies featured in the 
survey had a share capital of less than £1,000, with many choosing common 
denominations such as £1, £2 (where it was a two-man enterprise), £100 or £1,000. The 
mode average share capital was £100. The highest share capital was reported at 
£2,000,100, and the lowest £1. It should be noted that this is not necessarily out of step 
with companies across the entire register. In 2012-2013 CH reported that 84.6 per cent 
of companies had a share capital of £100 or less.395 So, whilst it is plain that a substantial 
number of the companies in the survey might be described as ‘undercapitalised’,396 they 
are negligibly more or less likely to be so than any other private company on the register. 
  
                                                 
395 In previous years, CH have provided a breakdown of the number of corporations by share capital 
though it appears this has ceased since 2013. The last available information, taken from the register 
as at 31 March 2013, suggests that in England and Wales 2,188,800 companies had a share capital 
of up to £100. This represented 84.6% of the total companies on the register. See: CH, Statistical 
Tables on Companies Registration Activities 2012-2013 (n 290). 
396 Though, as explored in the penultimate chapter, whether a company is ‘undercapitalised’ is a 
tricky business. It is not a straightforward matter of looking at the capital. Though, of course a 
company with a share capital of £1 might be described as undercapitalised in all conceivable 
circumstances. See 3.45. 




3.47 In a similar vein to undercapitalisation, owner-managed companies are often 
linked to disqualification. In other words, disqualification targets the small man, rather 
than the professional executive. Hick’s 1998 empirical study of disqualification is 
largely responsible for this claim,397 though the author knows of no more recent survey 
in the area. Not only is Hicks’ survey now some two decades old, but its findings were 
also based on a very small sample size of 33 disqualified individuals who responded to 
a postal questionnaire. The term ‘owner-manager’ is one that is rather hard to accurately 
define; it is largely a case of knowing one when you see one. Some attempt will be 
made. It is generally understood to be either a company where the directors are also 
controlling shareholders (either individually or collectively), a ‘one man company’, or 
a quasi-partnership.398 Hicks uncovered in his survey that of those respondents, 28 (84.9 
per cent) owned shares in their company; 23 (69.7 per cent) would describe their 
company as a ‘family company’; and out of a smaller sample of 27 directors 14 of those 
(51.9 per cent) held a controlling interest.399 This led Hicks to claim that nearly 75 per 
cent of respondents were owner-managers.400 Many of the author’s suggestions for 
reform, set out in the penultimate chapter, are hinged upon the assumption that the 
majority of ‘problem’ directors are owner-managers of small undercapitalised 
companies, in line with Hicks’ claims. As such, it was deemed necessary to test his 
findings further, and carry out some up-to-date research. The purpose of doing so was 
                                                 
397 Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (n 18) i. 
398 ibid 8. 
399 ibid. 
400 ibid.  
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to determine how closely held shares really are in the companies of disqualified 
directors, as based upon the survey data.  
3.48 As previously stated, the 285 survey records of disqualified directors were 
associated with a total of 224 companies. Shareholdings for each company were 
determined in the same way as the share capital. A search on the CH register was carried 
out to obtain the last annual return filed. For a number of reasons401 16 of companies 
had to be removed, leaving a total of 208 for the present study. The author went through 
each annual return and identified the names of the subscribers to the company. This was 
cross-referenced with the name of the director (or directors) that were disqualified based 
on the survey data. The following data was recorded for each director: 
(a) whether (s)he was also a shareholder of the company; 
(b) if so, the amount of that shareholding in percentage terms; 
(c) the total number of shareholders; 
(d) whether the company was owner-managed; 
(e) freehand observations of interest in relation to the company (e.g. ‘remainder 
owned by female relative; likely wife’). 
In determining ultimately whether the company was owner-managed, the author utilised 
the definition set out previously. Namely, a company would be considered owner-
managed where shareholders who were also directors had either a majority interest in 
the company or ran it jointly with (often family)402 others. 
                                                 
401 Three were companies limited by guarantee; two were LLPs; and for the remaining no records 
were held. 
402 It was assumed for present purposes that shareholders and directors with the same surname were 
family members. 
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3.49 Out of the sample of 208 companies, it was determined that a staggering 90.1 
per cent could be described as being owner-managed. Out of the 285 directors, 74.0 per 
cent were also shareholders of the insolvent company. This figure was slightly lower 
than expected, but it can be explained by two different reasons. Firstly, some companies 
in the survey had a sole corporate shareholder but when ‘backtracking’ through CH 
records for that company it transpired that the ultimate owners were one and the same. 
Therefore, whilst those directors were not recorded as being shareholders of the 
insolvent company it was still noted as being owner-managed. Secondly, in some cases 
the directors were not shareholders but were nonetheless part of very closely held (often 
entirely family) companies of which other (non-disqualified) directors held the 
controlling interest. Interestingly, 46.2 per cent were what might be described as ‘one 
man’ companies. These were companies where there was a sole (disqualified) 
shareholder-director. 32.7 per cent were ‘two men’ companies. Naturally, these were 
companies with two shareholder-directors; invariably holding shares in 50-50 
proportions. Overall, then, one and two men companies made up for nearly 80 per cent 
of the total survey records. 
REFORMING THE PUBLIC REGISTER 
3.50 The author took the opportunity to investigate the effectiveness of the DDR on 
two fronts. Firstly, the content of the DDR and, most importantly, its accuracy.  
3.51 Content of the DDR It has already been commented upon that the DDR does not 
contain details as to the underlying factual circumstances leading to a person’s 
disqualification; unlike the IES. This in itself is considered, by the present author, a 
significant omission that undermines the policy of having an online directory in the first 
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place. A prudent creditor may wish to make searches of the DDR so as to ensure that 
he or she is not dealing with an unfit person; or a company may wish to make probing 
enquiries as to the good-standing of a potential appointee to the board.403 It is accepted 
that, for the most part, additional details are superfluous; the mere fact that a director is 
listed should be sufficient to appease the enquiries of all but the most fastidious 
investigator. However, placing this information on the record, it is argued, would make 
great strides in the name of the public interest.404 Having the nature of one’s misconduct 
placed out in the open can be a very powerful deterrent; far more so than just a name 
on a long list of offenders. It goes without saying that an increased deterrent effect is 
fundamental to the overall regime, and would go some way to increasing the trust and 
confidence in it. It is therefore submitted that all records on the DDR should contain a 
misconduct report for public viewing. This would be a well-received extension to the 
idea of ‘naming and shaming’, and is something that the IS have got right. CH could 
learn a lot from this approach.405 
3.52 As an aside, it is somewhat curious that two separate databases exist in the first 
place, with different specifications and scope. Perhaps one solution would be to 
maintain one register that is jointly contributed to by both executive agencies, though it 
is assumed this would require a change in legislation to facilitate. 
                                                 
403 In a different context, CDDA 1986 checks are often carried out by various professions. For 
example, the Inns of Court require all barristers before call to certify that they are not disqualified. 
If checks were carried out (either routinely or randomly), some may slip through the cracks if the 
register is not properly maintained. 
404 Though as Hicks suggested, awareness amongst the public of the register may be in fact very low: 
Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? (n 18) 53. 
405 Perhaps somewhat selfishly, the author notes that it would also allow for considerably greater 
scope for statistical analysis going forward. 
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3.53 Accuracy of the DDR As part of the author’s research, some investigations were 
made to understand the accuracy of the public register of disqualified directors. The 
reader will recall that CH is required by statute to maintain the DDR. It is comprised of 
information passed to it by the courts in relation to disqualification orders, and the IS in 
relation to undertakings. Much has been written in relation to the accuracy and 
completeness of the DDR in the past. Of particular importance are the two reports 
published by the NAO; the first in 1993406 and the later in 1999.407 In the 1993 report, 
the NAO found that between December 1991 and November 1992 a substantial 58 per 
cent of records, out of a sample of over 100 disqualifications, had failed to be published 
on the register three months later.408 This report was followed up in 1999. Reflecting in 
that report on the position in 1993, the NAO noted it was ‘disturbed’409 by the fact that 
the DDR was ‘significantly incomplete’.410 It was argued by the NAO that the: 
…register has an important part to play in maintaining the standards of company 
stewardship. The general public and the commercial world are entitled to rely on the 
accuracy and completeness of the register, the more so because they pay for access to 
it.411 
It was suggested within the report that some blame was to be directed at the court 
system, for failing to notify CH that a disqualification order had been made within a 
timely fashion.412  Ultimately, however, the NAO concluded in its 1999 study that since 
1993 matters had improved considerably. They reported that there was merely a ‘small 
level of inaccuracy’413 on the DDR at that time.  
                                                 
406 NAO Report (n 124). 
407 NAO Follow-Up Report (n 15). 
408 NAO Report, para 4.13. 
409 NAO Follow-Up Report, 57. 
410 ibid. 
411 ibid. 
412 ibid, para 2.42. 
413 ibid, para 2.43. 
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3.54 The present author was able to conduct his own study on the accuracy and 
completeness of the DDR in respect of the survey records, in order to give a general 
appraisal of its state some 15 years following the latest published report addressing the 
issue. The author wrote a database query to cross-reference between the IES and DDR 
as obtained on 30th November 2013, to determine whether all of the records in the IES 
were present in the DDR. In theory, all of the records should have appeared in both 
databases. However, it transpired that only 112 out of 285 records were recorded on the 
DDR. In other words, approximately 60.1 per cent of records in the survey were not 
recorded. In line with the NAO’s methodology, the author repeated the process three-
months later. The same set of 285 IES records were compared with a new version of 
the DDR, obtained on 28th February 2014. Cross-referencing revealed that 170 records 
had been placed on the DDR by that time. To put it another way, 40.4 per cent of records 
were missing from the public register three months later. It should be noted, as discussed 
previously in dealing with the methodology of the survey, it was because of these 
omissions that the author could not cross-verify much of the data between the IES and 
DDR to check for accuracy. 
3.55 It is somewhat self-evident from the figures at hand that there is a large time 
delay, perhaps caused due to a backlog, between disqualifications being made and 
reflected upon the DDR. It should also be stated that the blame cannot lay at the feet of 
the court system in this instance (unlike with the NAO data), as the survey dealt with 
undertakings; not orders. Based on the survey information, a total of 58 records in the 
survey were added to the database within three months, which by way of extrapolation 
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suggests it may take up to a further six months before all records are successfully 
recorded on the DDR.414  
3.56 This is troubling. To reiterate the NAO’s own arguments: there is a great public 
interest importance in ensuring the accuracy, and therefore the completeness, of the 
DDR.415 One primary purpose of the register is to enable the public to know who they 
are dealing with. This promotes good stewardship of limited companies, as well as 
acting as a deterrent by ensuring that the wider general public can access the information 
freely. Any significant delay in the records appearing on the DDR therefore not only 
harms the underlying purpose of the register, in breach of a statutory obligation, but it 
also goes some way to defeating the effectiveness of the disqualification regime itself. 
In turn, this has implications for reducing the trust and confidence placed in it. The time 
delay may be of particular concern in respect of phoenix companies, where 
unscrupulous directors often will act as quickly as possible to raise a new company from 
the ashes, in order to continue trading. If information is not available on the DDR in a 
timely fashion it could cause issues for potential creditors, who are of course entitled to 
rely upon the accuracy of the information presented.416 Whilst there has clearly been 
improvement since the NAO report in 1993, it is argued here, contrary to their later 
report, that standards are once again on the decline. This is a matter requiring urgent 
attention. 
                                                 
414 The author did not carry out any additional tests at routine intervals to see when all records were 
in fact added; perhaps a missed opportunity. 
415 Moreover, the Cork Committee considered an accurate, publicly, searchable register as being 
crucial to a successful disqualification regime: Cork Report (n 68) paras 1824-1825. 
416 Despite this, the survey at hand would suggest that phoenixism (with zero reports recorded in the 
survey period) is becoming less of an issue than it previously was. However, this clearly does not 
excuse the potential for abuse created by the bad maintenance of the official record. 
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THE SOLVENCY OF DISQUALIFIED DIRECTORS 
3.57 One of the core difficulties, common to all of the mechanisms discussed 
throughout this thesis, is that of seeking redress against directors who transpire to be 
impecunious. In terms of disqualification proper, the issue does not arise. However, 
with the introduction of compensation orders and undertakings, it becomes a major 
factor for consideration.417 In short, mechanisms that require a director to account for 
her misconduct by contributing to the company, or compensate creditors, are only useful 
where the director in question is worth her salt. Where the individual cannot pay, 
personal insolvency proceedings will invariably ensue. Section 15B(5) of the CDDA 
1986 expressly provides that any compensation order made (or undertaking given) is to 
be considered a provable debt in bankruptcy, thus it is expected that individuals will be 
pursued to bankruptcy in appropriate cases. It is worth reiterating that perhaps one 
unintended consequence will be that more directors will simply submit to personal 
insolvency proceedings when faced with the threat of compensation.418 In this section, 
however, the author will assess how many directors within the survey data were 
bankrupted within a period of three years from their initial disqualification. Bankruptcy 
is clear evidence of an inability to pay and, as such, this will enable a more intimate 
understanding of the demographic of those directors who are likely to be pursued for 
compensation orders or undertakings. The three-year period was deemed optimal as the 
SS only has two years from the date of disqualification to proceed against a director for 
compensation.419 As such, those found to be bankrupt within that window are, for all 
                                                 
417 As it is with wrongful and fraudulent trading: 4.18. 
418 2.47. 
419 CDDA 1986, s 15A(5). 
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intents and purposes, not worth pursuing. The additional year will allow for some ‘spill 
over’ in respect of individuals that the SS might have proceeded against within two 
years, but in due course, when learning of this subsequent bankruptcy, decide to 
discontinue. It should be noted that Williams has conducted a similar, more detailed, 
inquiry into bankruptcy, based upon his own 2008 survey of undertakings.420 As such, 
the following analysis is included largely for completeness to enable comparisons to be 
made between the two data sets, and to bring those findings up to date.  
3.58 Methodology On 30 November 2016 (i.e. three years following the initial 
survey), the author wrote a computer programme to automatically match the 285 
records in the survey with corresponding entries (if any) in the London Gazette.421 The 
programme conducted a search based on the name of the director. By cross-referencing 
common information between the two data sources, it was possible to identify 
bankrupted directors. Generally, this was done on the basis of a confirmed name and 
date of birth match. In some cases, it required a match with the name of the company 
of which the individual directed, or the comparison of a last known address. At least 
two pieces of matching information were required in order for a record to be included 
in the survey. However, it transpired that there were no instances where it could not be 
confirmed, either way, whether the Gazette record concerned the individual queried. As 
such, all 285 records formed part of the final analysis. It is of course possible that a 
person may have been bankrupted prior to the insolvency of the company that led to 
their disqualification. As such, only bankruptcies that followed the insolvency of the 
relevant company were counted in the survey results. The date used in the analysis was 
                                                 
420 Williams, ‘Civil Recovery from Delinquent Directors’ (n 125). 
421 The Gazette is available at <http://bit.ly/1qL6OBf> accessed 26 March 2017 
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the date that the bankruptcy petition was filed, and not the date that the actual order was 
made. 
3.59 General findings Upon analysis, it was determined that 32422 of the total 285 
directors (11.2 per cent) were bankrupted following the corporate insolvency.423 The 
small sample size424 should therefore be considered as a limitation of the analysis to 
come. A considerable proportion of those (25 records; 78.1 per cent) were bankrupted 
either before or at around the same time the disqualification undertaking was given.425 
The figures therefore indicate that a disqualified director is most likely to be bankrupted 
in the interim period between the corporate insolvency and the disqualification. For 
those remaining directors (7 records), Table 9 below sets out the period of time that had 
elapsed, following disqualification, before the bankruptcy petition was filed: 











                                                 
422 11 of those were creditor petitions; 16 debtor petitions. In the remaining 5 cases, the information 
was not recorded in the Gazette. 
423 By way of comparison, Williams found that that 22.4 per cent of directors in his survey were 
bankrupted. 19.7 per cent were bankrupted within 3 years of the disqualification order being made 
(which is at the limit of this author’s results). See Williams, ‘Civil Recovery from Delinquent 
Directors’ (n 125) 325-326. 
424 Again, for comparison Williams’ survey yielded 102 bankruptcies out of 456 total records; ibid 
326-327. 
425 Williams found that 52.9 per cent were disqualified before or contemporaneously with the 
disqualification: ibid 326-327. 
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3.60 Only two directors in the survey fell outside of crucial cut-off period of two-
years following the disqualification. In other words, on this survey data, the SS would 
have had full knowledge of being unable to proceed against 30 out of the 32 bankrupted 
directors (93.8 per cent) before the statutory time limit expired.426  














2-5 16 (50.0) 64.2 -14.2 
6-10 9 (28.1) 26.3 +1.8 
11-15 7 (21.9) 9.5 +12.4 
3.61 Period of disqualification In terms of the period of disqualification the mean 
average amongst those bankrupted was significantly higher than across the wider 
sample, at 6.55 years (median average 5.50 years). As indicated in Table 10 above, 
based on Sevenoaks brackets, it would appear that misconduct considered to be ‘minor’ 
(i.e. within the 2-5 years category) is less frequent than when compared to the whole 
sample. Most of these cases are redistributed, in the case of the bankrupt director, to the 
highest bracket instead. This has implications for the compensation regime, given that, 
as stated in the previous chapter, the IS will only pursue the most serious of cases.427 
Again, it is assumed that this is limited to disqualifications made within the middle and 
top brackets. The reader is reminded that 102 directors (35.8 per cent) across the total 
                                                 
426 Should the SS have chosen to proceed against the other two, it is likely that the individuals would 
have been unable to pay going forward in any case. This would lead to ‘bad debt’ having to be 
written off by the IS. In recent times, it appears this is becoming more of a problem with 106 claims 
(accounting for £642,000) having to be abandoned in 2015-16. See: IS, Annual Report and Accounts 
2015-16 (n 249) 99. 
427 2.42. 
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sample fell within those brackets. However, 16 of these were ultimately bankrupted 
(15.7 per cent of those in the top and middle brackets). As such, it is argued that the 
scope for pursuing disqualified directors for compensation must take that factor into 
account. In other words, out of the total of 285 directors in the survey the author 
suggests that only 86 would have made suitable candidates for compensation. This 
amounts to some 30.2 per cent of the total sample of those disqualified.428  
3.62 Allegations Table 11 below sets out the breakdown of the allegations made 
against those directors that were bankrupt. Across the 32 directors, there were 58 
allegations in total. There is, however, little scope for analysis on this front as the results 
are not too dissimilar from those seen across the wider survey. One exception relates to 
a larger incidence of misconduct in dealing with suppliers or customers, which may 
account for the correspondingly higher average period of disqualification across the 
demographic. 
  
                                                 
428 Incidentally, the average deficit across insolvent companies for those bankrupted was also 
significantly higher than across the entire sample. Mean deficit: £496,270.74. Median deficit: 
£212,270.50. Even if the non-bankrupted individuals were pursued, it is questionable how many 
would be able to afford such sums – many would likely be bankrupted as a result of compensation 
proceedings, if not the disqualification itself. 
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Table 11: Number of misconduct allegations in respect of bankrupted directors 
Misconduct Description Allegations Total (%) 
Crown Debt 22 37.9 
Accounting 6 10.3 
Detriment to creditors other than 
the Crown 
11 19.0 
Pre-existing disqualification 1 1.7 
In dealing with suppliers and/or 
customers 
5 8.6 
Missing Trade Intra Community 
(MTIC) VAT Fraud 
1 1.7 
Breach of fiduciary duties 9 15.5 
Failing to cooperate with a 
liquidator 
1 1.7 
Breach of technical statutory 
provisions 
2 3.4 
Total 58 100.0 
3.63 Conclusion In summary, it can be said that the number of those bankrupted 
following disqualification is not overwhelming; but neither is it insubstantial. There are 
no doubt other factors at play in determining whether a disqualified director should be 
pursued for compensation aside from those examined here; namely the solvency of the 
individual and the seriousness of their misconduct. As such, the number of directors 
actually pursued is likely to be far fewer than the 30 per cent envisaged. The mechanism, 
therefore, should ultimately be seen as having limited overall utility in the grand scheme 
of things. In short, compensation orders and undertakings are unlikely to cause any 
significant shifts in the amount of recovery for unsecured creditors. In light of that, they 
ought not to be heavily relied on by officeholders or creditors, or held out by politicians, 
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as a magic bullet to remedying the current problems within the enforcement regime. 
Whilst they will no doubt serve some purpose, what has just been described is the true 
danger: that they are being heralded as something that they are not. Williams puts it in 
the following terms, which this author adopts in full: 
[the danger is in giving] both office holders and creditors a false sense of security in 
the ability of the state to improve on outcomes achieved by existing rules. To be sure, 
there will be some successes, but they may simply come in place of successful recovery 
by office holders under existing recovery powers [i.e. the private mechanisms].429 
CONCLUSION 
3.64 The author has shown that the vast majority of disqualifications arise from 
small, owner-managed, undercapitalised, private limited companies. This finding is 
crucial to the arguments set out in the penultimate chapter, which will deal with 
measures that might be taken so as to guard against some of the difficulties set out 
previously. The substantive empirical analysis presented adds yet another dimension of 
understanding to how disqualification operates in practice. The statistics reveal a great 
deal about what is working, and what is not. It has been shown that the statutory register 
is inaccurate and poorly maintained, thereby undermining the objectives of protecting 
the public, and deterring further directorial misconduct. That aside, it is argued here that 
undertakings themselves fail, in large part, to embody these underlying aims. Given that 
undertakings account for some 80 per cent of all disqualifications,430 this is not a 
conclusion simply to be brushed under the carpet.  
3.65 One primary, inescapable, problem arises from the fact that directors are 
investigated and prosecuted by a bureaucratic, target-driven, IS. This has, inevitably, 
                                                 
429 Williams, ‘Civil Recovery from Delinquent Directors’ (n 125) 339. 
430 IS, Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes 2016-17 (n 87). 
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led to suggestions that the more straightforward cases are being ‘cherry picked’ as a 
means of bolstering enforcement statistics. Although the author has not uncovered any 
evidence supporting that assertion, it is readily apparent that disqualifications arising 
from misconduct as against the state occupy a considerable portion of the spectrum. As 
was stated previously in this chapter: Crown debt misconduct is the lifeblood of 
disqualification. Whilst it might be true that undertakings reduce both the time and cost 
in dealing with delinquent directors, as compared to court proceedings, this comes as a 
trade-off for less scrutiny; a potentially target-based enforcement regime; and lower 
periods of disqualification overall. This is surely out of step with the objectives of the 
regime. As an inherently flawed system its effectiveness is stunted, and the desirability 
of maintaining it going forward ought to be challenged.  
3.66 An even greater pressing concern of the author is that the recently introduced 
compensation regime will go much the same way. This must be resisted. It must not 
simply become a backdoor means of recovering debts owed to the state; masquerading 
as a mechanism for the protection of the private creditor. To do so would render the 
effectiveness of the regime nil, when measured against its objectives, and all but destroy 
public trust and confidence in it. Even if this can be guarded against, the prospects of 
substantial recovery for the private creditor are slim. It has been demonstrated that a 
proportionally small number of disqualifications arise from transactions to the 
detriment of private creditors. Moreover, even where these individuals are disqualified 
it is invariably for a very short period of time. Another problem is, as this chapter has 
shown, that many disqualified directors suffer bankruptcy following corporate 
insolvency.  As such, the number of potential defendants in compensation proceedings 
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is comparatively small. In short, creditors are unlikely to find that the compensation 
regime provides anything more than a marginal improvement to their chances of 
recovery in reality.  
3.67 Despite the numerous concerns that commentators, committees, and consultees 
have expressed in respect of disqualification undertakings, it is quite remarkable that so 
little has changed over the years. The SBEEA 2015 provided an opportune moment to 
reorient disqualification towards its primary objective; to protect the public. Whilst it is 
far too early to examine its impact on the regime as a whole, it is this author’s belief 
that it is unlikely to bring any measurable benefits for private creditors. Yet, 
simultaneously, it opens up the possibility for abuse and a further deepening of the 
inherent IS bias towards state-related misconduct. It is business as usual at the IS, and 





















4.1 The next two chapters of the thesis now turn to deal with the entirely separate 
matter of private enforcement mechanisms, namely fraudulent and wrongful trading. 
The first chapter is concerned largely with the substantive law surrounding the 
mechanisms and will, in the usual fashion, set out the bare essentials of the provisions, 
followed by an exposition of their objectives. The author will then discuss the 
effectiveness of the provisions with reference to those objectives. Whilst the improper 
trading mechanisms are situated within this thesis as having primarily ‘private’ 
objectives, the author will also demonstrate that they have potential in theory for a 
‘public’ impact through deterrence and directors’ disqualification. The author will then 
explore some of the barriers that are inhibitive of the regime and, in doing so, take a 
view on effectiveness. Given the linked history between wrongful and fraudulent 
trading, many of the difficulties faced are common to both provisions. Therefore, first, 
the general barriers spanning both mechanisms will be considered. The author will then 
deal with those unique to each of the two mechanisms. Importantly, the impact of the 
changes made under the SBEEA 2015 in this area also fall to be considered.431 One 
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particular reform – enabling officeholders to assign, inter alia, improper trading actions 
to third parties –  is of such substance that it is dealt with separately in the next chapter.  
THE ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS 
Fraudulent Trading 
4.2 In its current form the fraudulent trading provision under section 213 of the IA 
1986 reads as follows: 
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business of 
the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the 
following has effect. 
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator may declare that any persons 
who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in the manner 
above-mentioned are to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the 
company’s assets as the court thinks proper. 
There are therefore three core elements within the section that are required to establish 
liability:  
(a) there must be a carrying on of the business of the company; 
(b) it must be carried on with an intention to defraud or for any fraudulent purpose, 
and; 
(c) liability only attaches to those persons knowingly parties to the carrying on of 
the business.  
Wrongful Trading 
4.3 By comparison, the wrongful trading provision under section 214 IA 1986 reads 
insofar as relevant: 
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(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if in the course of the winding up of a company 
it appears that subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to a person who 
is or has been a director of the company, the court, on the application of the 
liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such contribution 
(if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper. 
(2) This subsection applies in relation to a person if— 
(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, 
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, 
that person knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation or 
entering insolvent administration, and 
(c) that person was a director of the company at that time; 
… 
(3) The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any 
person if it is satisfied that after the condition specified in subsection (2)(b) was 
first satisfied in relation to him that person took every step with a view to 
minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors as (on the assumption 
that he had knowledge of the matter mentioned in subsection (2)(b)) he ought 
to have taken. 
(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), the facts which a director of a 
company ought to know or ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach 
and the steps which he ought to take are those which would be known or 
ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent person having both— 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by 
that director in relation to the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has. 
… 
Similarly, the core elements for liability to attach can be described as follows:432 
(a) the company went into liquidation or administration at a time when its assets 
were insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses 
of the winding up; 
(b) at some time before the commencement of the winding up a person who is/was 
a director knew or ought to have concluded there was no reasonable prospect that 
the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation or administration; 
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(c) unless it can be shown, for which the onus433 is on the director, that she took 
‘every step’ with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors. 
Recent Developments 
4.4 The two provisions have remained practically untouched for some three 
decades. However, two key reforms were implemented as part of the SBEEA 2015. The 
first relates to administrations. It is noteworthy that both sections 213 and 214 IA 1986 
give standing to bring an action only to liquidators. However, the substantial rise in 
administrations led to a call for this to be extended.  This was effected, albeit some 30 
years following a similar recommendation by the Cork Committee,434 by section 117 of 
the SBEEA 2015, which amends the IA 1986 to introduce sections 246ZA-ZC. These 
sections are identical to section 213 and 214 save that they pertain to administrators and 
administration. The second reform, dealt with in the next chapter, is that officeholders 
can now assign, inter alia, any wrongful or fraudulent trading action to a third party. 
A BRIEF HISTORY  
4.5 When the Cork Committee reported in 1982, as with many aspects of insolvency 
law at the time, it took great issue with the inadequacy of the fraudulent trading 
provisions as they stood.435 Originally, the criminal and civil fraudulent trading 
provisions were twinned within the same section. The Committee noted that, as a result, 
rules of statutory interpretation demanded that liquidators had to – even in the civil 
setting – prove their case to the criminal standard. Liquidators, the Committee therefore 
argued, in civil proceedings, would face ‘an unduly stringent burden of proof in relation 
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to the ingredient of fraud’.436 As will be shown later in this chapter, it being one of the 
major hurdles for applicants, proving fraud even to the civil standard in insolvency 
situations is especially difficult; to the criminal standard, immeasurably more so. Cork 
described the rationale for doing so in the following way:  
We realized that you could never write a law in this country where a jury will convict 
a man of fraud when all he had done was continue to trade. We had to take it out of the 
criminal law and make the responsibility a financial one inasmuch as he lost his 
immunity – limited liability.437 
A second issue taken up by the Committee was that, given the ‘dishonesty’ criterion, 
even the most incompetent, ignorant, or grossly negligent director faced no liability 
under the fraudulent trading provisions. Moreover, due to the potential for overlap, they 
noted that a liquidator may be deterred or inhibited from initiating civil proceedings in 
light of imminent or ongoing criminal proceedings.438 Thirdly, the Committee took issue 
with the fact that civil fraudulent trading claims could only be brought in the course of 
winding up, thereby limiting its applicability, and eliminating all potential for acting 
pre-emptively so as to mitigate the effects of the fraud on creditors.439 The combined 
effects of these highlighted difficulties, in particular the dishonesty requirement, were 
that the civil provisions were scarcely used in practice. 
4.6 The Cork Committee recommended truly radical changes, in particular that the 
civil fraudulent trading provision repealed entirely.440 In its place, the Committee 
suggested a new form of civil liability, which they coined ‘wrongful trading’. Crucially 
this would function without requiring proof of fraud or dishonesty, or be subject to the 
                                                 
436 ibid, para 1759. 
437 Bruce G Carruthers and Terence C Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate 
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criminal standard.441 The Committee recommended that the criminal fraudulent trading 
provision should remain in order to deal with instances of proven fraud.442 These 
recommendations were partly taken up by Parliament and the civil offence of wrongful 
trading was duly enacted, in what is today section 214 of the IA 1986. Parliament, 
however, declined to repeal the civil fraudulent trading provision. Instead, counter to 
the recommendation, it was merely separated from the criminal provision. The civil 
provision was re-enacted under section 213 of the IA 1986, with the criminal provisions 
being moved to section 458 of the CA 1985, now section 993 of the CA 2006. The 
severance of the two was accompanied by one other substantial modification that 
Parliament made to the civil element of fraudulent trading under the IA 1986: the 
applicant. Previously, the provision permitted ‘the official receiver, or the liquidator or 
any creditor or contributory of the company’443 to bring an action. However, under the 
reformulation in section 213 of the IA 1986, it became the sole prerogative of the 
liquidator.444 Though, as previously adumbrated, the action is now available to 
administrators. 
THE PRIVATE OBJECTIVES 
Fraudulent Trading 
4.7 The concept of using a company as a vehicle for fraud is no doubt as old as 
limited liability itself, though fraudulent trading began life as something of an 
‘experiment’. According to the Greene Committee, who reported in 1926, it was a 
particular problem of the time that directors who held a floating charge against a 
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company of questionable solvency could easily obtain goods on credit so as to ‘fill up’ 
their security.445 The director in question would then appoint a receiver and establish his 
claim on the floating charge. Reluctant at that time to suggest amendments to the 
floating charge legislation, the Greene Committee instead made recommendations to 
implement what became known as the fraudulent trading provisions.446  
4.8 The original rationale for the mechanism is therefore clear. It was to deal with 
a very specific problem of the time. However, as will have been noted, the provision 
has evolved somewhat. Because of the original focus as being against those frauds 
committed solely by directors, only they could be liable under it. This was rectified in 
the successor provision, namely Companies Act 1948 (CA 1948), section 332, which 
widened the ambit of liability to encompass ‘any persons’ found to be knowingly a party 
to the fraudulent activities. The focus of this thesis is strictly limited to director liability, 
though it should be noted that the nature of fraudulent trading as being applicable to 
any person is perhaps its most notable feature.447 Despite the changes over the decades, 
at its core, the primary objective – when all is said and done – has remained fairly 
constant. As it was put by Mummery LJ, in the Court of Appeal, in Morris v Bank of 
India:448 
[The c]ompensation of those who have suffered loss as a result of the fraudulent trading 
is the paramount purpose of the provisions imposing civil liability to contribute to the 
loss suffered.449 
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Therefore, in the case of the civil fraudulent trading provision the objective is, rather 
straightforwardly, to provide a mechanism that permits those who have suffered frauds 
at the hands of delinquent directors (and by others) to be compensated. The provision 
provides for this by imposing personal liability upon those found to have traded 
fraudulently within the terms of the section. The civil mechanism is therefore not 
intended to punish the errant director though, as one might expect, it was recognised 
that such persons were no doubt deserving of punishment in some cases. Thus, the 
criminal provision fills the particular lacuna where the conduct is deemed so severe as 
to warrant prosecution in the public interest. It should be noted that, in line with the 
scope of the thesis, the primary focus of this chapter is on the civil fraudulent trading 
provisions. With that said, however, much of the discourse will equally apply to 
criminal proceedings and they will be referred to where necessary throughout.  
Wrongful Trading 
4.9 Given that wrongful trading was a child of Cork, that provides a suitable starting 
point for determining the rationale for and objectives of the mechanism. It has already 
been expressed that wrongful trading was designed to overcome the perceived 
difficulties of fraudulent trading. As the Committee set out in its Report under a heading 
‘the justification for the new concept’: 
A balance has to be struck. No one wishes to discourage the inception and growth of 
businesses, although both are unavoidably attended by risk to creditors. Equally a 
climate should exist in which downright irresponsibility is discouraged and in which 
those who abuse the privilege of limited liability can be made personally liable for the 
consequences of their conduct. We believe that our proposals…strike a fair balance 
between those two conflicting needs. We regard them as of the greatest importance, 
and their implementation as a matter of urgent necessity.450 
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The rationale is therefore clear in that, as expressed in the first chapter, the mechanisms 
discussed in this thesis are all ultimately designed to retain a sensible balance between 
access to limited liability to encourage entrepreneurship on the one hand, but to prevent 
its abuse on the other. However, the primary objective of the provision is more difficult 
to pin down. One purpose of the mechanism was set out by Vinelott J in Re Purpoint 
Ltd451 as being to ‘recoup the loss to the company so as to benefit the creditors as a 
whole’.452 Moreover, in a command paper published by the DTI in response to the Cork 
Report it noted that one objective would be to: 
[L]ead to a material improvement in the position of unsecured creditors by curbing the 
activities of irresponsible directors and by ensuring that companies act more swiftly 
when faced by the prospect of insolvency.453 
In other words, by ensuring prompt action amongst directors in the face of insolvency, 
the instances of misconduct amounting to wrongful trading would be reduced, thereby 
improving the overall position for unsecured creditors. Prima facie it can certainly be 
argued that wrongful trading embodies as its primary objective a compensatory function 
similar to that found in fraudulent trading. But, in fact, the true position appears to be 
that through encouraging higher directorial standards the hope of the DTI at that time 
was that the mechanism would simply never have to be utilised. Williams and McGee 
have indeed cited this as being the most important objective of wrongful trading.454 In a 
similar vein to fraudulent trading, wrongful trading is therefore not designed to be a 
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penal mechanism.455 This approach is therefore in some ways at odds with original 
intention of the Cork Committee, who clearly envisaged that wrongful trading would – 
first and foremost – be about compensating creditors. 
THE PUBLIC OBJECTIVES 
4.10 Keay has argued that fraudulent and wrongful trading serve both a public and 
private function.456  As alluded to in Chapter 1, in some instances the dividing between 
strictly ‘public’ or ‘private’ enforcement mechanisms is blurred.457 This is particularly 
true in the case of wrongful trading given what has just been stated about its primary 
objective. The private functions relate to their ability to compensate creditors. The 
public functions lay in the improvement of standards of management generally; 
providing a deterrence from wrongdoing; and the interaction with disqualification.458 It 
is this author’s perspective, to the contrary, that although they may be said to serve 
certain public functions in theory, the practice is somewhat different. 
Deterrence and Raising Standards 
4.11 Deterrence has already been dealt with in significant detail previously in this 
thesis.459 The author does not intend to repeat those points, though it should be noted 
that many of those made – particularly in respect of awareness – apply equally in this 
context. The concern of this author is accurately summarised by Ball: 
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‘The deterrent effect of law obviously depends upon…the knowledge of the law and 
the punishment prescribed…A law can have no deterrent influence upon a potential 
criminal if he is unaware of its existence’.460  
Thus, a person unaware of the existence of proceedings that may be taken against them 
is wholly unlikely to be deterred from such a course of conduct. As discussed 
previously, the state takes limited steps to bring matters such improper trading, and the 
associated penalties, to the attention of directors.461 Coupled with the exceedingly low 
volume of cases, a matter dealt with below, it seems unlikely that awareness is high. 
The author makes the point that if awareness of by far the most widely used mechanism 
– disqualification – is low, then the mechanisms discussed in this chapter immensely 
more so. Consequently, it is suggested that any deterrent effect is commensurately low. 
This is especially troubling in cases of fraud, as the consequences of such wrongdoing 
can be especially damaging to creditors and wider society.462 A successful regime, 
therefore, should embody a strong deterrence agenda, and it is somewhat obvious to 
this author a lack of awareness has dogged current efforts in this regard. But, in turn, 
this has a knock-on effect in terms of improving standards. Again, this was dealt with 
substantively in relation to disqualification. In short, it cannot be said that standards of 
directorial behaviour will be improved if those subject to the regulation are not aware 
of what conduct it seeks to control. The state cannot expect this knowledge to be 
obtained by directors through osmosis; proactive steps are needed. In the case of 
wrongful trading this omission is especially noteworthy given its primary aim of raising 
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standards thereby obviating the need for its use. Thus, the author is forced to conclude 
that wrongful trading fails to achieve its primary objective as a result of the state’s 
almost total failure in this regard. The obvious solution to this, as will be dealt with in 
the penultimate chapter, is to raise awareness through education and training. 
Directors’ Disqualification 
4.12 The even stronger point made here however, manifested on official data, relates 
to directors’ disqualification. Another form of disqualification not yet discussed arises 
from CDDA 1986, section 10. It provides that where the court makes a declaration that 
a person is liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets for wrongful or 
fraudulent trading, it may also make a disqualification order for a period not exceeding 
15 years. It is contended that Keay’s comment that disqualification provides a public 
enforcement element within the context of improper trading is confined merely to 
academic theory. It benefits from limited practical observation. Whilst it is the opinion 
of this author that it should occupy a far more prominent position in the disqualification 
arena, the evidence examined below is conclusive of the fact that it simply does not. 
4.13 A spate of FOIA 2000 requests by this author to CH and IS conclusively 
illustrates that even for those few individuals found liable for improper trading, the 
numbers disqualified are infinitesimally small. Table 12 below identifies the number of 
disqualifications made under CDDA 1986, section 10, since its inception: 
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Table 12: Disqualification Orders notified to the Secretary of State pursuant to 
section 10 CDDA 1986: 1986-2015 
Year 
*Indicates grouped 












4.14 According to the official data, the total number of disqualifications made under 
section 10 is 27, all occurring within the years 1990-2000. Since that time there have 
been no further disqualifications made under that section to date. What is particularly 
interesting is that the surge of section 10 disqualifications in the 1990’s dissipated 
around the same time as the implementation of the IA 2000, which introduced 
disqualification undertakings. Although not necessarily causative, it seems likely that 
since this time, what with the vast majority of disqualifications occurring via 
undertakings, section 10 orders have been all but forgotten. However, on this point it 
may be deduced from statistics provided by the IS that even if this is the case, and it is 
their practice to pursue such individuals for undertakings, the numbers are equally 
small. The official statistics for 2016-17 suggest, for example, that there was only one 
allegation of ‘insolvent trading’ out of a total of 1272.463 No defined category in the 
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statistics relates to fraudulent trading and therefore it is deduced that any they would 
fall into the ‘Other’ category. For 2016-17 there were zero such allegations that fell into 
that category.464 
4.15 Given that there is not even a need for an application by the officeholder for 
disqualifications to be made under section 10, as the court may make an order of its 
own volition, it would appear that its lacklustre usage falls squarely in the hands of the 
judiciary. Particularly in the case of fraud it is argued here that, where proven, 
disqualifications should in fact routinely be ordered. In this author’s mind, there can be 
no greater display of misconduct than fraud so as to warrant being barred from 
directorial practice. It seems at odds with the objectives of disqualification to swiftly 
and forcefully pursue those that commit relatively minor wrongdoing, for instance a 
failure to pay modest Crown debts.465 Yet, when the court is physically faced with an 
individual proven to have committed acts so grievous to the extent of being labelled as 
‘dishonest’ it appears that such a person will in effect never be barred. Indeed, this is 
contrary to the very idea of a deterrence. One possible solution, of course, is to 
implement some mechanism of automatic disqualification, as in Australia.466 This has 
been proposed by various commentators, including the Cork Committee,467 though to 
more general effect, and the concept has largely been shunned by Parliament. What is 
suggested here, however, is the potential for the legislation to provide – namely in cases 
of fraudulent trading – for a presumption that the individual found liable should be 
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disqualified, except in cases where information prevailing at the time would prevent 
such an order. The more heinous the fraudulent trading, the more difficult it should be 
to rebut the presumption that there should be an order for disqualification.  
4.16 The author has therefore demonstrated that disqualification in all of its history 
has hardly ever been used as a mechanism of enforcement subsequent to a finding that 
an individual has engaged in improper trading. It is for this reason that it is concluded 
that the ‘public’ utility of either mechanism is muted. In terms of the effectiveness of 
the regime, this is from one angle highly damaging, and from another simply a missed 
opportunity. 
THE NUMBER OF IMPROPER TRADING CASES 
4.17 One of the most cited criticisms of the improper trading mechanisms is that there 
is a paucity of actions brought and, what is generally drawn from that, is they are 
ineffective.468 In modern discourse, the majority of the attention in this regard is focused 
on wrongful trading. It was known as long ago as the Cork Report, and even before 
then, that the number of fraudulent trading cases brought was infinitesimal.469 In fact, it 
was that, amongst other factors, which led to calls by the Cork Committee for the 
abolition of the civil fraudulent trading mechanism. To put it bluntly, commentators 
seem to now be bored of repeating those same arguments and, in numbers terms, 
fraudulent trading is treated as being ‘virtually dormant’.470 There was originally, 
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however, a significant hope that wrongful trading would be the solution. Indeed, there 
is still optimism expressed in the literature that the potential of the mechanism is very 
great indeed.471 It must be remembered that the whole ‘point’ of wrongful trading, on 
the view of the Cork Committee, was to overcome many of the historic difficulties 
associated with fraudulent trading, thus increasing the number of actions taken against 
delinquent directors, and ultimately improving returns for creditors. And, the reader will 
be reminded, that the Committee viewed this as being a matter of the ‘greatest 
importance’ and of ‘urgent necessity’ to resolve. Given the primary objective of the 
mechanism, it might be said that the true sign of an effective wrongful trading regime 
is no sign of it at all. Though, causally this can only be accurate where absence is caused 
by an improvement in standards which, as the author has set out, there is no evidence 
to suggest has been the case.  To take the Cork approach, another view of determining 
effectiveness might be to look at the number of cases, and to determine whether things 
have improved since that time. Yet, analysis by Williams, up to 30 September 2013, 
showed a mere 16 reported decisions on substantive liability under the section since 
1986. In 11 instances the liquidator was successful, and therefore no success was found 
in five of those cases; 13 cases dealt solely with procedural matters arising from section 
214 (but not substantive liability). Therefore, there were a total of 29 reported 
applications under section 214 at that time.472 For completeness, the author carried out 
– utilising the same methodology as Williams – a search for recent cases up to the time 
of writing. There have been an additional four reported wrongful trading cases since 
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that time, one of which was Scottish.473 One case dealt solely with procedural matters 
arising from section 214.474 In the three remaining substantive decisions,475 the liquidator 
only found favour in one.476 Thus, to date there have been 33 reported applications. 
These are small numbers indeed. The expected revolution has therefore surely been a 
failure in numerical terms. It is hoped by some that the SBEEA 2015 reforms, in 
particular that of assignment, might invigorate the usage of the mechanism. The reader 
will be spared from that discussion until the next chapter. But, it is suggested here that 
the expectation of a larger number of cases is based upon a false premise, i.e. that ‘the 
current modest levels of litigation…are [not] dramatically out of line with instances of 
insolvent trading’.477 That is also the argument recently set out by Williams, who notes 
that there is no evidence, empirical or otherwise, presented in the Cork Report or the 
wider literature that suggests otherwise. In short, wrongful trading as a form of 
misconduct may simply not be as common as was anticipated. Yet this author goes 
further, and argues that there is nothing in the Cork Report itself which even suggests 
that wrongful trading was ever a widely experienced problem. Whilst it is true that there 
is a demand for ‘urgent’ action in this regard, it was the assumption of subsequent 
commentators that the need for urgency was driven as a result of there being a 
widespread problem. This author was fortunate to have had access to the private papers 
of Muir Hunter QC, who kept detailed records of his time sitting on the Cork 
                                                 
473 Paton v Martin [2016] SC AIR 57. 
474 Brooks v Armstrong [2016] EWHC 2893 (Ch);  
475 The other two being Re Ralls Builders Limited [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch); Brooks v Armstrong 
[2015] BCC 561. 
476 The Scottish case. 
477 Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ (n 
471) 77. 
Fraudulent and Wrongful Trading 
 
 167 
Committee.478 On the author’s reading of the materials instead the reality appears to be 
that there was considerable ill-feeling towards directors that traded wrongfully, but were 
not dishonest, and ‘got away with it’. Cork in particular appeared to view it as something 
of a personal mission to fill what he viewed as being a lacuna in the law as it stood at 
that time. In fact, Cork seemed adamant that delinquent directors of this ilk should be 
made bankrupt, and wrongful trading apparently seemed to be present a sensible option 
of achieving that. It was therefore this lacuna – rather than there being any great 
numerical concern – that led to the call for urgent reform, and was thus the driving force 
behind the wrongful trading rule. This is also borne out impliedly in the work of 
Carruthers and Halliday, who conducted a series of personal interviews with Cork on 
the subject.479 And thus, there still remains to this day a dearth of evidence which might 
suggest that the type of conduct the mechanism was intended to counteract was, or 
indeed, is, a particular problem. It is therefore submitted, alongside Williams, that the 
reality is that wrongful trading probably does not exist in the wild with any notable 
frequency. As previously noted, this finding is consistent with the disqualification 
statistics. 
GENERAL BARRIERS TO CLAIMS 
Director Impecuniosity 
4.18 The issue of director impecuniosity has been discussed at significant length 
previously.480 But, indeed, the impecuniosity of potential defendants is a difficulty 
common to all of the enforcement mechanisms discussed in this thesis. In the case of 
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improper trading, it will undoubtedly be at the forefront of the officeholder’s mind. Put 
simply, it would defy logic to pursue a director who is not worth her salt. It will be 
remembered that this author has suggested that Cork’s intention for the wrongful trading 
mechanism was to bankrupt delinquent directors. But, in truth, if directors are already 
on the verge of their own insolvency before they are required to make a contribution, 
any resultant success is purely symbolic. Again, this is a problem particularly noticeable 
in the case of owner-managers, many of whom will inject their own personal assets in 
to their company in order to try and save it when insolvency nears. Others will be subject 
to personal guarantees and therefore the insolvency of the company may lead to their 
own demise in short order. Although this issue arises independently of the mechanisms 
themselves, it is argued that it must be a factor for consideration in determining their 
effectiveness. This is because it presents a strong disincentive for an officeholder to 
commence proceedings, even in circumstances where the case is otherwise evidentially 
strong. The net result, of course, is that creditors lose out. 
Standing 
4.19 One concern that has been revisited in the commentary over the years has been 
the limited scope of the locus standi of the improper trading provisions. This has 
particularly been true of fraudulent trading, mainly due to the fact that it saw a reduction 
in its scope post-IA 1986 as explored previously. It is argued here that the restrictive 
approach taken to standing has been inhibitive of the regime over the decades. At the 
very least, there are compelling arguments to favour the widening of the provision to 
permit creditors to bring improper trading actions. With that said, the author’s argument 
falls by the wayside to some extent following the reforms of the SBEEA 2015. The 
assignment provision in effect permits a circumvention of the locus standi requirements 
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and can, in theory, permit a creditor to take action; albeit only following officeholder 
approval. Nonetheless, the author will put his case as it is yet too soon to know whether 
officeholders will permit creditor actions in practice. And, that is to say nothing of the 
past three decades of wasted opportunities for creditors. 
4.20 An examination of Hansard reveals an insight into the reasoning as to why the 
government of the day sought to narrow the standing requirements in relation to 
fraudulent trading. By extrapolation it can be assumed that similar logic applied to 
setting the standing requirements for wrongful trading at the point of inception. 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for DTI, Mr Alexander Fletcher, explained that: 
… [fraudulent trading] proceedings should be available only to the liquidator 
and…therefore any imposition of personal liability on directors and others should 
benefit creditors as a whole…Creditors will no longer be able to institute proceedings 
for their own individual benefit.481 
The reason for the shift, it therefore might be inferred, relates to the fact that an 
individual creditor could pursue a fraudulent trading claim for her own benefit, 
potentially to the detriment of others. In line with this stance, Keay has argued that the 
position under section 213 is therefore more equitable than under any of its 
predecessors.482 This is because the older provisions may have consequently had the 
effect of placing the respondent in an impecunious state following a single successful 
creditor claim, thereby inhibiting her ability to pay other creditors who have failed to 
initiate proceedings, or were simply slow in doing so.483 In other words, Keay envisaged 
an inequity in the potential for a ‘race to the courthouse’ scenario amongst creditors. It 
should be noted that there is little evidence to suggest that this actually occurred in 
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practice. In contrast, however, any award made under the current provisions is 
specifically a general contribution to the assets of the company, for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors,484 and not the individual applicant. This stands to reinforce the pari 
passu principle. A second, but related, issue that stems from this is what Milman has 
described as the ‘spirit of collectivism’.485 In other words, it may, purely on policy 
grounds, be undesirable to promote or allow any action which militates against a pari 
passu type distribution. This author’s suggestion of widening the provisions, therefore, 
might be considered by those such as Keay and Milman to fly in the face of collectivism 
ideology and, as a result, be undesirable in policy terms. However, there are many 
diverse reasons as to why an action may be justifiable in spite of policy concerns, three 
of which are described here:486  
(a) not least that it may indeed be equitable that a creditor who successfully brings 
proceedings at his own expense should have the full benefit of any damages award 
as in any area of the common law. Any dividend stemming from the assets pot 
following winding up would be deducted from the award, in accordance with 
general principles,487 so as to prevent issues of double recovery;  
(b) a creditor might instigate proceedings as trustee of himself and a particular class 
of creditors by previous arrangement so that, in effect, any costs, as well as any 
gains, are shared amongst this class;  
(c) in some circumstances, there may be certain creditors who are aware of the 
company’s insolvency but continue to trade at the risk of default, whereas other 
creditors may be deceived as to the creditworthiness of the company.  
In terms of effectiveness, the author’s position is straightforward. In limiting the locus 
standi, although its impact is not measurable, pre-2015 creditors have been 
                                                 
484 Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1995] BCC 911 
485 On the issue of the tort of deceit as an alternative action in the fraudulent trading context David 
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unreasonably prohibited from commencing proceedings in otherwise actionable cases. 
Thus, in circumstances where the officeholder herself is reluctant or unable to 
commence proceedings even pecunious creditors that are willing to take matters into 
their own hands are left with no alternative, without any real justification. Hopefully, 
following the SBEEA 2015, this position will change as assignment takes hold. 
BARRIERS TO WRONGFUL TRADING CLAIMS 
The ‘Net Deficiency’ Requirement 
4.21 One of the most perplexing difficulties with the wrongful trading provision 
relates not to the establishment of liability, but the way in which compensation is 
calculated should the officeholder succeed in her action and, as a corollary, the 
circumstances in which a court will exercise the discretion to make a contribution order. 
One particular issue in this regard, which the author refers to as the ‘net deficiency 
requirement’, has reared its head fairly recently to considerable criticism by Gabriel 
Moss QC.488 In fact, the current approach has been described by that esteemed 
commentator as both ‘a disgrace to our jurisprudence’489 and ‘unjust and absurd’.490 In 
Re Ralls Builders Limited491 and Re Ralls Buildings Limited (No. 2)492 it was held by 
Snowden J that the directors in question had traded wrongfully, contrary to section 214 
IA 1986. However, even in the absence of the directors being able to establish the ‘every 
step’ defence, the learned judge declined to make a contribution order. Thus, the 
unsecured creditors of the company got nothing for the efforts of the liquidator. In fact, 
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as Rajak notes, they ‘suffered substantially through the depletion of assets incurred by 
long and expensive litigation’.493 Snowden J took this approach because, in short, 
although new liabilities had been incurred during the period of wrongful trading, 
existing creditors (primarily the bank) had been paid to a similar extent to the effect that 
there was no material increase in the net deficiency of the company. Or, if there was an 
increase in the deficiency, there was no satisfactory evidence, on the balance of 
probabilities, that it was caused by the directors. This was not a position adopted on a 
whim. Indeed, Snowden J’s view was in line with a number of existing decisions. 
Following a detailed examination, the learned judge went on to confirm the approach 
of Vinelott J Re Purpoint494 and Park J in Re Continental Assurance,495 holding that:  
[T]he fact that any contribution to be made under section 214(1) must be distributed 
pari passu among the general body of unsecured creditors of the company is a 
significant pointer to the fact that the purpose of section 214 is not to provide 
differential redress for individual creditors, depending upon an assessment of the extent 
of their loss caused by the period of wrongful trading. So, for example, a creditor whose 
debt was incurred after the relevant date cannot claim to recover 100% of his loss in 
priority to a creditor whose debt was incurred prior to that date and who may only have 
been marginally disadvantaged (or not disadvantaged at all) by the continuation of 
trading.496 
Although, as noted by Moss, the authorities relied upon were without exception first 
instance decisions and thus Snowden J could have adopted a different course if he had 
seen fit. To the contrary, it was made clear by the judge that any change to what he 
himself described as being a ‘shortcoming’497 of section 214 must now nonetheless be 
for Parliament.498 He described the root problem with the net deficiency requirement in 
the following way: 
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The real sin of the Directors, so far as the unsecured left in the liquidation are 
concerned, is the manner in which the continued trading facilitated the repayment of 
the Bank and some existing creditors whilst leaving new creditors unpaid499 
Therefore, whilst apparently sympathetic to those ‘new’ creditors that had suffered at 
the expense of existing creditors, he felt unable to make the contribution order sought 
by the liquidator on the basis of existing precedent. In the slightly later case of Brooks 
v Armstrong500 David Foxton QC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court followed 
the same approach of his brethren, thus apparently confirming that this is the position 
to be adopted for the future, save for intervention from either Parliament or the Court 
of Appeal. It goes without saying that, at present, there is no Parliamentary will to attend 
to the matter. Similarly, the likelihood of a case reaching the Court of Appeal is slim, 
as the officeholder has to weigh up the serious risk that he may simply be throwing 
good money after bad.  
4.22 Moss sets out what is, in his view, the absurdity of the current legal position 
with a simple yet stark illustration.501 Imagine a director, who during a period of 
insolvent trading takes on £1 million worth of new liabilities that the company had no 
reasonable prospect of paying. Should the director cause the company to pay off £1 
million of old liabilities in the same period, then no contribution order could be made 
on the current approach in Re Ralls Builders Ltd due to the net deficiency being zero. 
Moss therefore concludes that this ‘provides directors with the perverse incentive of 
continuing to trade as long as they are careful to “rob Peter to Pay Paul” and to make 
sure that the net deficit remains constant’.502 Moss describes the original intention of the 
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Cork Committee as being that directors should have to compensate creditors where they 
took on liabilities without any real prospect of being able to pay them.503 Thus, if this 
formulation were adopted the director in the above example would be liable for the sum 
of £1 million; namely the liability incurred during the period of insolvent trading, rather 
than the company’s net deficiency. He therefore suggests, given Parliament expressed 
no contrary view to the nature of the mechanism as proposed by the Committee, that it 
is that view that they silently adopted. Thus, he argues, the present position arises from 
statutory misinterpretation, originating from the early decision of Knox J in Re Produce 
Marketing Consortium Ltd.504 The author has considerable sympathy with Moss’ pro-
creditor argument. However, there are two points where the analysis falls down. As has 
been recognised by a number of commentators, including Sealy and Milman, 
Parliament ultimately did not see fit to accept the recommendations of the Cork 
Committee in full in this context. Therefore, whilst the bald concept was adopted, it 
cannot be assumed – as Moss appears to – in view of the DTI’s silence on the matter 
that the spirit of the provision was adopted in full. Moss’ argument is therefore based 
upon a false premise. In fact, it is suggested here that part of the reason for this lack of 
detail was, as recognised by Knox J in Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd that 
Parliament purposefully chose to afford the courts a large amount of discretion in the 
exercise of the remedy and its development. It should also be recalled that Parliament 
did not see fit to intervene at the most opportune moment and correct the position when 
passing the SBEEA 2015. It therefore seems the current approach to this issue is here 
to stay. There is however a further insuperable difficulty with Moss’ argument which, 
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upon reflection, confirms in this author’s mind that the current course adopted in the 
recent cases must be the correct one. To adopt the approach of the Cork Committee, 
and therefore Moss, it is argued, would orientate the mechanism as being one that is 
penal and not compensatory. There is little doubt that Cork himself very much intended 
the provision to have a penal effect; though without it expressly being penal on the face 
of the provision. However, that is not the approach that Parliament ultimately adopted. 
Thus, as with disqualification, any construction of the section that might exhibit 
punitive intentions must be resisted. Or, if the punishment of directors in this context is 
deemed to be desirable, then the law must be changed to reflect the change in appetite. 
4.23 Practically, this creates evidential difficulties for the officeholder who must 
prove both a net deficiency and a causal link between that deficiency and the director’s 
conduct. This is no doubt a time consuming and costly process in itself. But, as is now 
made obvious from the recent authorities, doing this properly is crucial to success or 
failure. In terms of the bearing of the current position upon the effectiveness of the 
wrongful trading regime, notwithstanding the arguments made previously, it cannot be 
denied that it paints a very stark picture indeed for creditors. If an aim of wrongful 
trading is to compensate creditors who have suffered at the hands of delinquent 
directors, then the recent case law in this area can be described as nothing other than a 
significant blow to that endeavour, even if it is done for the proper reasons. In terms of 
the other objectives of wrongful trading, namely deterrence and the raising of standards 
amongst directors generally, again, the current position is a considerable inhibitor; yet 
again confirming the significant difficulties that an officeholder will have in pursuing 
delinquent directors even where there is a prima facie strong case of misconduct. In 
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fact, the author suggests that the current approach may even encourage reckless trading. 
If very careful, a director could in theory continue to trade whilst insolvent – incurring 
additional liabilities knowing they are unable to be repaid in the process – in perpetuity 
without wrongful trading liability so long as the net deficiency remains at, or close to, 
zero, and so long as comprehensive accounting records are kept to evidence the same. 
BARRIERS TO FRAUDULENT TRADING CLAIMS 
The Dishonesty Requirement  
4.24 The need for proof of dishonesty for liability to attach under section 213 is 
nowhere to be found in the wording of the section itself. Yet it is recognised, even in 
the civil context, as being necessary to satisfy either of the ‘intent to defraud’ or 
‘fraudulent purpose’ ingredients.505 It is argued here that the miniscule number of 
fraudulent trading cases brought is primarily a result of officeholder reluctance 
stemming from the existence of this dishonesty requirement. In fact, there is little doubt 
in the mind of this author that it is the primary barrier to a successful fraudulent trading 
action.506 This may well be appropriate. Fraud is a very serious allegation and it is 
therefore quite right that it is proven to a high standard in order for liability to attach, in 
the interests of justice. The point made by the present author here is that, in fact, the 
need for the requirement is entirely erroneous and it has arisen primarily as a result of 
a misconstruction of the section in two early decisions of Maugham J.507 That 
notwithstanding, the courts have in any case introduced significant confusion and 
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adopted a patchwork approach to the dishonesty requirement.508 It is submitted that the 
failures in this regard have in reality been what has led to the slow, and painful, death 
of the mechanism. It seems likely to the present author that it was the original twinning 
of the civil and criminal fraudulent trading provisions, and its penal interpretation, that 
gave rise to this approach. Yet, the dishonesty requirement has in this author’s view 
rendered the effectiveness of the mechanism close to nil. This is because proving 
dishonesty is extremely difficult even in ‘ordinary’ circumstances. Doing so in 
insolvency situations where it has to be very carefully distinguished from mere 
ineptitude or poor commercial judgment, borders on the impossible. It will be advanced 
that knowledge, it being a far more morally neutral concept, ought to be the appropriate 
measure in this context. Knowledge is also far more straightforward to ascertain in the 
context of commercial decision making. On this point, albeit in the broader civil 
context, Davies has written that:  
[D]ishonesty is a distraction from the essence of the inquiry into the defendant’s 
knowledge. After all, a defendant will not be liable unless he or she fulfils the necessary 
criteria of knowledge a defendant who genuinely and legitimately knows nothing 
regarding the primary wrong will not be considered to be dishonest.509 
As will be addressed below, it is also contended a test based on knowledge must have 
been the pure intention of the legislator – an intention set adrift following the decisions 
of Maugham J, and one never steered back on to a correct heading.  
4.25 Judicial reluctance However, this is not merely a question of semantics. Not 
only is it true that substantial judicial energy has been expended on dealing with abstract 
                                                 
508 Birks has referred to ‘judges cast adrift on the sea of an undefined and objective dishonesty’ in 
Peter Birks, ‘Accessory Liability’ [1996] LMCLQ 1, 6; Lord Millett dissenting in Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley [2002] UKHL 12 similarly noted at [134] that ‘the introduction of dishonesty is an 
unnecessary distraction, and conducive to error’. 
509 Paul Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart 2015) 121. 
Director Liability in Insolvent Companies 
 
 178 
concepts such as dishonesty, but there is evidence to suggest that in the context of 
insolvent companies, judges are simply reluctant to ‘brand’ an individual as dishonest 
in situations of commercial decision making, thus further diminishing the effectiveness 
of the mechanism.510 Lord Hutton in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley511 insinuates as much in 
his judgment when he said that a ‘finding by a judge that a defendant has been dishonest 
is a grave finding, and it is particularly grave against a professional man’.512 Some might 
question why it is ‘particularly grave’ as against a professional. It seems uncontroversial 
to this author that it must be inappropriate, even in cases involving professionals, that 
judges should shy away from branding an individual dishonest where he has fallen 
below the required standard. Indeed, such reluctance has been criticised by Peter Smith 
J, who has stated it to be erroneous: 
First there is no justification in applying a stricter principle against a Defendant merely 
because he is a professional. It is no less grave for a non professional to be accused of 
dishonesty. The courts have always been reluctant wrongly in my view to adopt that 
stance. Second, cases in the last decade have shown sadly that there are plenty of 
professional men who act dishonestly.513  
In terms of the effectiveness of fraudulent trading uncertainty for the liquidator is 
compounded by judicial reluctance, thus reducing the desirability of mounting an 
action.  
4.26 The appropriate test But, even if one accepts the legitimacy of dishonesty within 
fraudulent trading, the discourse as to what standard of dishonesty is required has itself 
had a rather chequered history. It should be noted that this is an issue that goes beyond 
fraudulent trading, or indeed insolvency law. Nowadays, the matter predominantly 
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arises when dealing with liability for the dishonest assistance of a breach of trust.514 The 
definition of fraud is largely context dependent515 and therefore different standards of 
dishonesty are employed in particular cases.516 A unified test, as such, is undesirable.517 
In the words of Shine, ‘the level of culpability required in each case will depend on the 
origins and aims of the particular remedy sought’.518 Thus, in short, it may well be that 
a quite different definition of dishonesty would apply in a case involving the dishonest 
assistance of a breach of trust, as compared with the definition applied in a case of 
fraudulent trading under section 213. It is argued that this has merely added fuel to the 
fire and exacerbated the level of confusion inherent within this area of law. As the 
author will now go on to uncover, considerable judicial energy has been expended upon 
determining the correct test and standard of dishonesty required in the civil context. 
This has in turn detracted from focus in other areas, ultimately leading to uncertainty, 
thereby further discouraging liquidators from bringing an action. 
4.27 The primary issue has centred around whether a solely objective test should 
apply, whether subjective elements should also be considered and, if so, what precise 
level of subjectivity. Given the fragmented nature of dishonesty as a concept,519 this has 
been approached in a variety of ways. In the criminal law, the working definition of 
dishonesty stems from the seminal case of R v Ghosh.520 It requires that the jury first 
must find, according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people, that 
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what the defendant did was dishonest. If the first limb is answered in the affirmative, 
the jury must then consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what 
he was doing was, by those standards, dishonest.521 The later case of R v Lockwood522, 
which was a fraudulent trading case, albeit in the criminal context, made it clear that 
the Ghosh test, it being of general application, also applied to fraudulent trading 
actions.523 In other words, where a director in criminal proceedings takes the view that 
what he was doing was not dishonest, a jury must be directed to return a ‘not guilty’ 
verdict. 
4.28 However, as has been alluded to, the position in the civil context is not as 
straightforward. This short analysis must begin with the Privy Council decision of Royal 
Brunei Airlines v Tan524, a case, like many in this area, involving dishonest assistance 
of a breach of trust. Lord Nicholls acknowledged here that honesty ‘has a connotation 
of subjectivity, as distinct from the objectivity of negligence’525 and that dishonesty ‘is 
a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew 
at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or 
appreciated’.526 It was made especially clear, however, that the decision as to what was 
considered dishonest conduct was for the court to make on an objective basis. Put 
simply, it is not for the respondent to set his own standards of dishonesty.527 Shine 
suggests that following Tan ‘it seemed clear that in equity, dishonesty could be 
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established without proof that the defendant believed himself to have been dishonest’.528 
However, the decision was reinterpreted by the House of Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley529. Indeed, much of the confusion and criticism in this area has stemmed from 
Lord Hutton’s interpretation of Tan in that case.530 In short, Lord Hutton in Yardley 
established the so-called ‘combined test’ for dishonesty in the civil context. In effect, it 
is the Ghosh test.531 The combined test requires that two questions to be asked in order 
to find liability:  
(a) if ‘the defendant’s conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people’532 and; 
(b) if so, did the respondent ‘himself [realise] that by those standards his conduct 
was dishonest’?.533  
As in Tan, this is caveated in that it is not for the defendant to set his own standards of 
dishonesty.534 Thus, the Yardley decision, and the combined test of Lord Hutton, appears 
to represent the definitive position in law at the time of writing. It is worth noting that 
in the context of dishonest assistance of a breach of trust, however, further 
developments have been made and there is substantial new authority that suggests a 
move away from the subjective element imposed by Lord Hutton.535 In the area of civil 
fraud however, the courts appear to have been content to apply, in unadulterated 
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fashion, the combined test of Lord Hutton in Yardley.536 As Shine notes, in light of the 
divergence of judicial opinion in relation to the appropriate test to use in differing 
circumstances: 
It is unsurprising that the court [in the context of fraud] has preferred a test which retains 
an element of subjectivity. This is an inevitable consequence of the gravity which 
attaches to a finding of fraud in a civil court. It is a very serious matter indeed to even 
plead an allegation of fraud, reflected in the onerous burden of proof imposed by the 
courts. The standard of proof is of course the balance of probabilities but, since the 
court must assume that fraud is so serious it must be unlikely…[j]udges in fraud cases 
are always concerned to not dilute the fault element inherent in an allegation of fraud537 
It seems therefore likely that, due to the particularly serious nature of fraud, that it will 
be handled differently than other areas of civil liability where questions of dishonesty 
arise.538 The result is that where a respondent ‘honestly’ believes that he did not act 
dishonestly, there can be no finding of liability under section 213.  
4.29 The author’s very terse summary of the present law does not do justice to the 
sheer uncertainty that has plagued the concept of dishonesty. It is in fact an unwieldy 
beast whose definition cannot be pinned down – in fact some judges have explicitly 
refrained from doing so539 – and in the civil context it has become so vague and difficult 
a concept to handle that it is unsurprising that officeholders refuse to pursue potential 
claims in light of the overwhelming uncertainty. Indeed, as a result of the dishonesty 
requirement it is completely unsurprising that fraudulent trading is rarely pursued, but 
even more so that some commentators think of it as entirely insignificant in the context 
of the enforcement regime overall.  
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4.30 Attribution and knowledge The author here goes further, however, and suggests 
that a finding of dishonesty against the defendant, on a literal reading of the provision, 
is unnecessary. The incessant focus, in the case law, on the requirement under section 
213(1) of dishonesty has often led to a sidestepping of the ‘knowledge’ requirement of 
section 213(2) which, it is argued, must be wrong in principle. It is generally accepted 
that knowledge is itself a prerequisite for a finding of dishonesty, i.e. a person who has 
knowledge of fraudulent activities is no doubt dishonest.540 However, the legislation 
does not expressly require for this distinction to be made. It requires the recognition of 
an ‘intention to defraud’541 when ‘any business of the company has been carried on’,542 
but this intention to defraud is an intention that on construction must be capable of being 
attributed to the company itself. In other words, it is the company that is operating 
fraudulently and, as a corollary, dishonestly.543 Where dishonesty cannot be attributed 
to the company, it is suggested that a respondent cannot be liable as section 213(1) is 
not engaged. As section 213(2) makes clear, it is mere ‘knowledge’ of the intention to 
defraud which must be found in the case of the respondent for liability to attach. The 
respondent is liable, by virtue of her knowledge, as an accessory to acts attributed to the 
company. The defendant herself may indeed be dishonest, or she may simply have 
knowledge of another’s dishonesty, but in either case it is not necessary for the court to 
go as far as to make such a finding. This is of particular relevance given fraudulent 
trading’s applicability to ‘any person’. It must however be accepted that in close or 
                                                 
540 Morris v Bank of India [2004] EWHC 528. 
541 IA 1986, section 213(1) . 
542 ibid 
543 For such an attribution, in line with general principles, it is therefore necessary that the individual 
who possessed the intent must have been the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company: El Ajou v 
Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] BCC 143, 150. 
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owner-managed companies, this argument falls away as the distinction between the 
‘company’ and the ‘accessory’ is eroded. But, it is submitted that, excepting those cases, 
it is not only wrong in principle that dishonesty has been introduced in this context, it 
is also often simply unnecessary to do so.  
CONCLUSION 
4.31 A series of substantive barriers to claims concerning both wrongful and 
fraudulent trading have been set out in this chapter. More importantly, in line with the 
purpose of this thesis, the author has demonstrated at least in part how the improper 
trading provisions struggle to achieve their underlying objectives – whether public or 
private. But, the author is hesitant to conclude fully in that regard at this stage, given 
that much of the analysis, and a number of other barriers to improper trading claims, 
fall to be discussed in the next chapter. That chapter will largely concern itself with the 
new assignment provision but, in doing so, it will by implication deal with in some 
detail the issue of funding improper trading claims, some further evidential difficulties, 






THE ASSIGNMENT OF 
INSOLVENCY ACT CLAIMS 
 
 
5.1 In the context of IA 1986 claims, the most radical reform of the SBEEA 2015 is 
that which permits the liquidator or administrator (as the case may be) to assign an 
accruing cause of action.  This new possibility,544 brought to life by section 118 of the 
SBEEA 2015,545 applies to both wrongful546 and fraudulent trading,547 as well as other548 
IA 1986 claims. Crucially, in addition to the action itself, any resultant proceeds may 
also be assigned.549 The section thus permits, in effect, a circumvention of the locus 
standi requirements550 which have been argued by this author in the previous chapter551 
                                                 
544 It has been made clear by the courts that, before the SBEEA 2015, an action under IA 1986 
sections 213 or 214 could not be assigned by the officeholder: Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v SSEFRA (No. 
3) [2008] EWHC 730 (TCC); Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 493. 
545 The provision was brought in to force by Regulations on 1 October 2015: The Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (Commencement No. 2 and Transitional Provisions) 
Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1689, reg 2(j). 
546 IA 1986, s 246ZD(2)(b). 
547 IA 1986, s 246ZD(2)(a). 
548 This chapter only deals with those wrongful and fraudulent trading, though the section permits 
the assignment of a greater range of Insolvency Act powers, namely: transactions at an undervalue 
as (IA 1986, s 238); preference actions (IA 1986, s 239); and extortionate credit transactions (IA 
1986, s 244). It should be noted that the T&T Discussion Paper (n 14) set out an original intention 
to exclusively allow wrongful and fraudulent trading claims to be assigned. Based on responses from 
the consultation, the Government instead widened the scope of the provision to permit it for other 
types of insolvency actions, see: T&T Government Response (n 223). 
549 IA 1986, s 246ZD(2). 
550 Although this is not the technical legal consequence, this is the practical effect. Crucially, 
however, it can only be done with agreement from the officeholder. 
551 4.19 
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to be inhibitive of the overall success of the mechanisms. It might allow, for example, 
a pecunious creditor to step in, purchase the claim, and commence proceedings in their 
own right552. Alternatively, it permits a market to develop in insolvency claims bought 
by specialist companies.553 A decision to assign may come about, for example, where 
the assets of the insolvent company are insufficient to pursue a claim; where litigation 
is imprudent in light of the potential chance for recovery; or where, for other reasons, 
assignment affords the best chance of realising the optimal value for company creditors 
by ‘cashing in’ for a swift return. At first blush, therefore, assignment appears 
beneficial. This chapter will continue the discourse of the previous one, though it will 
look more closely at some of the specific arguments surrounding assignment.  Being 
the most crucial reform to the wrongful and fraudulent trading mechanisms since the 
IA 1986, it is clearly of considerable future importance for the regime as a whole, and 
therefore worthy of some interrogation. The chapter will therefore set out to determine 
the potential that assignment has for increasing the effectiveness of the fraudulent and 
wrongful trading mechanisms. It must be recognised by the reader that, at this stage, it 
is too early to determine the actual impact upon effectiveness and so the author only 
intends to examine its potential in this regard, more generally.554 The previous chapter 
dealt with difficulties in the wrongful and fraudulent trading regimes more generally. It 
is indisputable that the introduction of assignment follows a recognition by the state of 
an existing problem with those mechanisms.555 As a corollary, there must also be a 
                                                 
552 With respect to fraudulent trading claims it should be remembered that, pre-1986, it was already 
the case that a creditor had standing: 4.19. 
553 Indeed, as will be discussed in due course, this was the very expectation of Government in making 
the changes: T&T Discussion Paper, 11.8. 
554 As explained previously: 1.12. 
555 T&T Discussion Paper, 11.2. 
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recognition that those mechanisms were not, at least in part, operating with optimal 
effectiveness, and thus not as successfully as now might be intended post-reform. It is 
therefore logical in that context to begin by setting out the problem that assignment 
allegedly serves to solve. In identifying the problem, the author can go further and set 
out whether it is likely to be successful in doing so, and thus have the intended effect of 
improving the overall effectiveness of the wrongful and fraudulent trading mechanisms. 
Ultimately, it will be concluded that assignment is unlikely to have anything more than 
a negligible impact in that regard. The author concludes that the number of wrongful 
and fraudulent trading cases brought to trial is unlikely to increase substantially, or even 
marginally, due to the substantive legal issues that exist in bringing a claim, and the 
matter of director impecuniosity; neither of which are affected by the assignment 
provisions. To the contrary, the evidence examined in this section uncovers a real 
danger of a rise in speculative or vexatious claims being brought against directors, some 
of whom may end up being pressured into settlement or left unable to defend 
themselves. It is therefore submitted that assignment may lead to an increase in the 
number of cases settled. It is also gingerly suggested that assignment may come to 
overtake (and thus replace, i.e. without a measurable increase in the number of cases) 
other methods of funding insolvency litigation following the costs ramifications 
introduced by the LASPOA 2012. 
THE PROBLEM: FUNDING INSOLVENCY ACT CLAIMS 
5.2 The reader has already been introduced to the DBIS Transparency and Trust 
consultation in a previous chapter.556 It is the Discussion Paper arising out of this 
                                                 
556 2.32. 
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consultation (‘the Paper’) that led to, inter alia, the introduction of assignment. The 
Paper sets out the intended objectives of assignment as to: ‘[i]ncrease prospects of 
culpable directors being pursued where they have been responsible for allowing 
companies to trade wrongfully or fraudulently’557 by giving the provisions ‘more bite’.558 
It is unsurprising, then, that the rationale for the assignment provisions was said to be 
‘increase trust in our regime by ensuring that if directors…act fraudulently or recklessly 
they personally run the risk of being required to compensate those suffering loss as a 
result’.559 Of course, this accords with the objectives of wrongful and fraudulent trading 
generally. The Paper asserts one of the core criticisms attributed to the mechanisms – 
that liquidators commenced proceedings infrequently – was ‘largely because funds 
[were] not available’560 A difficulty, it was said in the Paper, compounded as a result of 
the changes (at that time, proposed changes561) introduced by LASPOA 2012.562 It is 
interesting to note that there is no mention in the Paper of the evidential and procedural 
difficulties faced by officeholders. Moreover, as Williams notes, it makes no 
suggestions dealing with other issues identified by commentators relating to the poor 
deterrent effect of the provisions.563 Instead, on the author’s reading, the problems with 
wrongful and fraudulent trading appear to be put down to a mere inability to fund 
                                                 
557 T&T Discussion Paper, 11.4. 
558 ibid, 11.7. 
559 ibid, 11.4 (emphasis added). 
560 ibid, 11.2. 
561 Although the Act had been introduced by the time of the T&T Discussion Paper, a time limited 
carve out exemption for insolvency actions was in place by virtue of The Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 5 and Saving Provision) Order 2013, art 
4. 
562 The impact of this on insolvency actions will be considered in greater detail in due course: 5.7. 
See T&T Discussion Paper, 11.2. Which, for insolvency actions, came in to force on 6 April 2016 
as a result of The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement 
No. 12) Order 2016, art. 2. 
563 Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ (n 
471) 63. 
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claims. Or, at the very least, this is the only issue substantively addressed by the Paper. 
The funding question is one that must therefore be explored in due course. But, at this 
juncture it should be said, when coupled with the introduction of compensation orders 
and undertakings to the realm of directors’ disqualification, under the same Act,564 
Government trajectory for policy in this area seems to be not so much along the lines 
of prevention of misconduct, but rather in the increased regulation of directors, and a 
strengthening of the sanctions available to be utilised against them.565 In examining the 
supposed funding difficulties in more depth, then, it is suggested the first step ought to 
be to consider what funding options have previously (i.e. pre-SBEEA 2015) been open 
to an officeholder in relation to fraudulent and wrongful trading claims.566  
Do Nothing 
5.3 Although not strictly a form of funding, it should be said initially that the IP, 
following an assessment of all of the evidence available to her, may simply decide to 
take no action. For example, due to the impecuniosity of the director concerned; due to 
evidential barriers; procedural issues; or otherwise. Alternatively, even where an IP 
determines there is a strong case to be made, she may be unable to commence 
proceedings on the basis that the funding options, discussed below, are unavailable or 
unworkable in that instance. It is the occurrence of this latter situation that the new 
assignment provisions attempt to mitigate against; by giving the officeholder a new 
alternative. Thus, in theory, assignment ought to increase the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
564 2.34. 
565 It will be argued in the next chapter of this thesis that this is, in fact, a misguided approach: ch 6. 
566 It should be noted that the forthcoming analysis only considers the primary options available to 
an officeholder where she is considering bringing specifically a wrongful or fraudulent trading 
claim. These actions differ from example, director misfeasance claims under IA 1986 s 212, or other 
miscellaneous contractual matters, such as director loan agreements, which have always been able 
to be sold or assigned. 
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wrongful and fraudulent trading provisions where it results in fewer cases of IPs opting 
to ‘do nothing’ simply on the basis of funding. Quite how often this occurs is a matter 
to be explored in due course. 
Using the Assets of the Insolvent Company 
5.4 Where there are sufficient assets in the insolvent company there is clearly little 
difficulty in initiating proceedings. However, this is no doubt rare given the nature of 
such companies as being impecunious. Another factor also falls for consideration in this 
regard. Wrongful and fraudulent trading actions are both personal to the liquidator or 
administrator. Therefore it is the sole right of that individual to bring an action, unless 
the claim is assigned under the new provisions.567 Because of this, an officeholder 
commences proceedings in her own name and is personally liable for any costs 
(notwithstanding that she carries out her office for the benefit of the insolvent company 
or, when all is said and done, its unsecured creditors).568 Where there is  a shortfall in 
the company’s assets, it falls to the officeholder to pay any difference.569 Granted, whilst 
the IP will generally obtain an indemnity against the company in question to escape this 
difficulty, anecdotal evidence from practitioner members of R3 suggests that there is 
currently: 
                                                 
567 Re William C Leitch Brothers Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 71; Re Oasis Merchandising Ltd [1995] BCC 911. 
568 The fact that insolvency practitioners carry out work in the public interest, yet receive no public 
funding for litigation (unlike, for example, with disqualification which is an entirely state funded 
mechanism) and, further, are personally liable for any debts incurred is a strange idiosyncrasy of 
English insolvency law. See the comments of Lord Millett in Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd. [2004] 
1 AC 158, [52] and Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ 
(n 50) 10. 
569 For an in-depth discussion on this point see Chief Registrar Baister and Stephen Davies, ‘Liability 
of Insolvency Practitioners for the Legal Costs of Litigation’ (May 2009) <http://bit.ly/2b21B3C> 
accessed 01 July 2016, para 36. It is interesting to contrast the position of the liquidator from that of 
the Official Receiver who benefits from immunity: Mond v Hyde [1999] QB 1097. 
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[A] widespread practice of directors leaving insolvent companies with no or virtually 
no assets. These companies have no assets with which to fund an investigation into 
directors’ conduct…[and]…there is no money with which to fund any litigation570 
Therefore, given the personal risk attached it is suggested that IPs will avoid funding 
litigation in this way, except where no other viable option presents itself, and there is a 
very strong likelihood of success. Thus, although distasteful, the author notes that any 
would-be miscreant director might be well-advised to go about ‘milking the company 
dry’ before plunging it into an insolvency regime, so as to reduce the options open to 
the officeholder in investigating and pursuing any misconduct.571 
Using a Litigation Funder 
5.5 It has been argued by Crinson and Morphet that, where the assets of the 
insolvent company are insufficient, creditors should be ‘the first source of funding [the 
officeholder] should consider’.572 However, it is submitted that creditors will be cautious 
of ‘throwing good money after bad’, thereby exacerbating their losses, save in 
circumstances where the likelihood of recovery is extremely high. There is also 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that the vast majority of creditors (generally smaller 
concerns) often play no part in insolvency proceedings.573 Indeed, some companies – 
and the author is particularly mindful of those who suffer a ‘domino’ insolvency arising 
from misconduct – will almost certainly have no inclination, or even the financial 
                                                 
570 Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (n 50) 11. 
571 This was the very ‘advice’ given, over two decades ago, to directors seeking to avoid liability by 
some commentators. See Christina Williams and Andrew McGee, A Company Director’s Liability 
for Wrongful Trading (ACCA Research Report No. 30, 1992), 13. 
572 Katharina Crinson and Sophie Morphet, ‘Funding for actions brought by insolvency 
officeholders’ (2011) 24(7) Insolv Int 108, 110. 
573 This was the view of the Fraud Advisory Panel in its submission to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills as part of the Transparency & Trust consultation. The FAP contended that 
smaller creditors are often ‘ill-informed and do not participate [in wrongful and fraudulent trading 
proceedings]’. A ZIP archive containing all such responses is available at <http://bit.ly/2bM33GU> 
accessed 01 August 2016. 
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ability, to fund further uncertainty. However, creditor funding, in some circumstances, 
may be an optimal solution; for instance, where a larger creditor is able and willing. 
But, in reality, it is unclear how often this occurs. There is evidence to suggest that 
HMRC, in its capacity as unsecured creditor, has in the past funded such actions. Given 
that the Revenue is invariably the largest unsecured creditor of an insolvent company it 
clearly has a vested interest in ensuring that proceedings are taken, where possible, with 
a view to recovery for the tax payer. Funding from the HMRC at present however has 
been described as ‘significantly restricted’574. But, any awards made following creditor-
funded actions still have to be distributed amongst the entire pool of creditors, and the 
individual funder would not be able to demand a higher proportion in view of her 
contribution.575 As such, this option seems to this author likely to be pursued only either 
where the creditor concerned is owed the bulk of the unsecured debt of the company; is 
acting in a public interest capacity, as with HMRC; or where, for whatever reason, an 
opulent creditor pursues litigation on a point of principle. In default of creditor funding, 
the officeholder may seek the services of an independent third-party 'litigation funder’ 
who will provide funding in consideration for any eventual proceeds. It has been said, 
however, that this type of funding is often expensive and difficult to obtain, as at least 
a 70 per cent chance of success will be demanded by the funding party.576 
  
                                                 
574 Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (n 50) 15. 
575 Indeed, doing so could engage issues of champerty and maintenance. For an historical exposition 
of those rules in the insolvency context see Crinson and Morphet (n 572). The largest insolvency 
litigation funder in the UK, Manolete Partners plc, however, contends that it can provide funding 
solutions that fall outside the scope of the champerty and maintenance rules. The market has adapted 
to overcome this particular limitation, so it would seem. See Manolete Partners Plc, ‘Frequently 
Asked Questions’ <http://bit.ly/2bQMSdl> accessed 01 August 2016 
576 Crinson and Morphet (n 572) 110. 
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Using CFAs and/or ATE Insurance 
5.6 The methods of funding explored thus far exhibit obvious difficulties for the 
officeholder; creating a lacuna which assignment may indeed fill. However, since July 
1995 an officeholder has been able to work alongside a solicitor or specialist firm to 
pursue cases by means of a CFA.577 This solution is most useful where there are some 
assets within the insolvent company, to cover legal fees and insurance premiums, 
though not enough for the officeholder to commence proceedings on her own. In 
companies that have been ‘milked dry’ and where third-party litigation funding is 
unavailable, this will invariably be the only other way in which litigation can be 
brought. In fact, according to anecdotal evidence, the vast majority of insolvency 
actions (i.e. pre-SBEEA 2015) take place in this way; perhaps upwards of 90 per cent.578 
Of course, as with litigation funders, solicitors and counsel are only likely to be retained 
on a CFA basis where there is a good chance of the action succeeding. The claim is still 
brought in the name of the officeholder. As a result, the original problem of funding is 
returned to: although the officeholder may have minimised her own legal costs by the 
use of a CFA, she can still be liable personally for any adverse costs orders made should 
the action fail. Because of this, she will seek specialised After The Event (ATE) 
insurance to protect herself in the event of failure.579 It is possible to utilise ATE 
                                                 
577 Highly popularised by personal injury claims, this type of agreement involves engaging a solicitor 
or other authorised claims firm for fees less than the standard rate where the action fails. A successful 
action, however, will usually require paying fees at the standard rate, plus an additional ‘success 
fee’. They were first introduced by the Court and Legal Services Act 1990, s 58. However, it was 
not until the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 that the first ‘no-win, no-fee’ type 
arrangements were made available for insolvency litigation. 
578 DBIS, ‘Impact Assessment: Enabling Liquidators and Administrators to assign to third parties 
certain rights of action that only they can bring under the Insolvency Act 1986 and to extend to the 
right to bring fraudulent and wrongful trading actions to an administrator’ (BIS INSS007) available 
at <http://bit.ly/2c2UtnE> accessed 01 August 2016, para 11 (Assignment Impact Assessment). 
579 It is also extremely noteworthy that under CPR 25.13 the defendant in, inter alia, wrongful or 
fraudulent trading proceedings may obtain an order for security for costs where it is thought that the 
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insurance as a standalone product, for instance where the company has sufficient assets 
to start proceedings but may not have enough to defend against an adverse costs order, 
or where the defendant seeks a security for costs order. However, by far the most 
common usage of ATE insurance is when combined with CFAs. ATE insurance will 
typically cover any adverse costs orders and the officeholder’s own disbursements 
including a proportion of legal fees if the case is lost. Generally, a premium is only 
payable to the insurer where the case is won, otherwise the insurer receives nothing.580 
Originally, it was the insured officeholder who was liable to pay the ATE success fee 
where she won her case; she could not recover it from the losing party as she could her 
ordinary costs. In April 2000, however, legislation led to a change in this position.581 
Thereafter, successful parties were able to recover from the opposition any success fees 
and ATE premiums in addition to ordinary costs, thus enhancing returns for creditors. 
5.7 However, as a result of a serious review of civil litigation costs by Jackson LJ,582 
culminating in the introduction of the LASPOA 2012 (‘the Jackson Reforms’), from 
                                                 
officeholder will be unable to pay them due to the nature of the company’s insolvency. The fact that 
a company is in liquidation is prima facie evidence that it will be unable to pay costs, unless of 
course it can be proven otherwise: Smith v UIC Insurance Co Ltd [2001] BCC 11; also see Jackson 
LJ (ed), Civil Procedure: The White Book Service 2016 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 25.13.14 (The 
White Book). One way of doing so is being the holder of a comprehensive ATE insurance policy. It 
is therefore, practically speaking, mandatory that officeholders obtain such a policy before 
commencing an action, if the company has limited assets. See recently Premiermotor Auctions 
Limited v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Lloyds Bank plc [2016] EWHC 2610 (Ch), where 
Snowden J ruled that the existence of an ATE insurance policy meant the threshold for a security 
for costs order was not met. R3 has reported that it is common for a defendant to ask the court to 
dismiss proceedings, on the basis of inadequate cover for adverse costs, where no ATE insurance is 
in place: Walton, 11. This creates the repugnant, though somewhat interesting, situation where a 
fraudulent or badly behaving director who has ‘milked the company dry’ can then attempt to have 
any proceedings taken against her struck out on the grounds that the company is impecunious. 
580 See e.g. Crinson and Morphet (n 572) for more technical detail as to how ATE insurance operates. 
581 Access to Justice Act 1999, s 29. 
582 The Stationary Office, ‘Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report’ (December 2009) 
available at <http://bit.ly/1IkgolZ> accessed 01 August 2016. 
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April 2016583 it is no longer possible for officeholders to recover these. Instead, any 
CFA/ATE insurance fees paid must be deducted from the main award.584 In fact, one of 
his Lordship’s main areas of criticism in this wide-ranging review focused on the use 
of CFAs and ATE insurance in civil litigation.585 The post-2000 (but pre-Jackson 
Reform) position was described by Jackson LJ as being unsatisfactory for the following 
reasons:586 
(a) the claimant may be operating at no risk as to costs, through the combined use 
of CFAs and ATE insurance. The claimant will pay no costs whether she wins or 
loses.  
(b) the defendant, on the other hand, may be litigating at a massive costs risk. She 
may be liable for up to four times the costs of the action: her own costs; the 
claimant’s ordinary costs; the claimant’s CFA uplift; the claimant’s ATE premium. 
5.8 His Lordship, in short, sought a change in the law to ensure a ‘level playing 
field’587 for both the claimant and defendant, ‘rather than one sloping at 90 degrees’.588 
Thus, since the implementation of the Jackson Reforms, any CFA uplift and/or ATE 
premiums must be deducted from the amount of damages awarded. This has the result 
of insulating the defendant from a ‘massive costs risk’.589 Though, of course, a by-
product is to reduce the overall pot for the insolvent company’s unsecured creditors. 
                                                 
583 Whilst his Lordship recommended that these reforms be implemented across all areas of civil 
litigation at the earliest opportunity, the Government specifically exempted actions brought by office 
holders, on a temporary basis. Originally, the exemption was due to come to an end in April 2015: 
see the written Ministerial Statement by Jonathan Djanogly at HC Deb 24 May 2012, col 94W. This 
was later extended to April 2016: see the written Ministerial Statement by Dominic Raab: HC Deb 
17 December 2015, col 420W. The result is that, at the present time of writing, the full effects of the 
LASPOA 2012 are in force in relation to officeholder-founded actions. 
584 As a result of the LASPOA 2012, s 46 which amends the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 to 
create s 58C. 
585 The Stationary Office (n 582) para 2.1-2.2. 
586 Jackson LJ, ‘The Civil Justice Reforms and Whether Insolvency Litigation Should Be Exempt’ 
(The Mustill Lecture, Leeds, 16 October 2015) available at <http://bit.ly/1RRLHap> accessed 01 
August 2016, para 2.3. 
587 ibid para 7.4. 
588 ibid.  
589 ibid para 2.3. 
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Indeed, a situation might readily arise in which creditors of the company see no return 
whatsoever, even where the officeholder is successful. Once the legal costs, the 
officeholder’s own fees, and any ATE premiums have been stripped away, very little 
may remain. In particularly small estates, it is conceivable that the officeholder or her 
legal team might not receive full payment of any fees due. For these reasons, amongst 
others, it has been thought for some time that the Jackson Reforms will cause substantial 
shockwaves for officeholders considering taking action against directors.590 It is still too 
soon to gauge any real-world impact. However, the new position has been strongly 
criticised by many of those in the insolvency sector,591 as well as the Bar Council.592 
Much of the criticism in the literature is founded upon an empirical study conducted by 
Professor Walton, on behalf of R3.593 Walton in his analysis argues that the introduction 
of the reforms will mean that fewer cases are brought, particularly at the lower end of 
the scale.594 For those that are brought, he argues, more will go to trial as a result of their 
being less incentive for directors to settle given their lessened exposure to potential 
costs orders.595 This is because it is a feature of ATE insurance that the premium is 
staged so that it increases at milestones in the litigation. It has been reported anecdotally 
that this has proven to be a useful tool in pressuring defendants to settle at an earlier 
stage; they being fearful that the longer they ‘resist’ the more costs incurred should they 
lose at trial. Walton has even gone as far to say that the Jackson Reforms are ‘likely to 
                                                 
590 For a comprehensive critique of the introduction of these reforms in to the insolvency arena see 
Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (n 50) 11. 
591 Not least, of course, by Walton, ibid; Walton, ‘Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms – 
An Update’ (An R3 Report, April 2016) <http://bit.ly/1SO0cLE> accessed 01 July 2016, 2.3. 
592 See, for example, Sarah-Jane Bennett, ‘The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012 (LASPO): One Year On, Final Report’ (A Bar Council Report, September 2014) available 
at <http://bit.ly/1vzRMwT> accessed 01 August 2016, para 230. 
593 Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (n 50). 
594 ibid 46. 
595 ibid 32. 
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encourage more culpable behaviour by bankrupts and directors’596, contrary to one of 
the underlying objectives of the improper trading provisions as being to deter 
misconduct. Walton estimates that creditors, including the HMRC and small businesses, 
collectively may be more than £160 million worse off per year as a result of the 
changes.597 Crinson and Morphet, in 2011, adopted a more optimistic stance. They 
argued that the changes would simply cause the market to ‘respond with revised 
packages’.598 They described the litigation funding market as being ‘on the brink of 
change’599 with it responding to the new legislation with ‘innovative and competitive 
products which [would] open up funding opportunities to insolvency office holders’.600 
They ultimately concluded that the ‘reforms mean that the next year or so will be an 
exciting time for litigation funding’.601 The point is, put simply, that markets adapt. As 
expressed previously however, the later accounts, from those such as Walton, hail it as 
being a far cry from a time of excitement. Interestingly, what Crinson and Morphet 
could not foresee was the game-changing introduction of the assignment of actions to 
this area. 
5.9 Despite the steadfast praise of those such as Walton, it is important to remember 
however that the use of CFAs and ATE insurance is by no means the holy grail of 
insolvency litigation ‘funding’. Many insurance policies suffer their own significant 
limitations and as a result, even where a CFA/ATE approach is a viable option, an office 
                                                 
596 ibid 46. 
597 ibid 29. This is also a point picked up, in critique, by Jackson LJ. His Lordship refutes this, 
arguing that ‘[Walton’s] report simply does not support that proposition’: Jackson LJ, para 8.12. 
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holder may be seriously deterred from commencing proceedings. Some of the 
recognised issues with ATE insurance are: 
(a)  as noted by Crinson and Morphet one of the most significant is that it does not 
create a cash flow for the officeholder.602 Therefore in order to commence 
proceedings counsel and solicitors must agree to have their payment of fees deferred 
until the insurance policy pays out. 
(b) it is expensive, with premiums of between 50 and 110 per cent of the insured 
amount; 
(c) due to the scarcity of insurance providers and the technicalities of each 
individual policy, they take many months to organise. This results in a longer 
liquidation/administration process, and therefore increases costs; 
(d) once a policy is taken out, the office holder must be careful to constantly update 
the insurer with details as to how proceedings are progressing, otherwise cover may 
be invalidated;  
(e) there is a risk that the insurer will seek to avoid paying out under the policy, 
leading to severe financial consequences for the office holder; possibly her own 
insolvency; 
(f) the premium paid on the policy is top-sliced from any return, potentially leaving 
the office holder and their lawyers unpaid in the case of a small award. More 
importantly, a situation might occur whereby an office holder is successful but 
delivers zero return for creditors due to the cost of the premiums as against the award 
made. 
Despite the disadvantages of the insurance approach, the combined use of CFAs/ATE 
appears to have nonetheless become totally dominant in this area.603 
IS FUNDING ACTIONS STILL A PROBLEM? 
5.10 Exploring the existing funding mechanisms has in fact uncovered a significant 
point for observation. Although it is indisputable that each suffers its own (sometimes 
significant) deficiencies, it is somewhat surprising that the Paper appears to have laid 
                                                 
602 ibid. 
603 Walton, ‘The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms – an Empirical Investigation’ (n 50) Executive 
Summary. 
The Assignment of Insolvency Act Claims 
 
 199 
all of the inadequacies of wrongful and fraudulent trading on funding concerns. Indeed, 
despite the Government’s claim that it is a considerable burden for officeholders, they 
present no empirical evidence, or in fact any evidence, save for anecdotal, to that effect. 
The only empirical studies that this author can find on the subject are those, dealing 
specifically with wrongful trading, published by Williams and McGee in 1992,604 and 
Andrew Hicks in 1993.605 Williams and McGee commented that ‘[t]he reality is that by 
far the biggest consideration is the question of costs’;606 alluding to the fact that funding 
is perhaps of a greater concern than the substantive legal issues.607 Hicks, on the other 
hand, was far more direct in stating that ‘[i]t is clear that the greatest inhibition to 
wrongful trading claims is the cost of investigating and then pursuing the claim’.608 In 
terms of the research conducted across both of these studies, there are four important 
factors to consider. First, the studies here are old. Second, the sample sizes were small. 
Third, the methodology in both cases was to obtain information by way of interview. 
Williams and McGee interviewed a broad range of professionals including accountants, 
solicitors, insolvency practitioners and bank officials.609 Hicks interviewed accountants, 
solicitors and IPs.610 Fourthly, the time at which the interviews were conducted, and the 
studies published, was before the CFA existed – clearly a game-changer for 
officeholders. Much of the modern rhetoric surrounding the funding crisis in this area 
is hinged upon these out-of-date and solely anecdotal accounts. What is suggested here 
                                                 
604 Williams and McGee (n 454).  
605 Andrew Hicks, ‘Wrongful trading – has it been a failure?’ (1993) 8(5) IL&P 134. 
606 Williams and McGee (n 454) 13. 
607 It is assumed here that Williams and McGee mean ‘costs’ to include both those needed to 
investigate and pursue directors, but also adverse costs in the case of failure. 
608 Hicks, ‘Wrongful trading – has it been a failure?’ (n 605). 
609 Williams and McGee (n 454) 2. 
610 Hicks, ‘Wrongful trading – has it been a failure?’ (n 605). 
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is that, although there are clearly funding issues in the narrow sense that the insolvent 
company itself is generally unable to cover the costs of insolvency litigation, the market 
has adapted and a range of products and services have been established to aid 
officeholders in cases that are viable, following the introduction of CFAs. Whilst 
funding concerns may have been the first – and invariably an insuperable – obstacle for 
officeholders pre-1995, it seems plausible that the substantive legal issues have since 
trumped funding claims as being the main inhibitor. Aside from this outdated empirical 
data, there does not appear to be anything that would suggest a great funding crisis 
exists. Although it is accepted that an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, 
it is altogether simply unclear upon what evidence the claims in relation to funding, as 
set out in the Paper, are based. In truth, this is a matter difficult to satisfy without an up-
to-date widespread empirical study. If such a study has been concluded, no reference 
was made to it in the Paper. Moreover, it is the author’s view that the advent of more 
modern funding options has rendered any such arguments far less potent than they 
might formerly have been. The simple point being made here is that too much time is 
spent on the oft regurgitated concerns about funding, based upon outdated evidence. 
Purporting to address a problem that does not exist (or is of marginal concern) by 
definition will not serve to increase the effectiveness of the IA 1986 private enforcement 
powers. In fact, it may reduce their effectiveness in the long term if its focus detracted 
from other material concerns. It is argued that unless further evidence to substantiate 
the funding dilemma is forthcoming, then it is time to move on and address the other, 
more inhibiting, issues that remain.  
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ASSESSING THE TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST CONSULTATION 
5.11 DBIS released its response to the Transparency and Trust consultation process 
in April 2014. In forming its conclusion that assignment was to be introduced, DBIS 
considered some 314 consultation responses from companies, NGOs, professional and 
trade associations, academics, enforcement agencies, and individuals.611 The author 
obtained all of these responses612 and has analysed them for the purposes of obtaining 
some insight as to views on the potential utility of assignment. In DBIS’s own words: 
Most respondents agreed that very few fraudulent trading and wrongful trading actions 
are currently taken by liquidators…[v]iews were more mixed on the proposal to make 
it possible to sell or assign actions to third parties.613 
Out of the 314 consultees, 116 wrote on behalf of corporations, NGOs, government 
agencies and academics.614 The remaining 198 wrote in their capacity as private 
individuals. Five of the responses from individuals were unobtainable and so had to be 
excluded from the analysis.615 It must be noted that, given the wide-ranging remit of the 
consultation, only a fraction of consultees considered the matters associated with 
creditor redress. A total of 45 non-individuals and a mere 3 individuals616 wrote to the 
Department to discuss matters surrounding creditor redress. The limitations of the 
                                                 
611 DBIS, ‘Consultation Outcome – Company ownership: transparency and trust discussion paper’ 
(15 July 2013) available at <http://bit.ly/1nD5QSo> accessed 1 August 2016. 
612 111 of these submissions were available within a ZIP archive on the DBIS website, available at 
<http://bit.ly/2bM33GU> accessed 01 August 2016. The remaining consultation responses were 
obtained under the FOIA 2000 from DBIS (T&T Consultation Responses). 
613 T&T Government Response (n 223) paras 263-264. 
614 For the purposes of brevity these consultees will collectively be referred to as ‘non-individuals’ 
hereinafter. 
615 These responses were withheld by DBIS under Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000), 
s 41, on the basis that their release might amount to a breach of the duty of confidence that was owed 
to those particular respondents. 
616 One might draw from this, albeit quite unscientifically, that the general public at large considers 
creditor redress as being an issue of minimal importance. Conversely, it is interesting to note that 
99 per cent of individual respondents discussed issues surrounding the Government’s proposed 
register of beneficial owners of companies. Further, 98 per cent of individual respondents solely 
discussed this issue in their response.  
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sample size of this study therefore should be borne in mind. That notwithstanding, it is 
suggested the insight is important. It is rare to be able to obtain views from such a broad 
cross-section. There is also great value in that many of the respondents have first-hand 
practical experience of the concerns faced. 
Questions Asked 
5.12 Consultees were asked to consider a variety of questions on the topic of the use 
of assignment to improve financial redress for creditors.617 This analysis concentrates 
on two of the core questions which assist the author in furthering his exploration of the 
effectiveness of the fraudulent and wrongful trading mechanisms. More specifically, in 
order to ascertain the impact that assignment may have in that regard. The questions 
considered here are:  
(a)  ‘[w]hether this proposal would improve confidence in the insolvency 
regime?’;618 and 
(b) ‘[w]hether, if liquidators were able to sell or assign wrongful and fraudulent 
trading actions, more actions would be taken?’.619 
The Results 
5.13 It should be noted that a total of zero private individuals responded to either of 
the two questions. Dealing with the first question, there were 27 non-individual 
responses. Despite being one of the primary aims of the SBEEA 2015, it is interesting 
to note that only four (14.8 per cent) consultees definitively thought that it would. In a 
further three (11.1 per cent) responses, the author was able to infer with some certainty 
that the consultee thought that it would do so, though without it being explicitly stated.620 
                                                 
617 T&T Discussion Paper (n 14). 
618 ibid, para 11.12. 
619 ibid, para 11.12 
620 Whilst this is admittedly somewhat unscientific, the author took a common-sense approach, by 
considering factors such as the content and tone of the response, and so forth. 
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This is in stark contrast to the 11 (40.7 per cent) respondents who were of the opinion 
that it would not increase the confidence of stakeholders in the insolvency regime, with 
this being inferred in a further seven (25.9 per cent) responses. Interestingly, two 
consultees believed that it would have the opposite effect and would in fact reduce 
confidence in the regime. The reasons for this will be examined in detail in due course621 
though can be summarised at this stage as being due to the potential for speculative or 
vexatious claims being pursued by commercial entities; and the potential for a negative 
public perception of corporations profiting at the expense of aggrieved creditors.  
5.14 The results in response to the second question are more difficult to comprehend. 
It should be noted that the sample size here was much lower, with only 15 non-
individual (and again zero individual) consultees engaging. This was expected as, in 
truth, it is more or less impossible to gauge the numerical impact of assignment on the 
cases brought at this stage.622 For present purposes it is noteworthy that, including where 
it could be inferred from the totality of the response, a total of 8 (53.3 per cent) 
consultees thought that it would increase the number of actions brought. However, a 
proportion of that total, some 37.5 per cent, suggested that any increase would be in 
speculative or frivolous claims made by claims companies in an attempt to coerce the 
director (or other defendant) into settlement.623 Seven consultees (46.6 per cent) who 
answered this question thought that assignment would not increase the number of cases 
brought. Six of those attributed that to the fact that the low number of cases was a result 
of the substantive legal difficulties, rather than funding concerns. This corroborates the 
                                                 
621 5.19. 
622 1.12. 
623 Dealt with substantively below: 5.19. 
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author’s suspicions expressed earlier in this regard. Given the responses, it is now 
therefore doubly unclear as to why DBIS insisted that funding was perceived to be the 
primary obstacle. And, even following this cursory examination, it is surprising that 
DBIS chose to use the word ‘mixed’624 to describe the appetite for assignment amongst 
consultees, and its potential to increase trust in the insolvency regime. It seems rather 
clear to this author that, in the main, assignment was not particularly favoured. The 
underlying reason for this, it is repeated, is simply that assignment does not necessarily 
solve any real problem. In fact, as will be explored below, it may cause more difficulties 
than it will solve. 
THE PITFALLS OF ASSIGNMENT 
5.15 To summarise, then, the primary benefit of assignment in policy terms lies in its 
potential to reduce the number of instances where an officeholder is unable to proceed 
with an action against a director due to funding constraints. This increase should have 
a proportionate impact upon the returns to unsecured creditors, thus enhancing the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms. It may also lead to wider reporting of such cases – 
whether in the law reports or the media – and therefore operate so as to increase the 
deterrent effect of the legislation.625 Though it has been queried by this author, in line 
with the scepticism of Transparency and Trust consultees, whether the perceived 
benefits will be realised on the basis that there is no real evidence to support the notion 
that a funding crisis exists. Further, the likelihood is that where claims are not pursued, 
                                                 
624 T&T Government Response, para 264. 
625 This is a point central to the author’s suggestion for reform as dealt with later in the thesis: 
education leads to awareness, which in turn leads to deterrence: 6.20. The importance of deterrence 
in this area has also been considered by those such as Andrew Campbell, ‘Wrongful Trading and 
Company Rescue’ (1994) 25 Cambrian LR 69, 81 and Williams, ‘What Can We Expect to Gain 
from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?’ (n 471) 62. 
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in a market dominated by the CFA, it is for reasons other than issues of funding. That 
notwithstanding, assignment also carries a number of other supplementary benefits, 
such as preventing the officeholder from being exposed to personal liability, therefore 
eradicating the need for expensive ATE insurance policies. However, an analysis of the 
Transparency & Trust consultation responses reveals a considerable number of 
potential pitfalls that may seek to limit the positive impact that assignment could have. 
The next section sets out some of the concerns that were identified during the course of 
the analysis. The point being made is that even it can be shown that assignment 
alleviates funding issues (i.e. we accept the crisis is ‘real’; which is disputed), it may 
create other adverse consequences that outweigh any of its positive effects, thus 
hindering the effectiveness of the regime overall.  
Difficulties in Obtaining Information 
5.16 Officeholders benefit from powers of investigation conferred by statute under, 
inter alia, sections 235-237 of the IA 1986. These compel those connected with 
insolvent companies to cooperate with the officeholder and, further, to furnish her with 
any documents relevant to the activities of the company where required. Evidently, in 
building any wrongful or fraudulent trading case against an individual, access to such 
documentation is vital. Given the nature of the forensic examination that needs to be 
undertaken where impropriety is suspected, claims are unlikely to succeed should such 
unrestricted access to documents be unavailable. These powers are unavailable to non-
officeholders, even in the case of assignment. Because of this, there seems little doubt 
that an essential characteristic of any assignment agreement would be that, where the 
assignee requires investigations to be undertaken, this would be done by the 
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officeholder for a fee.626 This presents difficulties as, given the nature of the 
officeholder’s duties to creditors, it may be seen to be detrimental on policy grounds 
that an Officer of the Court might be motivated by the objectives of a commercial third 
party, rather than creditors. It would be an injustice to the insolvency profession to 
suggest that this would actually occur in practice, but the perception might exist 
nonetheless, thus in turn reducing trust and confidence in the regime. There are also 
inherent difficulties of policy with quasi-public powers being used to this end. 
Depending on the circumstances, it is possible that it may amount to a breach of the 
officeholder’s obligations to creditors. However, without contractual assurances that 
the officeholder will undertake investigations on behalf of the assignee it is unlikely 
that an agreement would be entered in to, thereby providing no net benefit to creditors 
whatsoever. It is noteworthy that, of course, under a CFA/ATE arrangement this 
presents no problems as the officeholder retains property rights in the action and any 
proceeds. 
De Facto Settlements 
5.17 A number of consultees warned of the danger that potential defendants, or 
connected persons or entities, could simply buy out claims against them, so as to ensure 
that litigation could not ensue. This is more than a remote possibility. After all, a 
potential defendant is the one who is best placed to know the ‘value’ of any claim 
against her, as well as the likelihood of its success. She will have been inextricably tied 
to the activities of the insolvent company; she would know the extent of her 
wrongdoing, the availability of the evidence to the officeholder, and the monetary worth 
                                                 
626 Whilst methods vary from funder to funder, Manolete Partners PLC – the largest UK insolvency 
litigation funder – operates in this way. 
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to creditors of any wrongful or fraudulent trading that she has been a part of. Even if 
the officeholder in question refused to make an assignment to the defendant herself it 
would be very straightforward for an SPV to be established, or for some person 
connected to the individual (perhaps a friend) to purchase it. Post-assignment an 
officeholder would have no recourse and, even with the best due diligence, it would be 
very difficult to detect and prevent in the first place (if prevention is desirable). Such a 
scenario amounts to a de facto settlement which, it might be argued, provides a better 
return for creditors than nothing at all, should the alternative be that no action is taken 
by the officeholder herself. However, one consultee commented that the public 
perception of de facto settlements would be negative and it may diminish trust and 
confidence in the enforcement regime itself. This argument is persuasive, and is 
compounded by the fact that, given what has been said previously, it is very likely that 
the cases in which a director is eager to purchase a cause of action are cases worthy of 
the officeholder pursuing. If this transpires to be a reality, the effectiveness of private 
enforcement mechanisms are, it is argued, diminished on two grounds. First, because it 
may lead to less of a return for creditors in otherwise actionable cases. Secondly, it 
further damages the deterrent effect should directors come to learn that this might be an 
option as it permits them to ‘buy their way’ out of sanctions, possibly at a rock bottom 
price. DBIS acknowledged these dangers in its Response627 though, in spite of calls from 
consultees to ban assignment to defendants or connected persons, this did not make it 
to the legislation. DBIS commented that it was for officeholders, given their skill and 
experience in insolvency matters, to ensure that assignees were appropriate.628 Although 
                                                 
627 T&T Government Response, para 265. 
628 ibid, para 272. 
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laudatory this is unlikely to be of much comfort to officeholders or creditors. By way 
of mitigation an officeholder might decide as a matter of her own policy only to sell to 
creditors or recognised claims companies. However, therein lies a further issue: should 
there be no potential purchaser other than the director, might an officeholder have no 
choice but to assign should she be made an offer even for a nominal sum? Although the 
officeholder has an absolute discretion to assign – at least in theory – in practice if she 
refuses, there may at least be an argument that she has breached her duties to creditors 
to maximise returns for the insolvent estate. The officeholder may be put under 
considerable pressure from creditors to go ahead with the assignment. Granted, such a 
scenario is likely to be incredibly rare given that, if the claim was credible and no 
purchaser was available, the officeholder would pursue it herself by means of a 
CFA/ATE arrangement. However, it is not beyond the imagination. 
Valuing Claims: The Bird in the Hand or the Two in the Bush? 
5.18 One practical concern for the officeholder in assigning is determining the worth 
of a claim. This may be extremely difficult in the early investigative stages. R3, in its 
submissions to the Transparency & Trust consultation, commented that it is common 
for evidence that may be used against a director to ‘drip’ through as the investigation 
proceeds.629 At the outset, before formal investigations have been concluded, the 
monetary worth of a claim may not be possible to gauge with certainty. One of the 
negative consequences of assignment is that, given the innate risk in commencing 
proceedings, claims companies are likely to only pay a fraction of its estimated worth. 
This has the effect of reducing the pot available to creditors. This is further compounded 
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by the fact that claims companies are only likely to be interested in the more ‘valuable’ 
claims in the first place. Where the action succeeds, they are likely the only party to 
benefit substantially from a windfall award. This is because, in view of the difficulties 
surrounding valuation, claims companies will seek to undervalue claims to further 
maximise profit. At the early stages, the officeholder is unlikely to be in particularly 
strong negotiating position; she has carried out only cursory investigations; the 
litigation funder is acutely aware that the claim is unlikely to be pursued without their 
financing; and, ultimately, the officeholder is duty bound to maximise returns for 
creditors. Whilst it might be argued that an officeholder could choose to assign later 
down the line, once investigations have been concluded, this suffers from its own 
difficulties. An officeholder is unlikely to commit to a forensic examination of a 
potential defendant, at significant cost, before funding arrangements are in place, so as 
to avoid wasting the already limited resources of the insolvent estate. In theory, this is 
a simple economic exercise for the officeholder, though the reality is no doubt far more 
complex. The option to assign will invariably present itself in cases where chances of 
recovery are high and/or the value of the claim is particularly healthy. A decision to 
assign is therefore inevitably going to be a worse trade-off for creditors than if the 
officeholder were to pursue to claim for herself. It may therefore be said that this hinders 
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms by providing less of a return. 
However, this is arguably a better scenario than no case being brought whatsoever due 
to funding constraints.630 This must be balanced against any negative public perception 
vis-à-vis commercial entities profiting at the expense of aggrieved creditors. In the 
                                                 
630 Immeasurably more so when it is considered that this is Government’s primary rationale for 
introducing assignment. 
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words of one consultee: does the officeholder take the decision to have a bird in the 
hand rather than the two in the bush? 
Speculative, Nuisance and Vexatious Claims 
5.19 It was a further concern that assignment may do little more than increase the 
number of speculative claims brought against directors. It would be certainly 
undesirable for a culture of barratry to emerge with regards to insolvency actions but 
this is a very real danger. Whilst it was freely admitted by Government that it would 
expect a ‘market’ surrounding these claims to emerge,631 there was no acknowledgement 
or further discussion with regards to nuisance claims specifically. This is an issue 
peculiar to assignment because of the duties owed by officeholders to creditors. 
Commercial entities, as potential assignees, on the other hand are invariably driven by 
profit. The danger is therefore that even the weakest of claims could be bought cheaply 
from officeholders, who may be pressured or even duty bound to accept. Assignees 
would then seek to procure, under threat of litigation, a settlement from directors even 
where there is limited evidence of any wrongdoing.632 Directors of insolvent companies, 
many of whom will have given personal guarantees to secure company debt, may not 
have the funds to defend the claim and will simply fold under the pressure.633 Directors 
                                                 
631 T&T Discussion Paper (n 14) para 57. 
632 This is also a serious concern in respect of another SBEEA 2015 initiative, namely compensation 
orders and undertakings: 2.34. 
633 Importantly, it is this very concern that Jackson LJ had in relation to the use of CFA/ATE 
insurance in civil litigation. This was aired in the Supreme Court in Coventry v Lawrence [2015] 
UKSC 50, where the practice of doing so in general terms was described as a ‘blackmail’ or ‘chilling 
effect’, ‘which drove parties to settle early despite good prospects of a defence’ at [43]. The potential 
for undue pressure to be placed on defendants was also a reason cited for the change in the law 
relating to fraudulent trading in 1986, by removing the locus standi of creditors:  See, for example, 
the written statement of Mr Alexander Fletcher MP at: HC Deb 05 June 1985, vol 80, col 178W 
where this is alluded to, also; Hicks, ‘Wrongful trading – has it been a failure?’ (n 605) 136. It does 
not appear that, in the consultation relating to assignment, that this factor was considered at all. 
Undue pressure being placed on directors is also a core concern in the area of disqualification, as 
discussed at: 2.47. 
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with D&O insurance would be prime targets for this sort of tactic, which may lead to 
an increase in premiums across the board. Whilst the public at large would no doubt be 
relatively unsympathetic to such individuals – perhaps suggesting that there is ‘no 
smoke without fire’ – there is a strong possibility that even honest and competent 
directors could be targeted. If true, this could have a wider negative impact on the 
economy as it may disincentivise individuals from taking up directorships within 
companies for fear of litigation should things go wrong. This would therefore upset the 
balance between access to limited liability and appropriate levels of regulation. As 
explained in Chapter 1, it has to be accepted that in a market based economy businesses 
will fail. However, in instances where there has been no impropriety this should not 
necessarily condemn a person to financial ruin on the back of ambulance chasing. One 
consultee specifically mentioned the chilling effect that this may have on the taking up 
of directorships by insolvency experts, such as Chief Restructuring Officers. These 
individuals often come in to companies as change agents to turn around a business 
which may otherwise be destined for insolvency. Any such impact would clearly be out 
of step with the UK’s rescue culture and wider enterprise policy.  
Collectivism 
5.20 As a minor point of policy surrounding IA 1986 litigation powers, it should be 
noted that they are drafted in the full spirit of distributions being made pari passu. A 
core objective of the private enforcement provisions is to ensure increased returns for 
all unsecured creditors. It appears to this author that there may be policy issues with 
having one creditor buy out the claim, to eventually secure a benefit above and beyond 
that of her fellow creditors. Clearly there is an inherent risk in her doing so, and that 
risk may become her reward. But, looking at this issue through the spectacles of 
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collectivism, it appears to contort the original ethos of the provision. In line with the 
author’s approach this would therefore be undesirable in terms of the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms, given their objective as being to compensate an entire body of 
creditors. Yet, if it were to be a condition of assignment that proceeds were to be shared 
(equally) there would be no incentive for a creditor, or indeed any other person, to buy 
the claim.  
ASSIGNMENT IN PRACTICE 
5.21 At this juncture, it is worthwhile exploring briefly how assignment might 
operate in practice. In doing so the author investigated the types of products and services 
that specialist claims companies might offer to officeholders wishing to sell IA 1986 
actions. These companies will without doubt be the primary purchasers of such claims. 
It would certainly, for the purposes of the author’s research, have been informative to 
gain the perspective of officeholders so as to determine how they will approach the 
question of assignment in practice. However, in terms of the scope and methodology of 
this thesis, accessing the information provided by claims companies has been the more 
straightforward option. It is likely also the most useful, as these companies will 
invariably offer assignment agreements on standard terms, which are therefore likely to 
be representative of the majority of assignments that will take place. Information was 
readily available from Manolete Partners plc (‘Manolete’), which is the largest 
insolvency litigation funder in the UK.634 A survey of IPs conducted by R3 suggests that 
                                                 
634 This is Manolete’s own claim. See Manolete Partners Plc, ‘R3 Survey shows the majority of IPs 
who use litigation funding use Manolete Partners’ available at <http://bit.ly/2cjHqPg> accessed 01 
August 2016. 
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in circumstances where an officeholder chooses to make use of a litigation funder, the 
majority choose Manolete.635 It offers officeholders two assignment options:636  
(a) a Sale and Purchase Agreement: a sale of 100 per cent of the interest in the case 
for a lump sum cash payment to the insolvent company; or 
(b) a Funding Agreement: a smaller initial payment is made to the insolvent 
company, but with its retention of an ongoing economic interest in any proceedings 
taken. The retained interest is a minimum of 50 per cent though, depending on the 
quantum of any eventual recovery, this ratchets up to a maximum 75 per cent (in 
the insolvent company’s favour).  
Option (a) presents a straight forward sale agreement. The officeholder will be 
presented with a fixed-sum offer, which she can either take or leave. As described by 
Manolete themselves, the primary benefit of this option is quick turnaround for 
creditors: ‘[y]our file can then be closed. Final costs invoiced and distributions made’.637 
However, option (b), what Manolete calls its ‘traditional purchase’ offer, may prove to 
be the more favoured amongst officeholders. Any ‘cut and run’ offer of a fixed lump 
sum, as per option (a), is likely to result in a proportionately small return for creditors, 
or at least one smaller than could potentially be obtained under option (b). Officeholders 
may therefore face pressure from creditors to ‘gamble’ on the higher-risk higher-reward 
option. In either circumstance, even where an economic interest is retained by the 
insolvent company in proceedings, Manolete undertakes to indemnify the officeholder 
from any adverse costs, and covers its own legal costs. As a result, no ATE insurance 
is required and the entire process is carried out at virtually no risk to the officeholder or 
the insolvent company. Because of this, following the implementation of the LASPOA  
2012, and as its effects in insolvency litigation take hold, it seems inevitable that a 
                                                 
635 Walton, ‘Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms – An Update’, 2.3. 
636 Manolete Partners Plc, ‘Newsletter Autumn 2015’ available at <http://bit.ly/2bIyOpp> accessed 
01 August 2016. 
637 ibid. 
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greater percentage of officeholders will consider making the switch from the combined 
CFA/ATE approach to one of assignment; especially in small cases, where costs saving 
is essential. The Government has commented that the CFA is unlikely to be affected by 
the introduction of assignment.638 When taken in isolation this may be true, however, 
when joined with the potential effect of the LASPOA  2012 reforms this seems unlikely 
to the present author. In fact, it is argued here that assignment may simply go on to 
replace the CFA as the go-to method of dealing with IA 1986 litigation for the future. 
5.22 It should also be noted that the assignment of IA 1986 actions was permissible 
in Scotland before the introduction of the SBEEA 2015.639 Therefore, it is by no means 
an unprecedented step. More importantly, however, it provides a valuable point of 
observation in understanding how it may be utilised in the English and Welsh context. 
In its response to the Transparency & Trust consultation, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland stated that, given the substantive legal difficulties, the 
experiences of their members suggest that assignation is relatively rare.640  
CONCLUSION 
5.23  This chapter first began by assessing the problem that the new power of 
assignment purports to overcome – funding. It has been argued however that funding 
may no longer be as significant a hurdle as it once was. The author has suggested that 
the focus ought to, instead, turn to an investigation of the substantive legal and practical 
difficulties faced by IPs. There may not be a simple solution to those problems; a point 
that will be revisited in the next chapter of this thesis where the author considers more 
                                                 
638 Assignment Impact Assessment, para. 12. 
639 In Scotland, however, the process is known as ‘assignation’.  
640 T&T Consultation Responses. 
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fundamental reforms to access to limited liability itself. There is also a further 
dimension to consider in that, even where an assignee is successful, there is no 
guarantee that the defendant will be able to pay due to her impecuniosity. Whilst 
assignment clearly does not aim to target these difficulties, they must be considered as 
a factor in determining the potential that it has for the increasing the number of actions 
brought which – it must be remembered – was the objective of the provision as set out 
in the Paper. If the author is correct in his assertion that funding claims is an issue on 
the periphery, then one possible inference to be drawn from that is cases will not be 
assigned very often. Another possibility, as is cautiously suggested here, is that 
assignment, whilst not necessarily increasing the number of cases or returns for 
creditors, may in fact become the ‘go to’ device for officeholders when dealing with IA 
1986 claims instead of the CFA. This is because it overcomes some of the uncertainties 
and disadvantages of a combined CFA/ATE approach post-Jackson Reforms. But, it 
should not be held out by the state as a magic bullet to all the problems of commencing 
IA 1986 actions. In fact, this chapter has also identified many of the dangers with 
assignment itself. Put simply, assignment on its own is insufficient to improve the 
effectiveness of the wrongful and fraudulent trading provisions by increasing the 
number of claims brought. As such, the author is confident that they will retain their 
status as ‘paper tigers’ following the SBEEA 2015.641 The trade-off for this only-
marginally-improved position, however, is to create a very real potential for negative 
consequences upon the enforcement regime as a whole; brought on, in the main, by a 
                                                 
641 This is in reference to both Andrew Hicks and Carol Cook who have previously stated that the 
wrongful trading remedy may be seen by directors as nothing more than a ‘paper tiger’: see Carol 
Cook, ‘Wrongful trading – is it a real threat to directors or a paper tiger?’ (1999) 3(Apr) Insolv L 
99; Hicks, ‘Wrongful trading – has it been a failure?’ (n 605). 
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surge in nuisance claims. Thus, for directors this is no doubt a worrying development. 
For IPs practically speaking, it offers an interesting escape from the previous 
complexities and uncertainties of a combined CFA/ATE approach, though will likely 
have a limited impact upon their decision as to whether a director is pursued or not – as 
appears to be the Scottish experience. For the creditor, the author does not anticipate 
that there will be any noticeable increase in returns, though there will no doubt be the 
occasional success. And, there is also no doubt that it is these successes that will be 






















6.1  Governmental attitudes towards limited liability have already been set out in 
the first chapter of this thesis.642 By way of adumbration it may be reduced to the 
following: limited liability is viewed as necessary in stimulating and facilitating a 
capitalist economy. Incorporation in the UK is amongst the simplest and cheapest in the 
whole of Europe. Policy makers understand, indeed embrace, the inevitable abuse that 
follows from such unfettered access to limited liability. The private enforcement 
mechanisms explored throughout this thesis exist to provide a means of redress to 
creditors and regulate undesirable conduct. The primary public mechanism of dealing 
with undesirable conduct, disqualification, is inextricably tied to and, in some ways, an 
inevitable consequence of unrestricted access to limited liability. It exists as a means of 
reassuring creditors that, in what is a fertile landscape of moral hazards harbouring 
considerable scope for excessive risk taking, misconduct will not go unchecked. In other 
words, both public and private enforcement regimes provide a trade-off necessary to 
legitimise, in the eyes of creditors and the wider public, such open access to the corpora 
ficta.  
                                                 
642 1.2 
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THE CASE FOR REFORMING LIMITED LIABILITY 
6.2 As has been addressed in some detail in the preceding chapters, each of these 
mechanisms has its shortcomings. In some cases this is a gross understatement. What 
is apparent however is that each share a fundamental detail in common with the other 
which, it is suggested, creates an insoluble barrier to increasing effectiveness: each 
mechanism operates ex post facto. These mechanisms are solely concerned with damage 
limitation. They are a form of reactionary, not preventative, medicine. It follows that, 
despite the shortcomings of any individual mechanism, the underlying problem, namely 
permitting free access to limited liability in the first place, remains. Save for individuals 
with a track record of misconduct who can readily be identified (and disqualified), there 
is no accurate means of an ab initio ‘filtering out’ of those who will later be revealed as 
undesirable managers. It follows still that simply tinkering with, or even repealing and 
replacing existing mechanisms entirely, is unlikely to stopper the problem. As such, it 
is argued here that ex post facto mechanisms are unavoidably condemned to at least 
partial failure because they do not address this underlying cause. The reader will by 
now understand where the present argument is going: access to limited liability itself 
ought to be curtailed ex ante. This is not as radical as it first sounds, and it is by no 
means a new argument. Indeed, the idea is noticeably still very much alive amongst 
business and professional communities, as evidenced in the response to the recent 
Transparency and Trust consultation exercise;643 a matter dealt with in due course. 
However, free access to limited liability is a cornerstone emblem that permeates the 
very fabric of capitalist society. Any interference with it has therefore been routinely 
                                                 
643 See the T&T Discussion Paper (n 14) and the T&T Government Response (n 223). See also the 
T&T Consultation Responses (n 612). 
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rejected by governments of all colours.644 Yet, as will be shown, the benefit that limited 
liability supposedly brings can be disputed in many cases, particularly in owner-
managed companies. It is suggested here that limited liability ought not be seen as some 
sacred cow never befitting of reform. It is entirely counter-productive for any 
government to bury their heads in the sand as to the source of the problem for fear of 
upsetting the status quo, but then undertake merely to implement remedial, less 
effective, measures after the fact. Even worse, is to hold out (politically or otherwise) 
those remedial measures as evidence of taking a ‘tough stance’ on director misconduct, 
when the actuality is a stark lack of resolve in being willing to address the underlying 
cause.645  
6.3 More should be said as to the benefits of limited liability. In their seminal work 
on the economics of corporate law Easterbrook and Fischel stated the most touted 
benefits to be as follows:646  
(a) Limited liability decreases the need to monitor agents by promoting 
diversification of investment. 
(b) Limited liability reduces the costs of monitoring other shareholders; this is 
because individual shareholder wealth is rendered irrelevant. 
                                                 
644 As is evident most recently in the Transparency and Trust consultation from the rejection of 
educating directors as a pre-cursor to permitting accessing limited liability. As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, this is in spite of a considerable proportion of consultees being in favour of such 
an idea. See 6.20. 
645 There has been a great deal of political posturing on the issue over the years. This was especially 
evident during the passage of the SBEEA 2015. See for example Rowena Mason, 'Vince Cable To 
Bring In Tougher Penalties For 'Dodgy Directors' The Guardian (19 April 2014) 
<http://bit.ly/2q6crfL> accessed 17 May 2016; ‘Vince Cable proposes tougher rules for directors’ 
BBC News (15 July 2013) <http://bbc.in/2rGgX51> accessed 17 May 2016. 
646 The following list of advantages of limited liability is paraphrased from Frank H Easterbrook and 
Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1991) 41-
44. 
Reforming Limited Liability 
 
 221 
(c) The free transfer of shares permits shareholders to sell easily, which provides 
managers with an incentive to operate the corporation efficiently to prevent being 
replaced. 
(d)  Limited liability allows shares to be fungible, and their valuation is determined 
by the income stream generated by the corporation’s assets. Rather than being based 
upon investors’ wealth, individual wealth of other shareholders is in fact irrelevant. 
A lack of fungibility would, according to Easterbrook and Fischel, impede the 
acquisition of shares. 
(e) Limited liability permits market prices of shares to reflect additional 
information about the value of a firm’s prospects as all shares are traded on the same 
terms. 
(f) Limited liability permits more efficient diversification. Risk is reduced by 
diversifying, which in turn permits the raising of capital for corporations at a lower 
cost. In a system of unlimited liability diversification increases risk as one single 
business failure could lead the shareholder to become bankrupt.  
(g) Managers, in knowing that investors hold diversified portfolios, can take bold 
business decisions without exposing them to bankruptcy. In unlimited liability 
situations managers would reject projects deemed too high-risk. 
When considering closely held corporations however, as has been the author’s primary 
focus throughout this thesis, many of these benefits are merely theoretical.647 In fact, 
Easterbrook and Fischel concede that the limited separation between management and 
risk bearing found in close corporations has ‘profound implications’648 for limited 
liability. Indeed, limited liability cannot be said to reduce the costs of monitoring in 
owner-managed companies as the investors are also the decision makers. Owner-
managers generally do not have large diversified investment portfolios. The opposite is 
more likely to be true; a large proportion of an individual’s assets will be ploughed in 
to the single company. As such, owner-managers make for inefficient risk bearers.649 
Easterbrook and Fischel however suggest that this lack of diversification induces 
                                                 
647 See also Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 233. 
648 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 5) 55. 
649 This is dealt with in some detail in Easterbrook and Fischel ibid ch 9. 
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owner-managers to have more care when taking business decisions.650 It is submitted 
however that this is not necessarily the UK position, when one considers the data 
explored previously.651 The fungibility of shares is practically irrelevant in the closely 
held corporation, as the object is generally to restrict transfer by the utilisation of pre-
emption agreements or similar clauses within the articles. Furthermore, and crucially, 
owner-managers are often (but not always652) forced to contract out of limited liability 
should they seek capital from adjusting creditors653 such as banks. In short, as was 
concluded by Freedman and Godwin in their empirical analysis of the micro-business, 
often for small companies the burden outweighs the benefit.654
6.4 The result of this analysis therefore prompts the question: ‘why the limited 
liability company?’. It is this author’s belief that in many cases the choice of the limited 
liability company is one prompted by ‘marketing’ efforts, for example of formation 
agents and accountants, which deify the limited liability company – citing an untold 
wonder of tax advantages and ‘risk-free’ trading – rather than necessarily any process 
of careful decision making on the part of the incorporator as to what is most appropriate 
for his business needs.655 It is argued here that the owner-manager demographic presents 
                                                 
650 ibid 237. 
651 See 2.15 Even if their contention is true, however, there is still a visible problem for which the 
availability of enforcement mechanisms is clearly seen as being desirable.  
652 In Freedman and Godwin’s study (albeit of a small sample), 53.6 per cent (67 respondents) of 
directors and/or their spouses had provided personal guarantees. In the vast majority of cases these 
were to banks: Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 246. Moreover, Hicks in his survey found 75 per cent 
had given personal guarantees: Hicks, Disqualification of Directors: No Hiding Place for the Unfit? 
(n 18) 9. 
653 An adjusting creditor is one that can alter the terms on which it provides credit, for example, a 
bank. In doing so, the adjusting creditor can consider risk, based on a variety of factors, in 
determining whether to extend credit, rates of interest, or other terms. 
654 Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 233. 
655 In the words of Freedman and Godwin, owner-managers are ‘victims of a culture which 
encourages incorporation indiscriminately’: Freedman and Godwin ibid 233; Anecdotally, one 
Transparency & Trust consultee (an insolvency practitioner) complained that he was often told 
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itself as one where limited liability could be curtailed or removed, quite simply because 
the benefits are mythical.  
6.5 Of course, the economic sense of doing so must be considered. If the wealth 
benefits derived from free access to limited liability for owner-managers exceeds the 
cost656 of misconduct then it should be accepted as a necessary evil.  If the reverse is 
true however, then reform ought to be pursued to address the imbalance. The very 
existence of private enforcement mechanisms suggests that there is a perceivable 
imbalance between the two economic factors. If there was no such imbalance, then it is 
suggested there would be no appetite to permit recourse for creditors and others through 
regulation.657 Furthermore, it is suggested the existence of a public enforcement regime, 
namely disqualification, creates the impression of an even starker imbalance. It 
indicates that private enforcement is simply not enough on its own; state interference to 
the extent of banning individuals from directorial office is deemed as necessary. Given 
that disqualification specifically is utilised most frequently against owner-managers, 
this suggests that the imbalance must be wider in respect of this demographic. This 
latter point is also borne out by Easterbrook and Fischel, who suggest that the likelihood 
of managers engaging in risky behaviour is far greater in close corporations.658 
                                                 
owner-managers had incorporated for ‘tax’ reasons; but yet were completely ignorant as to directors’ 
duties; See also the discussion had earlier in this thesis: 1.6. 
656 Cost here is meant in the broadest sense, i.e. not just in monetary terms but as regards any wider 
societal impact. 
657 This is because the cost of introducing and maintaining enforcement mechanisms would by 
definition be undesirable. The attitude would instead simply for the loss to lay where it fell (i.e. at 
the feet of unsecured creditors). 
658 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 5) 56. Interestingly, this conflicts somewhat with the point made by 
those authors previously in that owner-managers are likely to be more risk averse in their decision-
making as a result of the closely held shares – a point also raised in Rizwaan Mokal, ‘An Agency 
Cost Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provisions: Redistribution, Perverse Incentives and the 
Creditors' Bargain’ (2000) 59(2) CLJ 335, 353. 
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Moreover, it is compounded by the greatly reduced advantages of limited liability in 
close companies, addressed previously. The very existence of enforcement mechanisms 
provides fertile ground for argument that access to limited liability ought to be curtailed. 
If the mechanisms proved effective, then the current policy could be tolerated. If shown 
to be largely ineffective however, as is suggested,659 then methods to limit access to 
limited liability should be explored.  
6.6 A question therefore arises as to what specifically could be done to redress the 
balance. If those with a temerarious attitude towards risk can be prevented from 
accessing limited liability in the first place the issues created by free access are 
mitigated against and, further, the need for ex post regulation is reduced (thereby saving 
further cost). By way of analogy, an envisaged optimal form of limited liability might 
be compared to a flood barrier. The barrier regulates the tidal waves that are company 
directors. The barrier prevents the worst tidal waves from breaching its defences. Such 
control inevitably causes an inconvenience for passing river traffic. But, society bears 
the inconvenience, and the cost of maintaining the barrier, to avoid certain disaster. At 
present however, in the context of limited liability, the barrier is perpetually lowered 
and therefore all ills pass through with considerable ease, without challenge, and 
entirely unmitigated against. Instead, the approach is simply to rebuild after the fact, at 
an increased long-term cost over prevention. To raise a barrier against entry would be 
to deal with the problem at source. Some delinquents may still permeate the defences, 
but the prospect of that occurrence is minimised; the worst offenders are stopped in 
their tracks, or their capability for destruction is diminished. The remainder of this 
                                                 
659 This is largely the substance of the author’s thesis, in fact. 
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chapter, then, will go on to consider several options open to policy makers in order to 
curtail the negative effects of limited liability at source. It is submitted that effective 
measures should go some way towards restoring the equilibrium between the cost of 
misconduct and any derived wealth benefits. This will be approached on two fronts, 
largely (but not exclusively) with a focus on owner-managers. The reason for this focus 
is as a consequence of the large proportion of enforcement action being taken against 
that demographic. Moreover, there is simply more data available for analysis in respect 
of owner-managers. It is therefore clearly ripe for close scrutiny and an ideal target for 
reform.  The author will approach this issue firstly by identifying some of the more 
traditionally suggested reform methods that focus on a burden placed upon the company 
for it to be lawfully incorporated (i.e. as affecting the ‘owner’). The chapter will deal 
with abolishing limited liability for owner-managers and minimum share capital 
requirements. Secondly, by dealing with the less well researched area of what can be 
done as against individual’s themselves (i.e. as affecting the ‘manager’). This will 
address minimum age requirements for company directors and minimum educational 
requirements. 
ABOLISHING LIMITED LIABILITY FOR OWNER-MANAGERS 
6.7 It has been set out earlier in this thesis that a considerable proportion of those 
directors who are disqualified are so called owner-managers.660 It has also been stated 
that many of the benefits attributed to limited liability are absent in the case of the 
closely held corporation. Incidentally, it is therefore this demographic least likely to be 
affected by mechanisms such as disqualification. Simply put, they don’t have very far 
                                                 
660 2.15. 
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to fall and can resume trading, albeit in an unlimited form, with little difficulty.661 The 
somewhat radical solution therefore would be to abolish limited liability for the small 
owner-managed corporation. In doing so, a considerable part of the problem that public 
and private enforcement mechanisms alike deal with is removed. The empirical findings 
of various commentators suggest that a regime of unlimited liability is generally the 
most efficient for owner-managed companies.662 As such, society would continue to 
derive benefits from similar levels of entrepreneurial activity but in a way that reduces 
the wanton transfer of risk to creditors; reduces costs for owner-managers; and all but 
eliminates moral hazards. The need for and utilisation of disqualification as an 
enforcement mechanism would in essence disappear for this class of persons, as the cost 
of risk taking is born by the individual concerned. Given the number of disqualifications 
levied at owner-managers, overall utilisation would be greatly reduced. For creditors, 
bespoke enforcement mechanisms would be unnecessary, as the general law provides 
sufficient means of recourse already. Naturally, it is conceded that this is only a partial 
solution as it does not deal with wider misconduct arising from access to limited liability 
in non-owner-managed companies.  
6.8 One less radical alternative to abolition is the creation of a new corporate entity 
specifically designed to be used by the owner-manager. It would adopt the structural 
and tax benefits of a limited liability company, but trade on an unlimited basis. 
Commensurate benefits, such as reduced transparency of corporate affairs would also 
attach. Whilst this seems to present an interesting ‘third way’ it is argued here that it 
merely perpetuates the problem. As Freedman and Godwin explain, the idea of a revised 
                                                 
661 2.15. 
662 Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 266; Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (n 22). 
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corporate form is frequently pursued by commentators663 due to their 
‘misunderstandings surrounding the reasons for incorporation’664 and the supposed 
benefits. These misunderstandings have led to an undue focus ‘on incorporated firms to 
the exclusion of unincorporated firms’.665 In this author’s words, the cultural deification 
of incorporated status has led policymakers to blindly bend over backwards to reform 
the incorporated form, as opposed to recognising that in some instances it simply does 
not provide benefit. As such, policymakers and commentators must start to seriously 
consider abolition in respect of the owner-manager and begin to encourage 
unincorporated forms of doing business.  
6.9 Moreover, such an entity already exists, namely the ‘private unlimited liability 
company’. These companies are exempt from filing annual returns or accounts, and do 
not need to utilise the ‘Limited’ prefix. 666 If a specialised form for owner-managed 
companies is preferred, adoption would have to be mandatory to have any meaningful 
impact. One other issue with this approach is that access to the full-blown limited 
liability company would have to be based on a criterion of how closely held shares in a 
corporation are. No doubt attempts would be made by lawyers to circumvent the 
requirements to achieve limited liability status, if it was deemed to be desirable.667 In 
principle, then, the author is of the view that in any approach unlimited liability must 
                                                 
663 For example, Michael Chesterman, Small Businesses (Sweet & Maxwell, 1972); John Farrar, 
Nigel Furey, and Brenda Hannigan, Farrar’s Company Law (3rd edn, Butterworths 1998). 
664 Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 233. 
665 ibid. 
666 They are hugely underused however, for obvious reasons: the latest statistics suggest that the total 
number of unlimited companies in existence accounts for 0.1 per cent of total companies on the 
register. See: CH, Companies Register Activities 2015-2016 (2016) <http://bit.ly/2pTlhBq> 
accessed 14 April 2017, Table G1. 
667 In true Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1 style; a case that needs no explanation 
here. 
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be the common denominator. This factor would remove a considerable portion of 
present difficulties, and substantially reduce reliance on ex post enforcement 
mechanisms, in one fell swoop. This can only be a good thing. Entrepreneurs would fall 
back on the unlimited liability company, or preferably unincorporated forms, and as 
such the economic aspects should remain largely unaffected. To be successful, however, 
a considerable cultural shift in attitudes toward the limited liability company would be 
required, as explored previously. There is much that policymakers can do to help in this 
regard. 
MINIMUM SHARE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
6.10 Another solution is the introduction of minimum share capital requirements for 
private companies.668 In short this is desirable because undercapitalisation promotes 
excessive risk-taking.669 Over the years the idea has been periodically revisited,670 though 
Anglo-American corporate law has traditionally rejected it as an inhibition on 
entrepreneurial freedoms. Its implementation would provide something of a safety net 
for creditors. It would ensure that shareholders pay an identifiable and irreducible price 
for their limited liability status and the benefits attached to it. The higher the minimum 
                                                 
668 It has been shown, previously, that most private limited companies adopt very low share capitals 
indeed: 3.45. 
669 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 5) 59. 
670 The Jenkins Committee considered the matter, though ultimately ruled it out as being to 
straightforward to avoid, at DTI, Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) para 
27 (The Jenkins Report). The issue was considered in passing by the Cork Committee when 
introducing the idea of wrongful trading. The Committee suggested that it (wrongful trading) would 
‘go a long way to meet the criticisms of those who complain of the absence of a minimum paid-up 
share capital’ at The Cork Report (n 68) para 1785. The Committee also clearly expressed distaste 
for under-capitalisation (para 1815) and stated that those trading when heavily undercapitalised 
would often be trading wrongfully (para 1785). The later 1973 DTI Whitepaper again commented 
on the matter; committing to the idea in terms of public corporations, though less certain about 
imposing similar requirements on private enterprise. See DTI, Company Law Reform (Whitepaper, 
Cmnd 5391, 1973) para 33 (1973 Whitepaper). 
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capital threshold, the more that shareholders risk. The lower it is, the less there is to 
lose. As with the ex post mechanisms discussed throughout this thesis, the aim of 
minimum capital requirements is the protection of creditors. It prevents access to 
limited liability –  full stop – for those unable or unwilling to put their money where 
their mouths are. One other cited advantage has been as a ‘deterrent to frivolous 
incorporations’.671 For this reason, it has been referred to as being an ‘entrance fee’.672 
Presently, in English law, there are no minimum capital requirements for private 
companies.673 Out of the sample of disqualified directors analysed earlier in this thesis, 
80.0 per cent of companies connected to those disqualifications had a share capital of 
no more than £100. 91.8 per cent of companies within the sample held a share capital 
of no more than £1000.674 Indeed, it should come as no surprise to the reader that the 
vast majority of English companies incorporate with a share capital of less than £100.675 
The reason for doing so could not be put more exquisitely than it has been by Messrs. 
Gilbert and Sullivan, whose words still, in the present day, have an eerie significance:  
  
                                                 
671 1973 Whitepaper (n 670) para 33. 
672 Prentice, ‘Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors’ (n 26) 102. 
673 Banks are a known exception to this general rule. For detail see: Garvey and Others (n 21) div A, 
ch 5. Public companies of course must have a minimum capital of £50,000 by virtue of the CA 2006, 
s 763. 
674 3.45. 
675 Many, in fact, do so for £1 or even a single penny. In previous years, CH have provided a 
breakdown of the number of corporations by share capital though it appears this has ceased since 
2013. The last available information, taken from the register as at 31 March 2013, suggests that in 
England and Wales 2,188,800 companies had a share capital of up to £100. This represented 84.6 
per cent of the total companies on the register. See: CH, Statistical Tables on Companies 
Registration Activities 2012-2013 (n 290). 
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Some seven men676 form an Association, 
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets) 
They start off with a public declaration 
To what extent they mean to pay their debts. 
 
That's called their Capital: if they are wary 
They will not quote it at a sum immense. 
The figure's immaterial - it may vary 
From eighteen million down to eighteen pence. 
 
I should put it rather low; 
The good sense of doing so 
Will be evident to any debtor. 
When it's left to you to say 
What amount you mean to pay, 
Why, the lower you can put it at, the better.677 
 
Practicalities 
6.11 As Armour notes, a minimum capital requirement taken alone would be largely 
ineffective without complementary anti-avoidance provisions in place to ensure that the 
capital has actually been contributed,678 and is maintained.679 Of course, if the stated 
effect is to reduce creditor anxiety it must be a minimum paid-up share capital 
requirement. Otherwise, it would be one having no teeth, to be avoided with 
considerable ease. This was the very fear expounded by the Jenkins Committee in 
considering it as a possible solution, leading them to dispense with the idea with 
relatively short shrift.680 Even should anti-avoidance mechanisms be introduced 
                                                 
676 Of course this is a reference to the original minimum number of stockholders required to form a 
company. 
677 William S Gilbert and Albert Sullivan, ‘Mr Goldbury’ from the opera Utopia Limited (1893). The 
full libretto is available at <http://bit.ly/2q15iNm> accessed 15 May 2017. 
678 John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’(2006) 7(1) EBOR 5, 10. 
679 Issues surrounding capital maintenance, for example, by utilising risk-free investments is 
considered at Easterbrook and Fischel (n 5) 60. Furthermore, Cheffins comments that simply 
enshrining a level of capital in the company’s articles does not guarantee that it will be available 
when called upon: Brian Cheffins, Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon 
Press 1997) 531. 
680 The Jenkins Report (n 670) para 27. 
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however, the increase in additional monitoring costs to ensure compliance would no 
doubt be considerable.  
6.12 That aside, one of the main barriers is determining how the ‘minimum’ ought to 
be calculated.681 There are dangers in setting the figure too high, as this would upset the 
balance between protecting creditors and encouraging entrepreneurship.682 Inevitably, it 
would be the small man that would suffer as a result. However, set too low and the net 
effect is that creditors remain vulnerable (though perhaps less so) and the increased 
costs of monitoring are likely to outweigh any perceivable benefits. It is also far too 
simplistic, as is done with the public company, to adopt a one-fits-all approach. Any 
‘minimum’ would have to be variable so as to account for the type of trading activity 
envisaged, and therefore the risks commensurate with it. Accurately calculating what 
the threshold ought to be for any given entity is an ineradicable difficulty. Presumably 
the solution would take the shape of a complex statutory algorithm. Aside from the 
obvious administrative costs in development, this seems to be an untidy solution and 
one probably resigned to failure unless it was ‘just right’. It is the traditional Goldilocks 
dilemma. It is not even clear whether it would be possible to fashion such a thing with 
any level of accuracy in the first place.  
                                                 
681 This is an issue recognised by many of the commentators. For example, see: Easterbrook and 
Fischel (n 5) 60; Armour (n 678) 11. The DTI Whitepaper in 1973 did suggest a £1000 minimum 
capital threshold (fixed); though it appears this figure was plucked out of the air for illustration 
purposes and not intended to be treated as a serious suggestion. See 1973 Whitepaper (n 670) para 
33. 
682 Armour suggests that an inability to gain access to limited liability may deter entrepreneurial 
activity, and cites a study showing a negative correlation between the size of minimum capital 
requirements and self-employment during the 1990’s at Armour ibid 18. For details of the study 
cited see John Armour and Douglas J Cumming, ‘Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship’, 
University of Cambridge ESRC Centre for Business Research (Working Paper No 300 March 2006).  
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6.13 A crucial factor to consider is that the introduction of a minimum capital 
requirement does not necessarily protect creditors. This is evident in the case of the non-
adjusting creditor. One of the problems most observable from the statistics explored 
previously in this thesis is that most disqualifications arise from the non-payment of 
Crown debts, in undercapitalised companies, that are largely owner-managed.683 
However, Armour has argued that a minimum capital requirement would have no effect 
upon the Crown in its capacity as a tax creditor given it extends credit on an involuntary 
and ipso facto non-adjusting basis.684 This is because tax liabilities do not arise until the 
company itself is operating and carrying out transactions that are taxable.685 
Furthermore, other involuntary creditors such as tort victims are faced with the same 
difficulties set out previously, namely that determining an adequate level of 
capitalisation is an inherently difficult task. A minimum capitalisation requirement, it 
is submitted, is only as useful as the accuracy of the method of determining what the 
minimum is. A tort creditor may find that the company is undercapitalised despite 
strictly enforced minimum capitalisation legislation. The extent of any benefits brought 
about by minimum capitalisation are therefore not, it is suggested, as attractive as at 
first blush.686 One final issue taken by Armour on this point relates to the position of 
trade creditors as being de facto non-adjusting in many cases.687 While this seems 
counter-intuitive, it must be correct that trade creditors will be conscious of ensuring 
                                                 
683 3.45-3.47. 
684 Armour (n 678) 20. 
685 ibid. 
686 On tort creditors and their interface with limited liability generally, see: David W Leebron, 
‘Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors’ (1991) Colum LRev 1565. 
687 Armour (n 678) 20. 
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that transaction costs incurred are ‘relative to the amount at stake’.688 Indeed, it would 
seem odd to suggest that a commercial wholesaler of wheat, for example, would offer 
more (or less) favourable terms of credit to one party over another on the basis of their 
capitalisation. The scope and cost of the inquiry is likely beyond the scrutiny of all but 
the most fastidious of creditors.689 As such, Armour concludes rather pithily that it is in 
fact ‘hard to find a category of non-adjusting creditors for whom minimum capital rules 
offer useful protection’.690  
The Death of Minimum Capitalisation 
6.14 It therefore does not require much by way of analysis to conclude that, whilst a 
minimum share capital would likely have a significant impact in terms of deterring risky 
corporate activities and ‘casual incorporation’, it is a concept plagued with difficulties. 
Not only is it something of an impracticable and haphazard solution to the problem at 
hand, it also serves to threaten rates of entrepreneurial activity; arguably with limited 
benefit in return. The protection supposedly offered to creditors (which is, after all, the 
primary concern here) ought not be overstated. Whilst, originally, minimum capital 
requirements were the mainstay across much of continental Europe, following the 
seminal decision in Centros691 much of this has since been abandoned or reformed.692 
                                                 
688 ibid. Armour cites empirical evidence of this claim from a study conducted by Chee K Ng, 
Janet K Smith and Richard L Smith, ‘Evidence on the Determinants of Trade Credit Terms in 
Interfirm Trade’ (1999) 54 J Fin 1109. 
689 A point also raised by Williams and McGee (n 454) 26-27. 
690 Armour (n 678) 21. 
691 ECJ Case 212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] 2 CMLR 551. 
692 For two interesting comparative studies on the issue see: Wenjing Chen, ‘Abolition of legal 
capital requirements under Chinese Company Law 2014 and its potential influence: a comparative 
study in selected countries’ (2014) 35(12) Co Law 371; Khodr M Fakih, ‘The one-member 
company: a comparison study of the one-member company in France, Europe, United States and 
Lebanon’ (2014) 25(6) ICCLR 221. 
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China, as recent as 2014, abolished its own minimum share capital requirements.693 
Although some have called for the matter to be revisited in the UK context,694 it would 
seem the death knell is tolling for minimum capital rules across the globe – and, it is 
submitted, for good reason. 
MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENTS 
6.15 Current law already imposes minimum age requirements for company directors. 
Section 157 of the Companies Act 2006 puts that age at 16.695 The argument to examine 
here then is whether it is worthwhile revisiting the minimum age and raising it in the 
hope of deterring and preventing further misconduct. It is worth noting before the 2006 
Act there were no age barriers whatsoever to directorship and so this was something of 
a step change. The same Act removed the maximum age for directors, previously fixed 
at 70, and provided that at least one director must be a natural person.696 The idea behind 
this suite of changes was to permit better enforcement of corporate legal obligations, 
therefore improving compliance, by ensuring at least one natural ‘adult’ director was 
available to proceed against.697 Milman has argued that the reason for not selecting 18 
as an appropriate age is ‘hard to justify’.698 Indeed, it is something of an oddity of 
                                                 
693 Chen (n 692). 
694 For example, Philip King chief executive of the Institute of Credit Management has stated he 
would ‘absolutely’ be in favour of a minimal share capital for small companies: Sarah Houghton, 
‘Interview with Philip King’ Recovery (R3, Spring 2012) 46. Moreover, whilst Milman accepts that 
minimum capital requirements offer little protection to creditors, he suggests the issue ought to be 
revisited: Milman, Governance of Distressed Firms (n 10) para 6.5. Also, see the much earlier David 
Milman, ‘The ‘phoenix syndrome’’ (2001) 6 Insolv L 199. 
695 The SS also has the power to make regulations to exempt individuals from the age requirements. 
To date no such regulations have been made. See CA 2006, s 158. 
696 Pursuant to the SBEEA 2015, s 87, this position is to change once more. The section introduces 
to the CA 2006 ss 156A-C. Although not yet in force, upon implementation, corporate directors will 
be banned entirely (CA 2006, s 156A), with exceptions (CA 2006, s 156B). All existing corporate 
directors will cease holding their office on an appointed day (CA 2006, s 15C). 
697 DTI, Company Law Reform (Cm 6456, 2005) 276 (2005 Whitepaper). 
698 Milman, Governance of Distressed Firms (n 10) 9. 
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English law699 that a person may command the responsibilities of a director at 16 but 
that same individual, in her personal capacity, will usually be unable to enter most types 
of contract.700 No doubt the reason for imposing what is arguably quite a low age 
requirement (as is invariably the reason put forward for these things) was so as not to 
deter entrepreneurship. 
6.16 On the one hand, then, it is hard to disagree with the sentiments of those such as 
Milman. It is suggested that if the age is to be increased there is little credibility in any 
argument that it should be greater than 18, that being the age of majority. On the other 
hand, imposing minimum age requirements beyond what is legally necessary to enforce 
compliance with companies’ legislation, could be perceived as unduly restrictive. Is it 
that society simply does not trust 16 and 17 year olds with such responsibilities, or does 
it relate to lack of experience or education, or perhaps other factors?701 Regardless, in 
the context of director liability, the correct approach here must be to assess whether 
those in the under 18’s demographic can be identified as being ‘problem directors’. If 
so, other matters aside, some benefit may be derived from increasing the minimum age. 
6.17 It was reported in 2005, before the imposition of the age requirement, that there 
were approximately 500 companies with a director younger than 16.702 No figures were 
given as to the proportion of directors who were 16 or 17. In any case, it seems likely 
                                                 
699 For example, in Australia the position differs (and is arguably more sensible) in that it imposes 
minimum age requirements of 18: Corporations Act 2001, s 201B(1). 
700 For fear of them being unenforceable as against a minor. For more detail see Hugh G Beale (ed), 
Chitty on Contracts: Volume 1 (32nd edn, Thomson Reuters 2015) ch 9. 
701 The author makes the point that everyone must start somewhere. Moreover, training in general is 
deficient across the board as will be explored below. It is simply not the case that upon turning 18 a 
person is suddenly all the more well-equipped to deal with directorial responsibilities. The focus of 
policymakers, as appears to be the case, must focus instead on the age necessary to be able to enforce 
legal obligations against directors on a personal liability basis. 
702 2005 Whitepaper (n 697) 276. 
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that we are dealing with very small numbers. This author’s own analysis of the DDR 
reveals that there were zero disqualified directors on the register below the age of 18 as 
of November 2013. Discounting records where individual dates of birth were not 
recorded, leaving a total of 7,178 for analysis, it was determined that the youngest 
disqualified director on the register was 19.703 A small 5.9 per cent of directors were 
younger than 30. The full results of the analysis, grouped by age range, is depicted 
below for completeness. 
Table 13: Frequency table depicting ages (ranged) of disqualified directors on the 
DDR 
Age Range Frequency Percentage of total 
16-24 78   1.1 
25-34 1037  14.4 
35-44 2209  30.8 
45-54 2272  31.7 
55-64 1239  17.3 
65-74 313   4.4 
75+ 30   0.4 
 7178 100.0 
6.18 It must be cautioned however that it cannot be drawn from this data that ‘young’ 
directors are either more or less likely to be disqualified than older directors; nor can it 
be stated that age is a causal factor in disqualification.  Such findings could not be made 
without more data, for instance the total number of directors in those age brackets 
registered as being directors of active companies at CH. In fact, one would almost 
certainly (though unscientifically) expect there to be a much higher frequency of 
disqualification amongst middle-aged directors, simply on account of there being more 
                                                 
703 There were two directors of that age on the register. 
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of them. Other factors to consider in approaching the statistics might be that young 
directors are likely to be accompanied on the board by older individuals, particularly in 
family undertakings. This supervisory element may reduce the risk of any misconduct 
occurring (unless the adult herself is errant of course). It may also be the case, though 
it is not known to be, that the SS is reluctant to pursue minors for disqualification 
undertakings.704 There is clearly more scope for research to be conducted in this area.  
6.19 The statistics do however go some way in assisting with the question of whether 
any benefit is likely to be derived from increasing the minimum age. As previously 
stated, the purpose of doing so in this context must be to further reduce the risk of errant 
directorship. The answer to that question then must be a resounding ‘no’ if 
disqualification is presumed as being a measure of identifying problem directors.705 The 
fact that no directors under 18 were on the DDR provides some support for the notion 
that this demographic are not ‘problem’ directors, or at least not noticeably so. Whilst 
it is likely that there are a very small number of this demographic in the first place, this 
is precisely the point. In the director liability context, it is therefore argued that any 
negative effects stemming from the inhibitions placed on entrepreneurial freedom in 
increasing the age is likely to be greater than any derived benefits.706 
  
                                                 
704 Though, it is not shown that the courts are reluctant to make a finding of liability against a young 
person; merely that they may impose a lesser period of disqualification. 
705 It has been argued that disqualification is not an effective enforcement mechanism when 
measured against its objectives. It cannot be said however that it is ineffective as one means of 
identifying directors who have committed misconduct. 
706 It is recognised that there may be other socio-legal, cultural or political reasons for increasing the 
minimum age. Such matters, whilst tempting to consider, fall outside the ambit of this thesis. 
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THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 
6.20 The final method of reform considered by this chapter will be as to the possible 
benefits derived from educating or training company directors. The idea is that, as will 
be explored in detail, a large proportion of enforcement action is taken against directors 
who are incompetent and ignorant as to basic management matters.707 Therefore, in 
creating a baseline competence of directors, standards of management within limited 
companies would be raised across the board. If successful, it would reduce reliance on 
existing ex post enforcement mechanisms by decreasing levels of misconduct in limited 
companies, thereby leading to fewer insolvencies, ultimately to the protection of 
unsecured creditors. The measure of success must therefore embody all of these 
elements which, as a secondary benefit, ought to increase the trust and confidence in 
the enforcement regime.708 Higher standards of management ought, in turn, to reduce 
insurance or borrowing costs given reduction of a risk factor.709 Moreover, a baseline 
standard ought to reduce the prevalence of ‘ignorance’ based arguments, either within 
section 17 CDDA 1986 applications or those substantively on liability or quantum in 
improper trading or compensation proceedings. There are also wider economic benefits 
for providers of the training (most likely to be private enterprise), as well as benefits 
commensurate with upskilling society more generally. 
                                                 
707 3.17. 
708 Perhaps even more importantly, trust and confidence amongst the public in wider corporate 
governance and of directors generally should also increase. 
709 Williams and McGee have also suggested that in one system ‘qualified’ directors may not be 
required to give personal guarantees, whereas ‘unqualified’ ones would. This assumes an 
implementation where qualification is not the norm. It is also likely an oversimplification as 
training/education is probably only one (of many) risk factors for consideration: Williams and 
McGee (n 454) 26. 
Reforming Limited Liability 
 
 239 
6.21  The discussion surrounding educating directors is not a new one (though it is 
largely under researched). In fact, recently, as part of the Transparency & Trust 
Consultation respondents were asked to comment on the following issues in this 
context:710 
(a) whether, if some form of director education were to be introduced, it would 
increase trust in the enforcement regime? 
(b)  what form the training should take and who should provide it? 
(c) what would be the likely cost of such training? 
(d) whether successfully completing any such training should enable a reduced 
period of disqualification; or should be a pre-condition for any disqualified director 
wishing to seek leave of the court to run a company whilst disqualified? 
(e) whether there would be value in offering such training to all directors of failed 
companies – irrespective of whether they were disqualified - having regard to the 
fact that the director would need to cover the cost? 
6.22 The implementation of any form of director training was subsequently 
abandoned. However, it is important to note that there was generally universal 
acceptance amongst Consultees that educating directors in and of itself is a good 
thing;711 this is surely uncontroversial, and it is surprising that Government made no 
efforts to address it. Consultees, however, differed wildly as to the possible 
permutations of implementation and the associated benefits. It is this point upon which 
the remainder of this section will focus. The author will also attempt to address some 
of the questions posed by the Consultation, as well as the associated difficulties, before 
drawing some conclusions as to the potential effectiveness of such a scheme.  
  
                                                 
710 T&T Discussion Paper (n 14) para 13.9. 
711 Almost universally; over 80 per cent of those that responded. 




6.23 In considering a system of education and training,712 the author is reminded of 
the seminal work on responsive regulation by Ayres and Braithewaite. In that work, the 
authors commented on an anecdote of a Chester Bowles who reported that: 
20 percent of all firms would comply unconditionally with any rule, 5 percent would 
attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent are also likely to comply, but only if 
the punitive threat to the dishonest 5 percent is credible.713  
Similar logic it is suggested may be utilised as a lens through which to view directors 
and their adherence to both good practice and the law714. Whilst much of the following 
discussion is academic in the purest sense, given that it essentially impossible to 
determine which particular category any given director belongs to (at least until it is too 
late), it is interesting to consider in this context.715 Firstly, it is argued that the 
demographic who would derive the most benefit from education must be the ‘75 per 
cent’. The ‘20 per cent’ is made up of those directors who will always obey the law as 
well as adhere to good management practices. Education would not particularly benefit 
this group of persons as there is no predisposition to commit misconduct. If education 
programmes were to be voluntary, this portion of directors would attend in greater 
numbers. Put simply, this demographic is keen to understand new developments in the 
law and better ways to manage their business – in the spirit of continuing professional 
development – although statistically they are the ones least likely to be disqualified, in 
                                                 
712 For present purposes the words ‘education’ and ‘training’ will be used interchangeably.  
713 Ian Ayres and John Braithewaite, Responsive Regulation (OUP 1992) 25. 
714 Though the reader will understand that it is not intended that Bowles’ percentage figures can be 
transplanted in to this context and expressed as a reliable indicator of the actual numbers involved. 
There is no point in attempting to be too precise about this, given that an accurate survey would be 
extremely difficult to conducted. 
715 Bardach and Kagan express a similar notion that ‘[t]en percent of the firms cause 90 percent of 
the problems’. Again, this 90/10 distribution is used merely for illustration; though the reader no 
doubt understands the general gist of the point. See Eugene Bardach and Robert A Kagan, The 
Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness: Going by the Book (Transaction Publishers 2010) 66-67. 
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part due to their attitude towards risk taking. Conversely, there will undoubtedly always 
be a thoroughly dishonest proportion; Bowles’ ‘5 per cent’. These are directors that 
intentionally set out to be fraudulent or otherwise. For this class of individuals, it is 
similarly suggested that no amount of training or education is likely to be of benefit. 
They are simply dishonest and never able to be rehabilitated. As such, these individuals 
ought to suffer the full extent of the sanctions that the law can offer. That does not mean, 
however, that they should not receive any training at all as there may be some general 
benefit.716 
6.24 This then leaves the ‘75 per cent’ demographic as those most likely to benefit 
from the implementation of training requirements. The reader is reminded that the non-
payment of Crown debts and accounting misconduct account for the vast majority of 
director disqualifications. As has been argued, in many cases this is as a result of 
incompetence (rather than wilful dishonesty). Moreover, awareness of enforcement 
mechanisms is low, thereby reducing the deterrent effect.717 The category of persons 
afflicted by incompetence and ignorance, it is suggested they being primarily within the 
‘75 per cent’, are those that stand to gain the most from training. In theory, it should 
reduce levels of incompetence and ignorance by definition. As such, it is argued that it 
presents a credible mechanism for reducing misconduct if properly targeted towards 
this demographic. It should be noted by way of limitation, as Finch explores, that 
                                                 
716 For example, it may assist in determining culpability or reduce the likelihood of successful 
arguments of ignorance. This may arise in the context of determining the period of disqualification 
or CDDA 1986 s 17 applications. More broadly, where liability is to be apportioned across multiple 
individuals, it may arise in determining the extent of any particular individual’s liability. 
717 2.11. 
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‘training does not guarantee competence’.718 This is a truism; history has seen its fair 
share of entirely incompetent professionals across all sectors. The object however is not 
to entirely defeat misconduct. This would be little more than a pipe dream. The object 
is instead to implement a targeted training effort which minimises the risk of 
incompetence-based failure. A primary factor in the resulting effectiveness of any 
training system, it is submitted, is however heavily dependent on the real-world 
proportion of the ‘75 per cent’. Put simply, how many directors fall within this 
demographic? Any realistic determination of that question is likely resigned to the 
impossible.  
Existing Provision 
6.25 A few words should be said about the existing provision of education and 
training for directors. There are no minimum educational requirements for company 
directors. As such, it generally falls to each given individual to determine what level of 
training they require, if any. Bodies such as the Institute of Directors (IoD) offer high-
level qualifications, such as their ‘gold standard’ Chartered Directorship.719 There is also 
the more traditional route of attending a higher education institution, many of whom 
provide degrees in management including the coveted MBA.720 At the other end of the 
spectrum, there are numerous training courses offered by private providers for those 
                                                 
718 Vanessa Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1992) 55(2) MLR 179, 
210. 
719 For full details see the Institute of Directors, ‘Chartered Director’ <http://bit.ly/2toupz1> accessed 
1 January 2017. 
720 The ‘Master of Business Administration’. The Complete University Guide suggest that this 
qualification can cost anywhere between £16,000 and £73,000 in the UK: The Complete University 
Guide, ‘MBA’ <http://bit.ly/2tXQYrw> accessed 1 May 2017. 
Reforming Limited Liability 
 
 243 
new to managing a limited company.721 Moreover, CH themselves offer free workshops 
across a variety of topics (including one for new directors) should directors choose to 
take advantage of them.722 There is a considerable amount of information on various 
Government websites as to directors’ duties; enforcement mechanisms; submitting 
confirmation statements; preparing and filing accounts; company and insolvency law 
generally; as well as how to seek help if in difficulty.723 One should also not forget the 
initial information leaflet on directors’ duties sent out to all directors on appointment 
by CH.724  
Voluntary or Mandatory? 
6.26 The problem, then, is that whilst there is some provision in the marketplace 
already, if directors are left to police themselves and are given a choice as to whether 
they should incur additional training costs, a considerable proportion will simply not 
bother. As Finch notes, the IoD revealed in 1990 that less than 10 per cent of directors 
had sought out any training whatsoever.725 Moreover, less than 25 per cent possessed 
any professional or managerial qualifications.726 Those that do seek out training 
voluntarily probably belong to the ’20 per cent’ demographic and therefore, save for the 
                                                 
721 The Institute of Directors for instance provide a number of training courses, including the 
Certificate in Company Direction. For full details see Institute of Directors, ‘Training’ 
<http://bit.ly/2tkn3Mm> accessed 1 January 2017. 
722 The CH ‘First Time Director Seminar’ is a free of charge 3–hour seminar ran nationwide, details 
of which are published on the CH website, see: <http://bit.ly/2t0mLrW> accessed 1 May 2017. Its 
title is however somewhat misleading. The aims of the seminar are set out to be: (a) explain how to 
easily and securely send information to CH; (b) inform how to prevent corporate identity theft; (c) 
inform about CH compliance; (d) make you aware of changes to the CA 2006; (e) demonstrate how 
you can search and use CH information. Whilst these issues are no doubt important, the author 
queries whether the aims of the syllabus are properly focused given current levels of misconduct. 
723 The sources are too numerous to recant. However, the websites of CH, DBEIS, and IS contain a 
vast quantity of information in this respect. 
724 Though no other known steps are taken. 
725 Institute of Directors, ‘Professional Development of and for the Board’ (January 1990) as found 
in Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (n 718) 210. 
726 ibid. 
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intrinsic value of the education itself, would derive very few wider benefits from it. 
Incidentally, in the same survey conducted by the IoD they noted that only 24 per cent 
of respondents considered training ‘very important’.727 On any implementation of a 
training scheme, then, little needs to be said on the subject as to whether it should be a 
requirement. For the reasons set out, it is submitted that a mandatory scheme is the only 
credible way forward. This may seem to be a restrictive approach. But, even in a 
mandatory system, it should not be forgotten that a person wishing to avoid formal 
training could simply trade on an unlimited liability basis. Of course, there would need 
to be some carve outs, for example, for established professionals. Practising barristers, 
solicitors, accountants, and those in related professions, should be exempt. Those with 
undergraduate or higher degrees in relevant fields (for example, law, business, 
management, and accountancy) might also be exempted. In terms of wider-reaching 
impact, it might also be suggested that the course content of those degree programmes 
ought to include the elements covered within the director training, and this could indeed 
be used as an additional marketing tool by education providers in recruiting students. 
Who Should Pay? 
6.27 Training has a cost, but if successful there are long-term prospects for a good 
return on investment. The answer as to who foots the bill falls into two camps; either 
the director, or the taxpayer. It is only justifiable that the taxpayer should pay where it 
can be shown that any outlay is offset by a reduction in economic loss caused through 
misconduct and subsequent insolvencies. Politically, however, convincing taxpayers 
that they should pay for director training is a hard sell. If directors are to pay, and it is 
                                                 
727 ibid. 
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argued that this is the most pragmatic approach, then minimising cost and maximising 
value is essential. It would be a sorry state of affairs if training came to be viewed as a 
mere ‘price to pay’ to manage a company; for the preserve of the wealthy or those with 
large capital injections. Instead, a shift in culture is necessary: training should be viewed 
as an essential start-up cost in the same way that incorporation itself is.728 
Content 
6.28 Sessions would need to be highly practical and pitched at a level that could be 
understood by the uninitiated, but sufficiently detailed so as to deliver the necessary 
information. The course content and delivery should be consistent across all delegates, 
to ensure that a minimum baseline standard for directors is achieved. The more content 
that is covered, the greater the time and cost incurred. As such, a consultation process 
would need to be undertaken to realistically appraise what this minimum baseline 
standard ought to require. Common matters leading to a finding of ‘unfitness’ would be 
an obvious starting point. It is suggested that training ought to cover at minimum: 
directors’ duties; a recognition of enforcement mechanisms and potential ramifications; 
insolvency basics and how to seek advice when things go wrong; record keeping; CH 
requirements including confirmation statements; and basic tax matters, with a particular 
focus on corporation tax and VAT. It is recognised that this is not a short syllabus. That 
is why considerable energy would have to be directed into thinking about what is 
essential, with the object of preventing misconduct in mind. This should be left to the 
hands of organisations expert in this field, not Government. Several consultees 
                                                 
728 As an aside, the author is slightly unsympathetic to those that could not afford even the most 
modest training costs. There are considerable issues with allowing such people access to the 
corporate form in the first place. How would they be able to properly capitalise a company, pay 
accountants fees or insurance, for example? Let us not forget that in default they would always have 
the alternative of trading on an unlimited basis.  
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suggested that the IoD would be well-equipped to carry out such an inquiry, and develop 
an appropriate syllabus at reasonable cost. This seems like a sensible suggestion. 
Possible Implementations 
6.29 The reader will appreciate that the number of possible permutations of 
implementation are infinite. However, some general observations will be made, with a 
particular focus on some of the key matters raised by Consultees.729 It is suggested that 
there are three primary variables for consideration in designing the training scheme: 
cost, time to complete, and value obtained.730 Against the backdrop however there is 
always the pressing concern that a system too restrictive would have a negative 
economic impact and be a barrier to entrepreneurship. It is therefore desirable to find a 
balance so that the maximum possible value is extracted, albeit within a reasonable 
time, for a sensible cost.731 An initial problem relates to whether the training should lead 
to an accreditation or qualification following examination; whether it should merely be 
attendance-based; or whether a ‘lighter touch’ is sufficient. The author has set down 
some of the most commonly advocated implementation types based on Consultation 
responses: 
  
                                                 
729 One other issue not covered here, but raised by Consultees, was the prospect of differing 
educational requirements depending on the sector and/or size of the company. This type of approach 
would require directors of a growing business to continue in their training as time and expansion 
goes on. 
730 Value here is defined in the wider sense, i.e. not just the intrinsic value of education to the 
individual, but the wider societal value in terms of increased public trust and confidence, less 
misconduct etc. 
731 Though it is recognised an exact balance is a utopian dream. 
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Figure 3: Director Education: Implementation Types 
Type Implementation 
‘Light Touch’ Warnings during online incorporation 
Publication of online materials (including videos) by CH or DBEIS
Attendance Based Seminars and workshops 
‘Director Awareness Course’ 
Accreditation Remote learning with online testing 
Provision of course materials, with computer or paper based 
invigilated examinations 
Full Regulatory body style accreditation (similar to FCA) 
Qualification NQF recognised Certificates and Diplomas etc. 
Professional Director Qualification (e.g. Chartered Directorship) 
 
MBA or similar 
The further one advances through the list the potential value to directors increases; as 
do the cost and time variables. An MBA or other Masters level qualification 
requirement is entirely disproportionate.732 It is a foregone conclusion that there would 
be very little appetite for ‘professionalising’ the company director. At the other end of 
the spectrum, whilst the simple publication of materials online would be an incredible 
resource (and should be adopted in any case733) they are less valuable in this context as 
they rely on director awareness and instigation; essentially the system already in place. 
It is argued here that the optimum position likely lies somewhere in between. Namely, 
some form of Director Awareness Course (DAC) and/or online testing which leads to 
being named an ‘Accredited Director’. The obvious distinction between the two is that 
                                                 
732 Similarly, whilst Chartered Directorships are no doubt incredibly valuable, the target market for 
these is the well-established professional. For the average director, it would be the case of a 
sledgehammer cracking the nut. 
733 For instance, two Consultees suggested that DBEIS publish videos on directors’ duties and 
enforcement mechanisms as a public resource.  
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one is attendance-based, i.e. there is no testing of knowledge or competence. Turning 
up is enough. It is worth noting that the IoD, as part of its Consultation response, set out 
that it could provide basic level training for £300-400, or more comprehensive training 
for £1000. They did not, however, state the specifications of that training, i.e. the type 
of implementation, whether it was competency tested, the syllabus etc. One option is to 
model the DAC upon the existing ‘Speed Awareness Course’.734 An eligible driver who 
successfully attends (and actively participates in) the course will suffer no other 
punishment, it being an alternative to prosecution. The courses are paid for by the 
driver. An obvious problem with any attendance-only course is that whilst it may have 
intrinsic value, it is only effective if it is taken seriously by those attending. It is 
plausible that a culture may develop of it being seen as ‘a hurdle’ to overcome to 
become a director, but nothing to be concerned about; a mere formality. Moreover, 
those who do take the course seriously are probably those who are less likely to commit 
misconduct in the first place. A DAC therefore has a number of significant limitations. 
As such, it is this author’s view that the only credible option is to implement some form 
of testing.735 This could take various forms. Again, at the low end of the spectrum it 
could be an online multiple-choice test736 (or similar) provided by CH through a secure 
portal. This has the benefit of being cheap to provide, maintain and score. Results could 
be delivered instantly. The downside to this approach is that impersonation on tests 
                                                 
734 Essentially, these are group-based interactive workshops aimed to ‘reduce casualties, encourage 
greater compliance with the law and good road use, and offer a behavioural change intervention’ 
amongst other things: see Department for Transport, ‘Effective Interventions for Speeding 
Motorists’ (2006) available at <http://bit.ly/2tkw2x5> accessed 1 June 2017 para 7.2.1. 
735 Philip King, chief executive of the Institute of Credit Management is also amongst those who has 
stated he would ‘favour a qualifying examination before directors could obtain limited liability 
protection’, though he concedes it is unlikely to happen any time soon: Houghton (n 694) 46. 
736 While multiple choice questions are often seen as a ‘soft option’, properly crafted questions can 
test application and not merely knowledge. For example ‘single best answer’ type questions, can be 
made as complex (or easy) as is necessary. 
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could become rife, and questions from the database are likely to be leaked and discussed 
online. The better alternative, to ensure integrity of the assessment is to have an 
invigilated examination, perhaps modelled on the Driving Theory Test. This comes at 
a greater cost but, to give some context, the current theory test is a mere £23.737 It is a 
computer-based exam taken at an invigilated assessment centre consisting of, in part, a 
multiple-choice element. The pass score for the test must be realistic, yet not undermine 
its function. Successfully passing the test should lead to the individual in question being 
named an ‘Accredited Director’ and assigned a unique identifier at CH which permits 
appointment to any number of companies. An individual who fails should be permitted 
to re-take the test. 
6.30 Though considerable consultation would have to take place on the proper 
implementation, it seems to this author that for cost reasons one workable solution 
would be to offer a series of self-study modules utilising online videos and information, 
or hard copy materials for those that prefer (at an increased cost). Videos should be 
delivered by practitioner and academic experts, in line with the devised syllabus. 
Following completion, the individual could enter themselves for a computer-based test 
at an assessment centre. It is argued that this implementation would balance the three 
variables of time, cost and value. It would not require attendance at workshops, which 
may be impossible for some, and massively increase costs. Whilst the absence of face-
to-face training would impact upon its value it is argued that the necessary information 
                                                 
737 Though, due to the smaller numbers involved in educating directors, it is recognised that these 
costs are likely to be higher. 
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is perfectly capable of being conveyed in this way.738 Moreover, it has the benefit of 
allowing individuals to replay and revisit content until the concepts are fully 
understood. 
When to Educate? 
6.31 One of the most important considerations that has not yet been dealt with is a 
simple one: when do you train directors? It is argued that training pre-appointment is 
the best, though not the only, way forward. The Consultation itself sought opinions on 
educating directors as part of the enforcement regime, i.e. post-failure or post-
disqualification. Mandatory training targeted at the disqualified is inherently attractive 
in common sense terms as it deals directly with those who have been identified as 
problem directors, as opposed to implementing a more pervasive system that deals with 
both good and bad apples; arguably to the inconvenience of the good. As will be 
explored, however, there are inherent difficulties with this demographic. The author 
therefore ultimately concludes that training all directors before first appointment is the 
optimal position, as it ensures the benefits of creating a minimum baseline standard 
across the board are felt. The points in time at which training becomes desirable are not 
always mutually exclusive. It may be appropriate to train a director both on appointment 
and re-train her post-failure, or post-disqualification. The next section of this chapter 
intends to deal with the arguments that arise out of these considerations, including 
educating directors on appointment; as part of continuing professional development; 
post-disqualification and post-failure. 
                                                 
738 Indeed it is the future, with many traditional undergraduate lectures likely to be phased out by an 
online alternative. See Rhett Allain, ‘The Traditional Lecture Is Dead – I Would Know I’m A 
Professor’ Wired (11 May 2017) <http://bit.ly/2pDzZs9> accessed 1 June 2017. 




6.32 We now return to the driving analogy, though this time with a focus on 
disqualification from driving following errant behaviour. A marked distinction between 
drivers and directors is that the driver who commits misconduct is generally dealt with 
under the ambit of the criminal law739, the latter usually under civil law.740 
Disqualification for a given period is merely one of a range of sentencing options 
available to deal with miscreant drivers.741 The three objectives of disqualification from 
driving are restraint, deterrence and retribution.742 Safeguarding the public against 
further breaches of road traffic law is crucial (i.e. restraint), whilst acting as a deterrent 
to further misconduct, thereby improving driving standards, is an important secondary 
aim.743 In short, there is considerable similarity between the objectives and effects of 
disqualification in both contexts.744 However, the means of going about rehabilitation 
could not be more different between the two. Drivers who are disqualified, save for in 
the most minor instances, do not automatically regain their driving licence following 
the lapse of the disqualification period. In the case of more serious offences, drivers 
must reapply for a licence, and ultimately pass a further (for the most serious offences, 
                                                 
739 This is largely pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1988. The reader is reminded of the general power 
of any criminal court (excluding court martial) to disqualify a driver, upon sentencing, pursuant to 
the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 146. Surprisingly, the power can be 
exercised even where the offence in question does not involve the use of a motor vehicle.  
740 Largely by way of the mechanisms discussed in this thesis. 
741 In fact, again to contrast with director disqualification, it is often used as an ancillary measure to 
be combined with fines or imprisonment in the most serious of cases, as well as other ancillary 
sentencing options such as victim surcharges. Director disqualification, given that most are by way 
of undertaking, tends to stand on its own; though this seems likely to change given the introduction 
of compensation orders and undertakings. 2.34. 
742 Catriona Mirrlees-Black, Disqualification from Driving: An Effective Penalty? (Home Office 
Research and Planning Unit, Paper 74, 1993) iii. 
743 In the driving context, it would appear that as a specific deterrent is effective in many cases, 
though awareness of disqualification as a potential punishment was rather low. See: Mirrlees-Black 
(n 742) 36.  
744 As to retribution, it has been previously argued that directors’ disqualification is in large part a 
punitive mechanism that ought properly to be dealt with by the criminal courts: 2.6. 
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extended) competency test. To pass the test, disqualified drivers will invariably have to 
seek training from an approved driving instructor to re-skill themselves to the required 
standard. In contrast, disqualified directors can return to office immediately following 
the lapse of their disqualification without further let or hindrance. This is remarkable. 
It is nonsensical, even though raising standards of management is an aim of the regime, 
that directors are not compelled to undertake training before being allowed to return to 
office after their period of disqualification lapses.  
6.33 One option therefore is to require training for directors wishing to return to 
office following a lapsed disqualification. This was an idea specifically considered in 
the Consultation: 
[The Department is] not aware of any evidence that a director who has served their 
period of disqualification will return to the market better equipped to act in the 
management of a company than before. This suggests that the public interest may be 
better served by offering disqualified directors the opportunity to undertake some form 
of education or training, helping them to take positive steps to learn from previous 
mistakes.745 
Ultimately it was rejected. The Government Response to the discussion paper suggested 
that educational requirements would be a ‘disproportionate response because of the risk 
of burdening UK companies’.746 Many consultees were however in favour of training as 
a pre-requisite for those seeking return to office post-disqualification.747 Many others 
felt, without additional training requirements on appointment, it did not go far enough 
and would be unlikely to increase trust and confidence in the enforcement regime.748 In 
                                                 
745 T&T Discussion Paper (n 14) para 13.6. 
746 T&T Government Response (n 223) para 194. 
747 It is also of interest that over 30 years ago, during the passage of the Insolvency Bill in 1985, 
Lord Meston raised similar arguments: ‘I would go further and say that the burden should be on the 
disqualified director, once disqualified, to show that he is fit to be allowed back into the commercial 
ring.’: HL Deb 15 January 1985, vol 458, col 915. 
748 Some 60 per cent. 
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the words of one Consultee, it was simply ‘too little, too late’. This author agrees with 
those sentiments. One key issue however is market re-entry. If to be considered a viable 
means of addressing director misconduct, some thought must be given to how many 
directors seek to take up a directorship following the lapse of their disqualification. 
Evidently, should the frequency of re-entry be low, the benefits of educating this 
particular demographic is questionable. The time and cost associated with designing 
and implementing a targeted form of retraining is likely to be considerable. It therefore 
seems to this author that the whole point is diminished into insignificance should it be 
shown that appetite is comparatively small. Returning to the disqualified driver analogy, 
it is suggested that one of the primary reasons that a period of re-training and additional 
testing works in this sector is that there is a high rate of re-entry to the market post-
disqualification. Therefore, a considerable public interest exists in retraining formerly 
disqualified drivers to reduce casualties, improve driving standards, and promote best 
practice when (as it is submitted most probably do) they return to road. As will be 
demonstrated, however, the same does not necessarily hold true for company directors. 
In fact, as will be uncovered from the ensuing analysis it is the conclusion of this author 
that the implementation of a system of post-disqualification education, in isolation, is 
of limited value for this reason. The next part of the chapter will therefore consider the 
following question: how many directors re-enter the market once the period of their 
disqualification has lapsed? 
6.34 Methodology The reader is reminded that the DDR obtained by this author 
contained a list of every disqualified director as at November 2013.749 On 1 February 
                                                 
749 3.5. 
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2017, the author set about utilising the DDR for the purposes of understanding and 
evaluating how many of those disqualified directors had chosen to re-enter the market 
following the lapse of their disqualification order or undertaking. The reader will 
remember that the DDR contained 7,825 records of disqualified directors, with each 
record consisting of a range of biographical and disqualification related data:750 
Additional analysis had to be undertaken for present purposes. The following actions 
were carried out to the DDR to create a new dataset: 
(a) given the focus of this thesis on the law and position in England and Wales, 552 
records pertaining to directors disqualified in connection with the activities of 
Scottish and Northern Irish companies were removed;  
(b) all records where the disqualification expired after the date of the analysis, that 
being the 1 February 2017, were removed. This resulted in the removal of 3,363 
records; 
(c) a further 4 records were removed where the recipient of the disqualification was 
a corporate body as opposed to a natural person; 
(d) 17 duplicate entries were removed. 
The final sample for analysis comprised 3,889 records.  
6.35 The author then proceeded to write a computer programme751 which queried the 
CH live database of company directors as at 1 February 2017. The database contains 
data as to all752 company directors, both those active and those who have resigned from 
office (whether following disqualification or otherwise). Since the initial DDR data was 
obtained the register has been reinvented and improved, albeit it remains in a beta 
testing phase at the time of writing. One major improvement, enabling the present study 
                                                 
750 See 3.9 for a list of the data extracted. For some records, not all of the aforementioned data was 
available though in each case enough ‘core’ data was available to be able to accurately identify the 
director in question. 
751 Enabled by his background in Computer Science 
752 Though on the use of the word ‘all’ see the section in this chapter on limitations of the study, 
below at 6.37. 
Reforming Limited Liability 
 
 255 
to be undertaken, has led to every director being associated with a unique identifier.753 
All companies of which the individual is either a director or secretary are linked to that 
identifier. Determining an individual’s identifier, assuming the accuracy of the 
database, then permits the researcher to display a list of all companies for which a 
person acts as a director or secretary. 
6.36 The object of the programme therefore was to search the database for a record 
of each of the 3,889 directors in the dataset. In matching each of the records with a 
corresponding record on the live database, it would then be possible to determine 
whether any particular individual was at present recorded as having an ‘active’ company 
directorship. It was also possible to use the records relating to their association with the 
company which led to their disqualification to further ensure the accuracy of the results. 
The analysis proceeded on the basis that if an individual appeared on the live database 
as having an ‘active’ directorship, then that person had returned to take up a directorial 
position following the lapse of their disqualification. The directors were traced using 
the company number associated with the disqualification or, where this was 
unavailable, their full name, date of birth and location. A total of 807 directors of those 
queried were not listed on the database whatsoever. For this analysis, these directors 
were removed from the sample.  
6.37 Limitations Given current governmental attitudes to director education it is 
submitted that the possibility of a wide-reaching inquiry into this area is unlikely in the 
short to medium term, hence the present study. However, the author recognises the 
limitations of the analysis carried out. As such, the reader should consider the insight 
                                                 
753 For example, the author’s identifier is v2I946iQuBkw8mRrvm4gfHhY6OI. 
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provided as something of a valuable ‘snapshot’ of market re-entry rates at the exact 
moment the data was gathered though, until the full extent of the raw data becomes 
available, nothing more. Firstly, the validity and reliability of the data is very much 
consequent on the source material being accurate and complete. As set out, some 807 
directors known to be disqualified were simply not listed on the database. Whilst the 
reason for this is unknown, it may be a result of systemic error or oversight in the CH 
process of data migration from the ‘old system’. As such, it cannot be stated 
conclusively whether the data that was available was by any means accurate. On 
balance, however, it is submitted that it is of sufficient integrity for present purposes. 
Secondly, the CH database is currently marked as being in the ‘beta’ stages of 
development. It is assumed that this refers to its functionality rather than the integrity 
of the actual data held, though again this cannot be conclusively stated. Thirdly, it is 
unknown as to whether the CH unique identifier system is capable of associating 
records of directors who have changed their name. For example, a director who changes 
her name and is appointed under that new name is likely to be assigned a new ‘unique’ 
identifier, unless CH has a means of determining former names of directors and 
associating them within a single identifier. The practical implication of this for the 
survey is that the proportion of those directors who re-enter the market may be either 
over or under represented where a director changes their name following 
disqualification (through marriage, taking on an alias, or otherwise) and therefore is 
rendered unidentifiable.754 Fourthly, by way of a further limitation relating to the 
development of the computer programme, it is also possible that some directors were 
                                                 
754 For instance, it is highly likely that some proportion of the 807 directors who were unable to be 
traced on the database have merely changed their name and are thus unable to be identified. 
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mistakenly identified and collated into the survey data erroneously. However, the author 
only collated records (all others being excluded) where it could be shown that a director 
with the same name, date of birth and (in some cases) place of residence, as taken from 
the November 2013 DDR was present on the February 2017 online system. As such, it 
is suggested that the risk of this having occurred is small.755 Finally, but importantly, the 
timing of the two data sets must be explored. The NAO has stated that, based on its own 
research, a company director is most likely to be involved in a second corporate failure 
within five years of the first.756 Given that the disqualifications on the DDR lapsed at 
different times, the closer to February 2017 that they lapsed, inevitably the ‘less time’ 
those directors had to re-establish themselves in the market. For instance, a director 
whose disqualification lapsed in December 2013 will have had approximately 38 
months in which to return to a directorship. On the contrary, a director whose 
disqualification lapsed in January 2017 will have had merely 1 month to do so. Both 
will have been caught within the sample data. It therefore seems clear that the utility of 
the data must decrease as the end date of the disqualifications tends towards February 
2017. It is for this reason that it was previously stated that the analysis should be viewed 
as nothing more than a ‘snapshot’ into market re-entry statistics. The most reliable 
approach would be to examine a large sample of disqualified directors exactly five years 
following the lapse of the order or undertaking. For present purposes, this is simply 
impossible to carry out; though it would provide a more accurate insight into the number 
of directors who have since re-established themselves, as well as those who have 
suffered multiple corporate failures. Therefore, until a more expansive survey based on 
                                                 
755 Simply because in the vast majority of cases the director in question was identified by his or her 
connection to the company leading to the disqualification. 
756 NAO Follow-Up Report (n 15) paras 19-21. 
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the raw data is forthcoming, it is argued that the author’s survey provides a valuable 
indicator if nothing more. 
6.38 Findings There were 3,082 records for which unique identifiers could be 
obtained. The details for each of these directors could then be matched against a record 
in the CH database. Out of this number, 2,158 directors were listed as having zero 
current appointments. This left 924 records for which it was indicated there was one or 
more current appointments. Out of this proportion, 381 directors were exclusively 
appointed to a company or companies (excluding the company leading to their initial 
disqualification) that were listed as being ‘inactive’.757 The remaining total of 543 
directors were listed as being directors of one or more ‘active’ companies. The analysis 
carried out therefore reveals that:  
(a) 30.0 per cent of directors in the sample had at some point returned to manage a 
limited company following the lapse of their disqualification758; 
(b) 58.8 per cent of those (17.6 per cent of the total records) were considered to be 
directors of ‘active’ companies;  
(c) Therefore 41.2 per cent (12.4 per cent of the total) of those were directors of 
solely ‘inactive’ companies. This suggests that approximately two-fifths of those 
who returned to a directorship post-disqualification had suffered at least a second 
(or greater) insolvency.  
6.39 Perhaps surprisingly then, the figures indicate that a considerable majority of 
directors do not return to the marketplace. It is unclear whether this is due to reluctance, 
                                                 
757 This is a status attributed by CH to a company that is in a formal insolvency regime, is in the 
process of being wound up or is otherwise not ‘active’. 
758 That is 70 per cent did not. This perhaps highlights further issues as to the suitability of 
disqualification for dealing with misconduct in the long-term if a result a considerable majority of 
do not return to the market place. Some may argue that it is in the best of interests of wider society 
that problem directors do not return. Others may interpret disqualification as creating an undesirable 
chilling effect in relation to the management of future companies. If the latter, clearly this is counter 
to the original aim and purpose of the disqualification regime as a whole, i.e. as being non-punitive. 
A further study as to the lost economic benefits from removing these directors from the market place 
would no doubt prove interesting. 
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continuing to trade in an unlimited form, a chilling effect, or otherwise. In any case, the 
relatively small numbers involved render it questionable as to whether the time and 
expense associated with implementing training for solely this demographic is 
worthwhile. It is submitted that it is probably not.759 As such, the original argument is 
reiterated: implementation must be ‘all or nothing’ to see the benefit. Moreover, it must 
be remembered that purpose of this chapter is to suggest ex ante reforms, therefore to 
do any differently merely returns us to the original problem of being reactive, rather 
than proactive. It also lends itself to the (untested) assumption that education would in 
some way prevent repeat offenders.760 If, however, Government was minded to 
undertake a ‘trial’ of some form of training it is submitted that disqualified directors 
would be an ideal demographic for initial focus with longer-term prospects of rolling it 
out to all directors. 
6.40 Other Matters One suggestion coming out of the Consultation was that training 
post-disqualification ought to reduce the period of disqualification, thereby providing 
further incentive to undertake it.761 It is argued here such an approach must be firmly 
rejected. Firstly, as has been shown, the rates of market re-entry are not particularly 
high. As such, there seems little worth in incentivising directors to take up education 
given that many are unlikely to be interested. Secondly, taken to its logical conclusion 
this in effect amounts to a person being able to ‘buy’ their way out of sanctions. This is 
undesirable both politically and in terms of increasing trust and confidence in the 
                                                 
759 On the latest statistics for 2015-16 there were 1,327 disqualifications. 30 per cent would account 
for approximately 398 directors who might face compulsory training in any given year. See: CH, 
Companies Register Activities 2015-2016 (n 666) Table D1. 
760 Although education should prevent repeat offending, in theory, unless the individual is part of 
Bowles’ ‘5 per cent’ as discussed previously. 
761 This approach again assumes a voluntary implementation. 
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enforcement regime. To paraphrase one Consultee, the purpose of education should be 
to avoid failure not to avoid disqualification. Another Consultee took the position even 
further, stating that those with existing training should face an additional layer of 
sanctions. The author has some sympathy with that view in respect of qualified 
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants who act as directors, but then fall to be 
disqualified due to matters within their expertise.762 However, in the event that a baseline 
level of education is implemented, by definition all directors should be of a similar 
minimum standard and such an approach would be unwarranted. It also must be the 
case, given the minimum two-year period for disqualification under section 6 CDDA 
1986, that directors disqualified for the minimum period would have no incentive to 
undertake training; as the court would be unable to reduce the level of sanction any 
further. A separate argument arises as to the impact of training upon section 17 CDDA 
1986 applications. One consultee suggested that the section should be abolished due to 
its current effect of undermining trust and confidence in the enforcement regime. Others 
suggested that it should be heavily curtailed in respect of requiring a director to undergo 
a period of training or rehabilitation as a pre-condition to granting the application. If 
section 17 is to remain, this seems a sensible option. To ensure it has sufficient bite, 
directors who fail to adhere to their training requirements should be found guilty of 
contempt.  
6.41 As part of a wider training package, as is advocated, there would be no 
impediment to a director having to carry out further training following disqualification– 
as is the case with driving. A director who has undertaken initial training but then falls 
                                                 
762 This is already the current practice. It is most noticeable where there are multiple directors and it 
is a case of apportioning blame. See 2.7. 
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to be disqualified should, it is argued, be required to re-take the same initial training 
and perhaps a specific type of training relating to the matters for which she was 
disqualified. Given that this custom training would be targeted at a much smaller 
demographic and that matters leading to disqualification are largely centred around 
similar themes, it would surely be workable for providers to cater for this. Moreover, it 
would be incredibly valuable given that it would deal directly with the problem 
behaviour.763 
Education post-failure 
6.42 There is some merit in the argument that educating directors post-failure may 
be an optimum middle ground. It has the advantage of dealing with those that have a 
proven track record of failure, but does not disadvantage the general population of 
directors (some of whom might never fall foul of the law) by requiring training across 
the board. However, this author would resist such arguments again on the grounds that 
it does little to improve the situation for unsecured creditors in the short-term. The 
NAO’s finding that a director is most likely to face her second failure within five 
years,764 means there is likely some appetite for this approach. However, there is no 
current data as to how many directors post-failure (but without being disqualified) re-
enter the market. Moreover, one needs to look at the general tax/accountancy defaults 
as being the reason for most disqualifications. It cannot be said with any certainty that 
a similar proportion of actual failures are a result of such matters. But, if they are, then 
they surely ought to be taught and understood from day one; there seems little point in 
                                                 
763 However, such an implementation still suffers with the difficulty of relatively low numbers of 
market re-entry. 
764 NAO Follow-Up Report (n 15) paras 19-21. 
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attempting to remedy poor accounting and management practices after the event, once 
bad habits have been formed. As with training post-disqualification, however, there is 
considerable merit in suggesting that directors should have to re-take the original 
competency test post-failure as part of a rehabilitative process. 
Education on appointment 
6.43 Driving has been used throughout this chapter as a means of comparison. It is 
well known that drivers are subject to a multitude of education and training 
requirements.765 This is because driving is a serious responsibility. Government 
recognises the need to train drivers in part because, at one end of the spectrum, reckless 
or dangerous driving can cause death. Initially, a series of competency tests must be 
passed to obtain a licence, at which point the holder can drive in accordance with that 
licence, subject to road traffic law. Directors too command significant (and increasing) 
responsibilities. But, as discussed, most directors undertake no training whatsoever. It 
does not seem radical to suggest that directors ought to undergo some form of training 
as a pre-requisite to appointment. In the case of drivers, the rationale is to create a 
baseline standard of drivers, ultimately to prevent loss of life. In the case of directors, 
the public interest element is in reducing misconduct, levels of corporate collapse, and 
ultimately protecting creditors. Training also increases awareness of sanctions, and 
therefore acts as a deterrent. It is argued that, due to the concerns expressed previously, 
a system of training which is simply reactive is insufficient to achieve this aim. Testing 
competency on appointment is the only means of ensuring that all of the associated 
benefits of training are realised. Given that a considerable proportion of enforcement 
                                                 
765 See for example the Government webpages on current training requirements, Gov.UK ‘Learning 
to Drive’ <http://bit.ly/2s23fKa> accessed 1 June 2017. 
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action is taken against directors who could likely be rehabilitated, it is simply 
insufficient for Government to adopt a ‘sink or swim’ type attitude.766 Directors who get 
it wrong should be disqualified, but then they should be helped in their rehabilitation 
efforts so that they can try again. This is, in fact, not only economically desirable but it 
is an extension of UK rescue culture. Obviously, this is the most pervasive option and 
therefore the most difficult to orchestrate successfully. However, it is suggested, firstly, 
that the potential benefits make it a worthwhile endeavour. Furthermore, any partial 
implementation is simply unlikely to be effective for the reasons set out. In short, it 
would be a waste of time and money. 
6.44 A wider concern in this respect arises as to whether directors already appointed 
would be required to undertake training. Whilst this is the optimal approach, it is 
recognised that it may not be workable in reality.767 As such, this author suggests that 
existing directors would not be required to undertake training, however, given that it 
would apply for all new appointments, should that individual wish to become a director 
of a second (or greater) company then the training would be mandated before that 
appointment could be confirmed. This has the effect of balancing the impact on existing 
directors but ensuring that, over a period of time, the baseline minimum standard is 
achieved and unaccredited directors are phased out. 
Continuing educational requirements 
6.45 Some Consultees went as far as to suggest that directors ought to have 
continuing educational requirements, either on an annual basis or some other period. 
                                                 
766 An argument also made in Freedman and Godwin (n 281) 233. 
767 Presumably it would be implemented so that on an appointed day all unqualified directors ceased 
to hold office. Given how pervasive such changes would be, there is great potential for calamity in 
such an approach.  
Director Liability in Insolvent Companies 
 
 264 
This is a very similar idea to Continuing Professional Development, as required by 
many professional regulators. Usually, activities will include workshops, seminars or 
other educational events to ensure professionals are aware of the latest developments in 
their field. Whilst the author does not disagree with this idea in principle, one has to be 
realistic. It seems likely that the continuing costs of training for small company owner-
managers would prove too much. It is therefore argued that this would be one step too 
far. However, there should instead be an onus on DBEIS, CH, IS and other relevant 
Government bodies to periodically distribute plain English leaflets (whether in 
electronic form or otherwise) to all directors setting out new developments in the law, 
or changes in practice. This is already done to some extent at present. However, 
distribution needs to be more widespread. Moreover, directors may struggle to 
understand new developments if they don’t have any existing knowledge to build upon. 
Implementing a minimum baseline standard ought to rectify this issue to some degree.  
CONCLUSION 
6.46 In summary, then, the problems associated with permitting more or less totally 
unrestricted access to limited liability cannot be overstated. As has been shown 
throughout this thesis and intimated in this chapter, much of the burden in relation to 
this falls at the feet of the small, undercapitalised, owner-managed company. The author 
has identified that some of the problems can be attributed to the utilisation of solely ex 
post facto enforcement mechanisms. In response, the Government needs to be more 
proactive in its efforts. Several means of doing so have been analysed, many of which 
have been ultimately discredited. However, one particular method targeted at the 
individual director – education on pre-appointment basis – is largely an unexplored 
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landscape. Whilst it gained some traction in numerous responses to the Consultation, it 
was ultimately rejected without much consideration or published analysis. This is a 
missed opportunity. Imagine a person, equipped with a scalpel, permitted to operate 
without satisfactory qualifications or experience; or the motorist allowed free reign of 
the road system without passing a competency test. A system that would seek to 
condemn these hypothetical individuals following a transgression seems implausible, 
but this is precisely the system within which directors find themselves. Government 
instead takes the extreme stance of ensuring the promotion of industry by freely offering 
limited liability at any cost, and sees education as a stumbling block in this endeavour. 
It is argued that this should be revisited, as mandatory training has the potential to bring 
about considerable cultural change. Most importantly, this shift ought to be an effective 
force in reducing misconduct. As such, the reduced reliance on ex post mechanisms 
should serve to rebalance the economic factors as to the cost of misconduct and the 
benefits derived from entrepreneurship. There can be no better recourse for protecting 








7.1 It must be remembered that the starting point is that the regulatory mechanisms 
discussed throughout this thesis, whether public or private, are designed to curtail to the 
negative implications of the abuse of limited liability. This need arises due to the 
inevitable moral hazards created by such unfettered and uninhibited access to the 
corporate form, as is the current position in UK enterprise policy. As has been 
demonstrated, this moral hazard is particularly noticeable in the owner-manager context 
and, indeed, although not necessarily causative, it is that demographic that suffers the 
vast majority of enforcement action. The operation of the current regulatory regime is 
such that it purports to provide a means of compensatory redress, primarily for the 
benefit of creditors, against those who ‘misbehave’. In the case of disqualification, the 
state goes further and, by way of direct intervention, bars a delinquent individual from 
future directorial activity for a fixed period. The purpose of this thesis has, inter alia, 
been to assess the effectiveness of both public and private regulatory mechanisms in 
dealing with rogue directors of insolvent companies, with a special focus on improper 
trading and disqualification. The author has done so first by setting out the statutory 
basis and objectives for those mechanisms. These objectives in turn provided a platform 




outlook has not been particularly favourable. Indeed, the author has no trouble in 
concluding that each of the individual mechanisms discussed suffers its own 
considerable difficulties. 
7.2 With that in mind, the author also went on to consider the impact of the SBEEA 
2015 in this area. It is without doubt the most significant piece of legislation in the field 
of director liability since the inception of the IA 1986, perhaps with the sole exception 
being the introduction of undertakings pursuant to the IA 2000. The author was in part 
fortunate of it receiving Royal Assent during the process of researching and writing this 
thesis, though in other ways it has simply brought further uncertainties as to what the 
future holds in this area. As the reader will now be intimately aware, the author has thus 
sought to assess the potential implications of the Act upon the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, a substantial amount of time has been devoted to the 
subject. The author considered the implications of assignment upon the private 
enforcement regime in a discrete chapter, Chapter 5. Chapter 4 saw analysis of the 
extension of the locus standi of the improper trading liability provisions to 
administrators. And Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with, alongside some more minor matters, 
perhaps the most radical of them all: the implications of compensation orders and 
undertakings for the disqualification regime. In summary, whilst many of the changes 
are to be welcomed in principle, the author is truly sceptical of the potential impact of 
them at improving effectiveness overall.  
7.3 For instance, the new ability of administrators being able to bring improper 
trading claims is most certainty a step forward. In fact, the author is of the view it is 
something so obvious that it ought to have been in place from the inception of the IA 
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1986, as was recommended by the Cork Committee. The law catching up with practice 
in this way will inevitably reduce costs and save time in circumstances where previously 
the administration would have been converted to a liquidation. This may have a 
marginal impact upon returns for creditors. It is, however, unlikely to increase the 
number of cases for the very reason that where an officeholder deemed proceedings to 
be desirable steps would have been taken so as to convert the administration, 
notwithstanding the additional cost and time involved in doing so.  
7.4 In the case of the assignment of actions, the author has expressed a more 
troubled viewpoint. It has been argued in this thesis that giving officeholders the ability 
to assign claims was quite simply based upon the false premise that there is a funding 
crises in respect of commencing IA 1986 actions, in spite of the fact that no real 
empirical evidence to that effect has been presented. Whilst it is true that the LASPOA 
2012 reforms have almost certainly been a blow to officeholders who might have 
previously been reliant upon the recovery of CFA uplifts and ATE premiums, there is 
no evidence empirical or otherwise to suggest an endemic funding crisis. Thus, in 
purporting to solve a problem that does not necessarily exist, the potential impact of the 
assignment provisions are muted. It has been gingerly suggested within this thesis that 
although assignment may come to outstrip the use of CFA/ATE agreements as the ‘go 
to’ means of commencing IA 1986 actions, it is unlikely to increase the overall number 
brought nor significantly enhance returns for creditors (except perhaps in cases at the 
lower end of the spectrum). This is predominantly due to the significant substantive 
legal hurdles, and issues of impecuniosity, faced by applicants neither of which 




risk of creating a potential for a surge in nuisance or vexatious claims against directors. 
Many of whom could easily be pressured into early settlement, augmented by their own 
precarious financial positions, by companies the author terms ‘insolvency trolls’ on 
dubious grounds.  
7.5 The potential harnessed within the compensation provisions are game-changing 
for creditors; at least on paper. However, as has been demonstrated, given the issues of 
director impecuniosity on the one hand, and the IS’s self-imposed policy of ‘cherry 
picking’ particular cases to pursue for compensation on the other, the number of 
candidate directors will likely be very small indeed. Even smaller will be the number of 
successful cases. Therefore, ultimately, the author concludes that the provisions are 
unlikely to benefit creditors as considerably as the state has suggested. But, again, this 
approach comes at the expense of an increased scope for the oppression of directors by 
the SS. The author also has been highly critical of what appears to be currently a rather 
haphazard approach to dealing with circumstances in which compensation in the 
disqualification context and the improper trading mechanisms collide. If not properly 
managed, the not insignificant issues of double recovery and wasted litigation costs and 
time, as a result of simultaneous actions, might begin to rear their heads. Put simply, 
the compensation provisions strike the author as being a useful political tool – the 
successes will no doubt be few; but they will nonetheless be wheeled out by politicians 
at any opportunity as an indication of an overall effective regime. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.6 One thing that struck the author in the process of writing this thesis is quite how 
little empirical research had been conducted in the area of director liability generally. 
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The present author has attempted to fill that lacuna in a modest way in the course of this 
thesis, notably in Chapter 3. Though, inevitably both financial and time constraints have 
had implications for what research could reasonably be carried out. Aside from the 
official disqualification statistics, and those collected by the state (and therefore 
obtainable pursuant to the FOIA 2000) staggeringly, and largely without exception, the 
empirical work in this field has been the work of comrades Hicks (historically) and 
Williams (more recently). Even in the recent Transparency and Trust consultation, the 
empirical justifications for a number of the SBEEA 2015 reforms are left entirely 
unclear. One of the difficulties that the author has identified, which in turn creates a 
danger, is that erroneous or outdated findings create a folklore in the insolvency 
community which, in turn, drives policy reform – perhaps in the wrong direction. To 
give but two examples, the author notes that the supposed funding difficulties with 
wrongful and fraudulent trading are still being ascribed to Hicks’ now outdated study, 
which was limited in its sample size in any event. Moreover, the very creation of 
wrongful trading as a mechanism, and the expectations of academics and practitioners 
alike as to its performance, have been argued in this thesis to be based upon unproven 
and unevidenced assumptions (empirically or at all) by commentators. Indeed, this 
author has (albeit consciously) fallen into that very trap though, where possible, has 
sought to modernise the findings. It is hoped that in raising the matter at this juncture 
caution might be adopted in future by those that follow. 
7.7 However, the real point to be made here is quite simply that more empirical 
analysis in this field is needed in order that policy can be shaped more accurately going 




consequences of limiting access to limited liability for owner managers is needed. 
Following that, more work needs to be done in relation to how best to do so, if it is 
deemed economically desirable. In the course of this thesis, in Chapter 6, the author has 
suggested that a system of education and training is one credible way forward. But, in 
truth, the merits of that approach cannot be stated with any certainty until more is known 
about the economic factors at play. Moreover, in a similar format to Hicks’ study, a 
widespread survey of directors who have suffered enforcement action would be 
welcomed in this area, so that – if the regime is to be maintained in its current form – 
any impurities can be examined and eradicated. The prime opportunity for these 
investigations by the state, i.e. prior to the introduction of the SBEEA 2015, has 
unfortunately now come and gone. Given the political, economic, and legal 
uncertainties of modern times, following the UK’s decision to depart the European 
Union – and the hierarchy of priorities that results from that – the chances of their being 
sufficient Parliamentary will to revisit this area in the short to medium term is, however, 
slim.  
FINAL REMARKS 
7.8 Given their nature as being ex post facto the enforcement mechanisms discussed 
herein will, by definition, be condemned to at least partial failure. This must be accepted 
as a truism. That is to say nothing of the other procedural and substantive legal 
difficulties that have been subject to analysis in this thesis. But, the approach of the 
state, it must be said, is fundamentally misdirected. At present, the policy focus remains 
firmly fixed in tempering the symptom and not the ultimate cause: uncontrolled access 
to limited liability. Of course, the state may do so rationally should it be shown that the 
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economic benefits of the current position outweigh the cost of abuse. Yet, as has been 
expressed, the author is unaware of any evidence to support that proposition – 
particularly in the case of the owner-manager. Indeed, the approach of the state, 
evidenced by the passage of the SBEEA 2015, in continually increasing the scope of 
its regulatory machine might suggest that the inverse is true. Nonetheless, the state 
seems content to plough ahead with a regulatory regime of dubious efficacy, and with 
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